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ABSTRACT 
 
Truman, Congress and the Struggle for War and Peace in Korea.  (May 2008) 
 
Larry Wayne Blomstedt, B.S., Texas State University; 
 
M.S., Texas A&M University-Kingsville 
 
Chair of Advisory Committee:  Dr. Terry H. Anderson 
 
 
 
 
This dissertation analyzes the roles of the Harry Truman administration and 
Congress in directing American policy regarding the Korean conflict.  Using evidence 
from primary sources such as Truman’s presidential papers, communications of White 
House staffers, and correspondence from State Department operatives and key 
congressional figures, this study suggests that the legislative branch had an important 
role in Korean policy.  Congress sometimes affected the war by what it did and, at other 
times, by what it did not do. 
Several themes are addressed in this project.  One is how Truman and the 
congressional Democrats failed each other during the war.  The president did not 
dedicate adequate attention to congressional relations early in his term, and was slow to 
react to charges of corruption within his administration, weakening his party politically.  
For their part, the Democrats gave HST poor advice concerning congressional 
involvement in the decision to take the nation to war.  A number of them allowed their 
personal dislike for Secretary of State Dean Acheson to poison their support for the 
administration whenever U.S. fortunes in the war soured.  Another issue was Truman’s 
interpretation and use of the concept of bipartisanship in foreign policy.  HST generally 
 iv
manipulated the idea for political advantage.  Ironically, had he listened to the counsel of 
an administration Republican early in the war, Truman could have mitigated the 
explosion over the firing of General Douglas MacArthur.  A topic heretofore overlooked 
by historians concerns congressional peace initiatives proposed during the first half of 
the war.  Analysis of the effectiveness of these resolutions, particularly during the 
heyday of McCarthyism, yields surprising conclusions.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The United Nations Security Council held a meeting and passed on the 
situation and asked the members to go to the relief of the Korean 
Republic.  It was unlawfully attacked by a bunch of bandits. . . .  And the 
members of the United Nations are going to the relief of the Korean 
Republic to suppress a bandit raid on the Republic of Korea.- President 
Harry S Truman, press conference on June 29, 1950. 
 
The Korean War stormed upon the world scene on June 24, 1950 when Premier 
Kim Il Sung launched a massive invasion by North Korea into its southern counterpart, 
hoping to unite the peninsula under his leadership.  Neither the administration of 
President Harry S Truman nor the members of the 81st Congress could have known that 
their response to this attack would mark a monumental shift in how the U.S. government 
commits the nation to war.   Believing that communist expansion into South Korea was a 
threat to American national security, Truman and Congress responded swiftly with 
military intervention.  When China entered the war, however, HST and many American 
legislators became concerned that the regional conflict would escalate into a world war 
that they, wisely, were unwilling to wage.  Instead, the Korean intervention introduced 
the American public to the concept of limited war, which contrasted sharply with the 
unconditional surrenders obtained in World War II.  This conflict changed the roles of 
the president and Congress when committing the nation to major overseas military 
interventions, as chief executives dispensed with obtaining congressional declarations of 
war, changes that the nation later witnessed in Vietnam, the Persian Gulf, and Iraq. 
____________ 
This dissertation follows the style of Diplomatic History. 
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The war in Korea unfolded quickly.  News of the attack reached Truman, and 
within three days he had dispatched air and naval support to South Korea, inspiring 
House members to rise and cheer the decision.  In addition, he obtained a commitment 
from the United Nations (U.N.) to give military support to South Korea.    On June 28, 
Congress overwhelmingly approved the commander in chief’s order to extend the draft 
for one year and to call up reservists in all service branches, bolstering the manpower of 
an American military that had dwindled from 12.3 million at the end of World War II to 
1.4 million, producing a force of 3.2 million some 15 months later.  After meeting with 
key members of Congress two days later, Truman issued a statement approving Air 
Force missions over North Korea.  It concluded:  “General MacArthur has been 
authorized to use certain supporting ground units.”  In just one week, the United States 
had committed air and ground forces to a significant military intervention overseas 
without a declaration of war from Congress.  When Secretary of the Army Frank Pace 
asked the president about obtaining a declaration, Truman replied, “Frank, it’s not 
necessary.  They are all with me.”  For the moment, he was right.1 
Despite the U.N. intervention led by U.S. forces, Il Sung nearly achieved his goal 
during the summer of 1950.  Dismayed by the speed of the North Korean advance, 
Lieutenant General Walton Walker, commander of U.N. ground forces, issued a “stand 
or die” order on July 29.  The U.N. troops did just that, and by August 15 they and South 
Korean forces had secured a small area encircling the southeastern port city of Pusan.  
                                                 
1 Truman’s statement in Public Papers of Presidents of the United States:  Harry Truman, 1950 (Washington:  U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1965), 513; Truman to Pace in Robert H. Ferrell, Harry S Truman:  A Life (Columbia, 
MO:  University of Missouri Press, 1994), 324. 
 
 3
There, they managed to hold the line until U.N. Commander General Douglas 
MacArthur launched a daring counterattack at Inchon on September 15, some 150 miles 
behind enemy lines on the western edge of the peninsula.  MacArthur himself 
underscored the risk of this maneuver, calling it a 5,000 to 1 shot.  The general’s gamble 
paid off, for the Inchon attack swung the momentum to the U.N., whose troops quickly 
took the offensive and reestablished control of South Korea.  Admiral William Halsey 
wired MacArthur: “The Inchon landing is the most masterly and audacious strategic 
stroke in all history.”2   
Riding the impetus from Inchon, on October 7 the U.N. General Assembly 
approved a measure allowing the military coalition to take “all appropriate steps . . . to 
ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea,” carrying the battle north of the 38th 
parallel, the original line dividing the peninsula. The purpose of this change was to be 
“the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Government in the 
sovereign State of Korea.”  Although the U.N. had made reunification of Korea an 
objective in 1947, this resolution was a significant departure from its initial statement at 
the war’s outset, which only called upon North Korea to withdraw its forces northward 
to the 38th parallel.  Tom Connally (D-TX), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, later stated, “I don’t recall that any of us reminded the President that his 
objective had been only to liberate the Republic of South Korea.”  When the U.N. forces 
surged into the North, Communist China entered the war, perceiving the American 
                                                 
2 “Five thousand to one shot” in David McCullough, Truman (New York:  Simon and Schuster, 1992), 797; Halsey 
quoted in Burton Ira Kaufman, The Korean War:  Challenges in Crisis, Credibility and Command (New York:  
McGraw-Hill Companies, 1997), 54. 
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advance as a threat to its security.  By late October, China had halted the U.N. offensive 
and then appeared to withdraw from the conflict.  A month later, MacArthur initiated 
another offensive into North Korea, predicting he would have the troops home by 
Christmas.  This was not to be.  On November 25, some 250,000 Chinese troops 
overwhelmed MacArthur, forcing what one historian called the “longest retreat of 
American military history,” a withdrawal lasting over two months.  In raging winter 
winds and temperatures dipping to -25oF, automatic weapons and vehicle gearboxes 
froze, forcing the retreating troops to mix kerosene with lube oil to keep their equipment 
functional.  Grimly, the U.N. commander wired Washington:  “We face an entirely new 
war.”  How to fight this “new” war became the great question of the hour.3   
The Chinese invasion produced hysteria in the American public and Congress.  
Believing World War III was imminent, Americans participated in civil defense drills, 
built bomb shelters, and read booklets on how to survive nuclear attacks.  Senator 
Dennis Chavez (D-NM) advocated raising an international mercenary army of 20 million 
soldiers to retaliate, while Senator Owen Brewster (R-ME) and Rep. Mendel Rivers (D-
SC) advocated nuclear attacks on the Chinese, reasoning that what had worked against 
Japan in 1945 would be effective in China.  Republican legislators looked for scapegoats 
and quickly found one in Secretary of State Dean Acheson.  In December 1950, the 
                                                 
3 “Resolution 376 (V), Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, October 7, 1950,” FRUS, 1950, Volume 
VII, Korea (Washington:  U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), 904; Connally quoted in Alfred Steinberg, Sam 
Rayburn: A Biography (New York:  Hawthorn Books, Inc., 1975), 263; Longest withdrawal in Gary R. Hess, 
Presidential Decisions for War:  Korea, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf (Baltimore:  The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2001), 63; Conditions of retreat in McCullough, 818 and Brian Catchpole, The Korean War, 1950-53 (New 
York:  Carroll and Graf Publishers, 2000), 159-60; MacArthur quoted in Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. 
Army, American Military History, “The Korean War, 1950-1953,” p. 560, http://www.army.mil/cmh-
pg/books/AMH/AMH-25.htm, (November 2, 2005). (Emphasis added.) 
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Republican Conferences in both the House and Senate submitted resolutions to oust the 
secretary, while House Minority Leader Joe Martin introduced a bill to cut off 
Acheson’s salary.4    
With China’s entry into the conflict, sharp and public disagreements over war 
strategy emerged between Truman and his military commander.  A few days after 
General MacArthur received word from the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Truman 
administration was planning a peace proposal for the Chinese, he sabotaged it.  On 
March 24, 1951, the general publicly mocked China’s military and industrial abilities, 
then issued an ultimatum, saying failure to withdraw would “doom Red China to the risk 
of imminent military collapse” from a U.N. attack.  Furious with MacArthur’s blatant 
attempt to usurp the administration’s foreign policy, HST relieved him of his command 
on April 11, 1951, triggering public outrage.  Evangelist Billy Graham declared, 
“Christianity has suffered another major blow.”  Angry citizens hung the president in 
effigy throughout the nation, and the Chicago Tribune called him “a fool who is 
surrounded by knaves.”  The deposed commander returned to an unparalleled hero’s 
welcome, highlighted by a parade in New York City attended by over seven million 
people, twice as many as for Dwight Eisenhower’s victorious return from World War II.  
After the general addressed both houses of Congress, Rep. Dewey Short (R-MO) 
declared, “We heard God speak here today, God in the flesh, the voice of God.”  Short’s 
                                                 
4 Chavez in James Richard Riggs, “Congress and the Conduct of the Korean War” (Ph.D. diss., Purdue University, 
1972), 139; Brewster and Rivers in Rosemary Foot, The Wrong War (Ithaca, NY:  Cornell University Press, 1985), 
115; Acheson’s ouster in, “Memo, L. D. to Murphy 12/15/50-4:15 p.m.,” State, Dept. of folder; Charles Murphy 
Papers, HSTL; Martin’s bill in Thomas Connally, My Name is Tom Connally (New York:  Thomas Y. Crowell 
Company, 1954), 353. 
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“God,” however, soon lost his aura of infallibility when the Joint Chiefs of Staff sided 
with the president in subsequent congressional hearings.  The war then settled into a 
series of ebbs and flows, with neither side having the will nor the resources to drive the 
other from the Korean peninsula.  This stalemate, however, prodded both sides to the 
negotiating table to find a way to end the fighting.5   
The U.S. and its communist adversaries began to publicly discuss possibilities for 
peace during the spring of 1951.  In mid-May, a cease-fire proposal by a U.S. senator 
drew significant attention from the Soviet news agency Pravda.  By the first week of 
June, the U.N. proposed allowing Korea to remain divided at the 38th parallel instead of 
unifying the peninsula, a suggestion swiftly endorsed by the Truman administration.  On 
June 22, a Voice of America radio broadcast challenged Jacob Malik, the Soviet 
ambassador to the U.N., to end the war.  Malik responded with his own radio address 
aired in the U.S. suggesting that the conflict could be resolved and that armistice talks 
should begin.  Hopes for peace rose as negotiations to end the war began at Kaesong, 
North Korea on July 10, 1951, approximately a year after the fighting erupted.6 
The armistice negotiations dragged on for two long years.  It took the negotiators 
16 days to simply agree on an agenda for the talks, an omen of things to come.  
Ultimately, the fate of prisoners of war (POWs) became the major obstacle to peace.  
Truman believed it would be morally wrong for the U.N. to forcibly return North Korean 
                                                 
5 MacArthur quoted in Kaufman, 98; Graham quoted in Stephen Whitfield, The Culture of the Cold War (Baltimore:  
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 60; “Impeach Truman,” Chicago Tribune, 12 April 1951, p. 1; Short quoted in 
David Rees, Korea:  The Limited War (New York:  St. Martin’s Press, 1964), 227. 
 
6 Cease-fire proposal came from Senator Edwin Johnson as noted in FRUS, 1951, Vol. VII, Korea and China, 445-6. 
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or Chinese POWs who wanted to defect from their communist countries.  The 
Communist regimes, however, vehemently insisted on the repatriation of all POWs, 
regardless of whether they wanted to come home or not.  In the meantime, military 
commanders waged a bloody war of attrition.  Instead of attempting to conquer and hold 
more and more territory, both sides attempted to put pressure on the other at the 
armistice table by killing as many enemy soldiers as possible.  During last two months of 
the war, some 100,000 Communist soldiers and almost 53,000 U.N. combatants would 
be killed, captured, or wounded, a grim testament to the strategy of attrition. Half of the 
casualties of the Korean War occurred after the peace talks began.7   
Unsurprisingly, the war significantly affected the 1952 presidential election.  
Truman decided not to run for another term, a decision undoubtedly driven by his 
popularity sinking to a low of 23 percent as the peace process stalemated.  The 
Democrats nominated a reluctant Illinois governor, Adlai Stevenson, while the 
Republicans chose World War II hero Eisenhower.  While he admitted having no 
magical formula for ending the war, Ike captured the hope of the nation with a campaign 
promise to visit Korea to find a way to stop the bloodshed.  His promise worked, 
propelling him to a landslide victory.  Eisenhower made good on his vow to visit the 
warfront.  More importantly, on July 26, 1953, some seven months after taking office, 
the new president announced that the Korean War was over.  The conditions for the 
armistice, ironically, were virtually identical to those established during the Truman 
administration.  Senator Paul H. Douglas (D-IL) suggested that if the armistice “had 
                                                 
7 “The Korean War:  Years of Stalemate,” U.S. Army Center of Military History, 34.   http://www.army.mil/cmh-
pg/brochures/kw-stale/stale.htm., (November 2, 2005). 
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been put through by Truman and Acheson there would have been cries throughout the 
country to impeach them.”8    
The result of the Korean War, unlike World War II, was not a clear-cut victory 
for the United States.  The U.N. did deny Kim Il Sung’s bid to bring South Korea under 
communist rule.  However, because South Korea refused to sign the armistice, the war 
did not resolve the political strife that precipitated the conflict.  Testaments to this very 
uneasy peace are the nearly two million troops currently maintaining the 2.5 by 155 mile 
demilitarized zone between the Koreas.  Little changed in terms of national boundaries.  
The negotiators slightly redrew the dividing line between the Koreas close to the pre-war 
boundary of the 38th parallel.  South Korea gained 2,350 square miles of territory, while 
North Korea gained 850 square miles of land south of the parallel.  America incurred 
enormous costs for its part in this intervention:  33,629 dead, 103,284 wounded, 5,178 
missing or captured and $153 billion of national wealth in today’s dollars.  For this 
reason, the Korean conflict is worth remembering and studying in hopes of learning 
from its mistakes.9   
Veterans of the Korean War dubbed it “The Forgotten War” because it receded 
from the American public’s attention during the prolonged peace negotiations.  Yet, it is 
historically crucial.  Korea began a trend of American presidents committing significant 
troop deployments overseas without obtaining a declaration of war from Congress.  This 
                                                 
8 Truman’s popularity figures in Maeva Marcus, Truman and the Steel Seizure Case (New York:  Columbia 
University Press, 1973), 34; “Senator Douglas Doubtful,” NYT, 24 July 1953, p. 2. 
 
9Territorial changes and financial costs in Eric Goldman, The Crucial Decade and After:  America, 1945-1960 (New 
York:  Vintage Books, 1962), 246-7; Casualty figures from  American Military History, “The Korean War, 1950-
1953,” p. 570, http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/AMH/AMH-25.htm (November 2, 2005). 
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brings up a critical constitutional issue:  Should a president have the authority to involve 
the U.S. in a major conflict?  Did Truman seize this power, or did Congress abdicate it to 
him?  Congressional peace proposals during the war, overlooked by historians until now, 
raise an important question that is still relevant today:  Can Congress help the U.S. 
conduct effective international diplomacy, or is this best left to the executive?   The war 
also ushered the American public into an age of limited foreign wars.  Since Korea 
probably drove Truman from office, an analysis of his efforts to sell the war is 
worthwhile.  Did the president simply do an ineffective job in rallying the nation to the 
Korean intervention, or did other things cause the decline in public support for a war in 
which unconditional surrender of the enemy was not an objective?  Another relevant 
facet was the role of domestic politics, which is in the spotlight today over the Iraq war.  
How well did HST unite Congress behind the Korean cause?   Did the Democrats help 
or hinder his efforts?  What role did the opposition Republicans play in the conduct of 
the fighting?  Did Truman believe in bipartisanship in the area of foreign policy, and 
how did he try to woo GOP support?     
Several important books touch on national domestic politics during the Korean 
conflict.  Of the Truman biographers addressing the commitment of troops to Korea, 
Robert J. Donovan gives the most detailed account in Tumultuous Years:  The 
Presidency of Harry Truman, 1949-1953 (1982).  James L. Sundquist also covers this 
decision, placing it into historical perspective in The Decline and Resurgence of 
Congress (1981).  Ronald J. Caridi’s The Korean War and American Politics:  The 
Republican Party as a Case Study (1969) dissects GOP factionalism and concludes that 
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key party leaders cynically chose to exploit the war for political gain, crippling 
Truman’s efforts to unite the country.  Historians have devoted little study to Congress’s 
role in facilitating the armistice talks.  Although Rosemary Foot touches on this briefly 
in A Substitute for Victory:  The Politics of Peacemaking at the Korean Armistice Talks 
(1990), she dedicates most of the book to the effect of politics on the negotiations once 
they began.  Concerning HST’s salesmanship of the war, Halford R. Ryan’s Harry S. 
Truman:  Presidential Rhetoric (1993), The Truman Persuasions by Robert Underhill 
(1981) and a Ph.D. dissertation by Michael S. Twedt, “The War Rhetoric of Harry S. 
Truman During the Korean Conflict” (1969) analyze the effects of his speechmaking.  
The only study dedicated to the president’s relationship with his own party is Sean 
Savage’s Truman and the Democratic Party (1997), which concentrates on Truman’s 
role as party leader in electoral politics.  Kari Frederickson’s The Dixiecrat Revolt and 
the End of the Solid South, 1932-1968 (2001) is an excellent study that includes 
Truman’s struggles with the Southern Democrats.  Information on the Democrats during 
the war is also available in The Democrats:  The Years after FDR by Herbert Parmet 
(1976) and in Alonzo Hamby’s comprehensive political biography, Man of the People:  
A Life of Harry S. Truman (1995).  The most thorough examination of efforts to 
maintain a bipartisan foreign policy during the war is The Collapse of the Middle Way:  
Senate Republicans and the Bipartisan Foreign Policy, 1948-52 (1988) by David R. 
Kepley. 
This study provides new interpretations of events researched by other historians.  
Concerning the commitment of troops to Korea, Donovan blames HST for skirting 
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congressional approval beforehand.  Sundquist, on the other hand, faults Congress for 
abdicating its responsibility to declare war.  I, more specifically, argue that the 
congressional Democrats are to blame for the lack of a proactive endorsement of troop 
commitments by the Congress.  Truman’s attempt to maintain a bipartisan foreign policy 
needs to be examined in a new light as well.  While David Kepley’s research is an 
important study of the Republicans on this topic, I will dissect bipartisanship from the 
perspective of Truman and his fellow Democrats.  Keply correctly asserts that the 
president’s inclusion of the Republicans in the formation of his foreign policy left much 
to be desired.  I, however, will explain why.  My analysis will also show how Truman’s 
desire to maintain bipartisan harmony led him to a regrettable decision at the war’s 
outset which, ironically, could have been averted by heeding the advice of one of his 
token GOP advisors.   
In addition to these original interpretations, this study explores fresh topics 
previously neglected by historians.  While Caridi examines how the Republican Party 
undermined national unity behind the war effort, I will be the first to analyze the role of 
the Democrats in detail, as well as how Truman affected harmony within his party.  
Another topic previously not studied in depth is the behavior of congressional 
Democrats regarding the decision to go to war and how this factored into the president’s 
choices.  Concerning HST’s efforts to sell the war, I will go beyond the studies of his 
rhetoric to include other ways that his administration sought to communicate his 
international aims to the public.  Finally, no historian has examined Congress’s role in 
getting the belligerents together at the negotiating table.  Following MacArthur’s 
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destruction of Truman’s planned peace offer, several senators proposed ways to end the 
war.  This study discusses them all, ranging from the bizarre to the surprisingly helpful. 
This dissertation will explain how Harry Truman attempted to build and maintain 
support among congressional Democrats for his Korean War strategy and related Cold 
War policies.  He had a challenging task, particularly with the Southern wing of his 
party.  Friction with the Dixiecrats stemmed not only from foreign policy, but also from 
what they perceived as an overactive federal government in domestic issues.  The level 
of Democratic Party unity and its effect on Truman’s ability to maintain public support 
for the war is one theme of this study.   
Truman sought support for his war policy from Republicans as well as his own 
party.  Like other presidents before and since, he frequently expressed his belief that 
America had to present a united front to the world in order to be effective in world 
affairs.  This study will reveal how the chief executive pursued bipartisan support and 
why he continued to do so, even after two years of harsh attacks by many Republicans.  
Moreover, it will explore his definition of nonpartisanship, and why many observers 
suggest bipartisanship in foreign affairs died during the war.  Did HST truly believe that 
both parties should dutifully support him, or did he simply use this rhetoric to squelch 
dissent about his conduct of the war? 
Another topic is Truman’s effectiveness as a promoter of a new kind of 
conflict—limited war.  The man from Missouri faced unique challenges to keeping the 
nation behind him, some of which he created by altering the war’s objectives as he went 
along.  This study will evaluate whether he succeeded or not.   
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Other themes of this dissertation are the roles that Congress played in committing 
American troops to Korea and the start of armistice negotiations.  While Truman 
intentionally avoided asking Congress for a declaration of war, does he deserve all the 
blame for starting a trend of American presidents committing the nation to major 
overseas conflicts without congressional approval?  This project will therefore analyze 
the influence of congressional Democrats in the president’s decision to go to war.  
Congress also helped nudge the adversaries to the armistice talks through resolutions by 
both Democrats and Republicans.  Since this occurred during at the zenith of 
McCarthyism, it is worthwhile to ask how lawmakers had the courage to suggest 
stopping the war short of annihilating the Communists.        
The first part of this study tells the hidden history of Truman’s attempts to 
marshal support for the war.  Two chapters deal with the struggles that HST had in 
keeping the Democrats together.  Chapter II traces how disharmony emerged over 
opposition to the Fair Deal in the 1940s and how the emergence of McCarthyism 
affected the 1950 mid-term elections, loosening Truman’s grip on the party.  The next 
chapter, “A Fallen Icon and a Lost Election, 1951-1952,” picks up the story at the firing 
of MacArthur and explains how a combination of the war and corruption charges against 
the administration led to the Democrats losing control of Congress and the White House 
in 1952.  The study then turns to Truman’s dealings with the Republicans.  Chapter IV 
describes the birth of the idea of a bipartisan foreign policy during World War II and 
analyzes the effects of the Tydings Committee hearings on Communist infiltration of the 
State Department.  The decline and death of bipartisanship during 1951-1952 is the 
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subject of chapter V, focusing on the effects of MacArthur’s removal.  Truman’s public 
relations effort is the subject of chapter VI, exploring how the administration sought the 
support of the American people through the various changes in the war, including the 
expansion of the war into the North, the declaration of a national emergency after 
China’s entry, and the subsequent decision to settle for an armistice around the 38th 
parallel. 
The second part of this study describes how Congress affected the processes of 
going to war and deciding to negotiate for peace.  It begins with chapter VII, “Let the 
Chief Take the Heat:  Congress and the Decision to Intervene,” which examines the 
reactions of both parties in Truman’s leap into Korea and analyzes the legalities of the 
intervention, particularly in light of the fact that it was America’s first military action in 
conjunction with the U.N.   The topics of chapter VIII are congressional peace initiatives 
from the war’s outset through early 1952, particularly those made by senators Edwin C. 
Johnson, Brien McMahon, and Ralph Flanders.  One of these, fortunately, gave 
significant impetus to the Kaesong talks.  Less fortunately, by the time the two sides 
stopped fighting, the war had taken a massive toll. In addition to the U.S. losses 
mentioned earlier, South Korea suffered over 800,000 civilian and military casualties.  
On the Communist side, some 3 million North Koreans were injured or killed, and 
152,000 Chinese soldiers perished.10 
Americans grappled with defining the meaning of the war when it finally ended 
in 1953.  Secretary of State John Foster Dulles declared, “For the first time in history an 
                                                 
10 War statistics from Robert L. Beisner, Dean Acheson:  A Life in the Cold War (New York:  Oxford University 
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international organization has stood against an aggressor and has marshaled force to 
meet force.  The aggressor, at first victorious, has been repulsed.”  Yet, a New York 
Times headline read, “Not Victory, Not Defeat:  But Another War, Marked by Shining 
Deeds as Well as Misery, Passes Into History.”  Harry Truman and the Congress had no 
less of a struggle in conducting the war and deciding when the time was right to begin 
the process of ending it.  The pages that follow tell the story of how they met these 
challenges.11 
                                                 
11 White, William S., “Congress Cautious in Korean Comment,” NYT, 28 July 1953, p. 1; Baldwin, Hanson W., “Not 
Victory, Not Defeat:  But Another War, Marked by Shining Deeds as Well as Misery, Passes Into History,” NYT, 28 
July 1953, p. 6. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
A SPORADIC ALLIANCE:  HST AND HIS PARTY, 1946-1950 
 
 “There are liars, trimmers and pussyfooters on both sides of the aisle in the 
Senate and the House,” wrote President Harry S Truman in late 1950.  He had other 
reasons for being in a foul mood.  China’s entry into Korea had transformed the war, 
plunging U.N. forces into a lengthy retreat and raising the specter of another world war.  
The Republicans had just taken seats from the Democrats in both houses of Congress 
during the mid-term elections.  Legislators from both parties were calling for the 
resignation of Truman’s most trusted cabinet member, Secretary of State Dean Acheson. 
Things looked grim for the president.1 
Nevertheless, throughout the Korean War Truman had an apparent advantage 
that presidents crave:  His party controlled both houses of Congress.  When the conflict 
erupted in 1950, the Democrats held majorities of 263-171 in the House and 54-42 in the 
Senate.  These margins narrowed to 235-199 and 49-47 after the November 
congressional elections, reflecting typical losses by the president’s party at mid-term.  
However, these nominal Democratic majorities did HST little good as he led the nation 
into an unexpected and perplexing conflict.  Although the Democrats united against 
Senator Joseph McCarthy’s initial bombshells alleging a communist infestation in the 
State Department, their cohesiveness quickly disintegrated.  Criticism of Truman, 
                                                 
 1 Truman diary entry, November 30, 1950; PSF:  Longhand Notes File, November 30, 1950 folder; Truman Papers, 
HSTL. 
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particularly from Southern Democrats, sharpened throughout the remainder of his term, 
crippling his ability to unite the country behind the war effort.  
This chapter will examine why the Democrats failed to stick together.  Was 
Truman’s leadership to blame?  Did fear of McCarthyism overwhelm party loyalty, or 
did Democrats divide over regional agendas?  How did the onset of the Korean conflict 
affect party unity, and what was the effect of China’s entry into the war?   
The answers lie in the environment within the party when the war broke out, 
which began to take shape shortly after Truman took office.  In 1946, racial violence 
directed at Southern blacks erupted in the form of lynchings and police brutality.  To 
Anglos, the Supreme Court’s termination of white primaries, surging African-American 
voter registration, and black World War II veterans denouncing discrimination 
represented threats to the status quo that had to be squashed.  Driven by Jim Crow, many 
black voters left the South and began returning to the party of Lincoln, helping produce a 
Republican landslide in the 1946 congressional elections.  Motivated primarily by 
revulsion at the racial violence, but also realizing the value of the black vote, Truman 
established the President’s Committee on Civil Rights in December.  Shortly thereafter, 
HST declared, “We can no longer afford the luxury of a leisurely attack upon prejudice 
and discrimination.”  In October 1947, the committee recommended federal legislation 
to stop lynchings, to prevent various forms of racial discrimination, and to desegregate 
the armed forces.  The chief executive followed up with an unprecedented speech to 
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Congress dedicated to civil rights in February 1948, strongly endorsing the committee’s 
report.2       
 Harry Truman therefore became public enemy number one in much of the white 
South.  A Mississippi woman wrote the president that he surely would not want his 
daughter to travel by bus across the country sitting next to “a dirty, evil smelling, loud 
mouthed negro man.”  Southerners, who chaired most of the key panels in Congress, 
killed all of the president’s civil rights initiatives in committee.    In the 1948 presidential 
campaign, Southern Democrats vowed to defeat HST and his pursuit of racial equality.  
At the Democratic convention, the entire Mississippi delegation and half of Alabama’s 
stalked out after passage of a civil rights plank in the party platform, and the Southerners 
who remained all supported Georgia senator Richard Russell rather than Truman as the 
party nominee.  Soon afterwards, disgruntled Southerners led by those bolting the 
Democratic convention formed a third party, the States-Rights Democrats, or Dixiecrats.  
Even though the Dixiecrats carried four states and liberals ran Henry Wallace as a 
candidate for the Progressive party, Truman scored the greatest upset in U.S. history, 
defeating the two splinter parties and Republican Thomas Dewey.  Voicing his 
understandably hard feelings toward the Democratic defectors a few days after the 
election, the president told his staff, “I don’t want any fringes in the Democratic party, 
no Wallace-ites or states’righters.”3 
                                                 
2 Kari A. Frederickson, The Dixiecrat Revolt and the End of the Solid South (Chapel Hill:  University of North 
Carolina Press, 2001), 52. 
 
3 Woman quoted in Frederickson, 77; Truman quoted in Robert H. Ferrell, ed., Truman in the White House: The Diary 
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In spite of these remarks, the victor meted out only a measured punishment to the 
Dixiecrats.  While Truman did purge the Democratic National Committee (DNC) of his 
Southern opponents, he allowed them to retain their positions in the congressional 
Democratic Party caucuses and as committee chairs.  Despite failing to boot Truman 
from the White House, the Dixiecrats emerged from the 1948 election as strong as ever.  
Senator Clinton P. Anderson, a strong backer of the administration and chairman of the 
Democratic Campaign Committee, called the Southern bloc the “strongest single force in 
the Senate” from 1949 into the early 1950s.  Though a few Southerners, most notably 
Foreign Relations Committee chairman Tom Connally of Texas, remained strong 
Truman allies on international issues in spite of administration civil rights policies, many 
did not, draining the president of support at the outset of the war.  As one historian 
argued, HST could have saved himself some grief by removing Dixiecrats from their 
congressional positions of power.  Instead, with vindictiveness giving way to the urge to 
unite his party and the nation following the election, the president left them in the 
saddle—which would come back to haunt him.4 
Democratic disharmony prior to the Korean conflict also surfaced when 
Truman’s Secretary of State began to draw fire from Republicans over U.S. policy 
towards China and alleged communist infiltration into the State Department.  Part of 
Dean Acheson’s friction with Congress stemmed from personalities rather than policies.  
                                                 
4Purging of DNC in Sean J. Savage, Truman and the Democratic Party (Lexington, KY:  University Press of 
Kentucky, 1997), 67-8; Clinton P. Anderson with Milton Viorst, Outsider in the Senate:  Senator Clinton Anderson’s 
Memoirs (New York:  The World Publishing Company, 1970), 96; Tom Connally to George H. Crank, August 17, 
1948; Box 104; Tom Connally Papers, MDLOC; Robert S. Ferrell faults Truman for insufficient punishment of the 
Dixiecrats in his Harry S. Truman:  A Life, 291.  
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The secretary believed the legislative branch was a nuisance due to its penchant for 
wasting his department’s time in endless hearings.  Recalling his dealings with Capitol 
Hill, Acheson wrote, “Those who assert that I do not suffer fools gladly . . . do me less 
than justice for these anguishing hours.  Despite current folklore, one could and did learn 
to suffer.”  The secretary turned off many legislators with his aloofness and, of all 
things, his preference for British clothing.  In their eyes, Acheson did not approach 
members of Congress with the deference that they expected, and so he had few 
Democratic allies when the Republican attacks began prior to the war.  Even though 
Truman steadfastly backed his beleaguered secretary, most Democrats increasingly 
distanced themselves from Acheson over time, creating another division within the 
party.5 
The administration’s change of course regarding China policy presented 
challenges to the Democrats.  When the Chinese civil war resumed following World 
War II, the U.S. funneled millions of dollars to Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalists in their 
struggle against the Communists.  Realizing the futility of continued American support 
of the Nationalists, Acheson generated a 1,054-page “white paper” on America’s China 
policy in late July 1949.  The report concluded that popular support for Chiang had 
evaporated, making continued assistance of his regime a waste of American resources.  
The paper advocated termination of aid to the Nationalists and conceding Formosa, a 
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large island off the coast of mainland China, to the Communists.  By October, the 
Communists had driven Chiang’s forces from the mainland to Formosa. 
Although Acheson’s report correctly held that America had limited ability to 
control internal events in China, the Republicans would have none of it, blasting the 
Truman administration for a defeatist attitude that allowed the Communist victory.  
Senator Styles Bridges (R-NH) led the initial attacks, claiming that the State Department 
had plunged to a “new low in governmental integrity and rectitude of high principles.”  
Bridges argued that the U.S. showed inconsistent commitments against the spread of 
communism in different parts of the globe, asking, “Have we manhood in Europe and 
none anywhere else in the world?  Are we men in Europe and mice in Asia?”6 
The complexities of the geopolitics of the day worked against the administration 
and in favor of black and white perceptions such as those articulated by Bridges and his 
allies.  Recalling World War II, which ended in an American victory over the twin evils 
of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and Adolf Hitler, the right wing of the 
Republican Party viewed communism as equally evil and therefore advocated forceful 
opposition to it at all costs anywhere on the globe. 
Acheson disagreed.  In an address to the National Press Club, he pointed out that 
making opposition to communism the top priority of America’s national interests was 
“putting the cart before the horse.”  Although the secretary’s statement was valid, it 
seemed to contradict the Truman Doctrine put forth in 1947, which proclaimed U.S. 
policy was to “support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed 
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minorities or by outside pressure.”  Did the Nationalists therefore merit American 
support, regardless of the ineptness of their leadership?  The secretary implied that in 
some situations, American opposition to communism was in the nation’s interest, while 
in other cases, such as Formosa, it was not necessarily vital to prevent a Communist 
takeover.  Furthermore, Acheson declared that Chiang’s support had “melted away.”  
Even though it was unfathomable to Bridges and company that the Nationalists lost due 
to poor leadership rather than inadequate U.S. assistance, the secretary portrayed the 
situation accurately.  Initially, Senate Democrats agreed.  In a rare show of unity, they 
responded to Bridges’ attack by unanimously endorsing the administration’s decision, 
arguing that continued aid to the Nationalists could draw the U.S. into a war.7 
However, Democratic solidarity behind the secretary of state did not last long.  
After a sensational trial concluding a couple of weeks after the Bridges attack on China 
policy, a jury convicted former State Department official Alger Hiss of lying under oath 
about his connections to the Communist Party.  At a press conference shortly thereafter, 
Acheson declared that despite the verdict, he would not turn his back on Hiss.  Even 
though the secretary clearly was expressing personal loyalty to Hiss rather than political 
policy, his statement produced a firestorm of criticism.  House Republicans Richard 
Nixon (CA) and Minority Whip Les Arends (IL) described Acheson’s response as 
“disgusting” and “an affront to the nation.”  Democrats chimed in.  Rep. James C. Davis 
(GA) asked, “How long can Americans be expected to show respect for Acheson when 
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he hugs to his bosom those who have betrayed their country?”  Senator James Eastland 
(MS) presented a resolution his state’s legislature calling Acheson’s backing of Hiss a 
“dangerous precedent to the security of the nation.”  No Democrats defended the 
secretary, including the president.8 
  In this environment, the administration struggled to explain to the American 
people why the U.S. was powerful enough to stop the Nazis and Japanese in World War 
II, but not the Communist Chinese in 1949.  The answer proposed by the Republican 
senator from Wisconsin, Joseph McCarthy, was:  The U.S. “lost” China because 
Communists like Alger Hiss were running the State Department. 
Shortly after the Communist victory in China, McCarthy launched a series of 
accusations of Communists working for the State Department.  On February 9, 1950 in 
Wheeling, West Virginia, the senator from Wisconsin made his infamous speech in 
which he claimed to have a list of 205 Communist infiltrators.  The next day in Salt Lake 
City, he said he had 57 names.  During a six-hour speech on the floor of the Senate on 
February 20, McCarthy changed his story again, declaring he knew of 81 Communists in 
the department.  This speech quickly became a free-for-all, as a trio of Democratic 
senators repeatedly, but unsuccessfully, tried to pin the Republican down on specific 
charges.  Majority Leader Scott Lucas (IL), Brien McMahon (CT) and Herbert Lehman 
(NY) interrupted McCarthy’s speech 61, 34 and 13 times, respectively, to no avail.  
Despite McCarthy’s changing story, the Senate convened a special committee headed by 
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Millard Tydings (D-MD) that began hearings on March 8 to investigate the charges.  
Tydings appeared to be the perfect choice for leading the investigation, from the 
Democratic perspective.  Respected as an able senator, yet having, in one historian’s 
words, a “political killer instinct,” Tydings detested McCarthy and intended to plow him 
under.  Furthermore, the Maryland senator’s reputation as an ardent anti-communist 
would seem to insulate him from the “soft on communism” charges that McCarthy 
attempted to pin on any political adversary.9        
As the hearings progressed, Senator Bridges announced that the Soviet 
government had planted a “master spy” who was “using our State Department as he 
wills.”  He therefore promised that a group of fellow Republican senators would be 
gunning for Acheson in the weeks ahead.  Few Democrats responded.  During the first 
two and a half weeks of the Tydings hearings, Truman’s party replied to the charges 
with a deafening silence.  Finally, freshman Senator William Benton (CT), a former 
State Department official, stepped forward to defend the secretary, saying of the alleged 
problems in the department, “You certainly do not cure a man’s headache by cutting off 
his head.” Rep. Stephen M. Young (D-OH) called McCarthy a “rabble rouser” and 
declared the State Department employed no subversives.  Senator Warren Magnuson (D-
WA) noted that McCarthy’s charges “probably caused great joy in Russia.”  Despite 
these courageous rejoinders, the problem was they came from congressional 
lightweights.  The only influential Democrat who consistently and publicly backed the 
Truman administration during the Tydings hearings was Senator Tom Connally (TX), 
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chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee.  However, even Connally did not defend 
Acheson on the Senate floor until six weeks into the hearings.10    
The White House and party liberals grew concerned about Democrats’ 
abandonment of Acheson during the Tydings hearings.  Charles Murphy, preparing the 
president for a routine meeting with the “Big 4” congressional leaders (Vice President 
Alben Barkley, House Speaker Sam Rayburn, majority leaders of the Senate and House), 
suggested that Truman ask them “if anyone will defend Acheson in  the Senate.”  At its 
national convention just a few days afterwards, the Americans for Democratic Action 
(ADA), a liberal lobbyist group, said they were “outraged by the reluctance of many 
Democratic Senators and Congressmen to reply to these attacks with the truth which is 
common knowledge to every one of them and which, had it been spoken, would long 
since have disposed of the whole contemptible campaign.”11   
By May 1950, Acheson began to see the light at the end of the tunnel despite the 
relentless Republican attacks during the Tydings hearings.  More Democrats were 
starting to defend him, highlighted by a “performance unparalleled in recent years” on 
the Senate floor by eight senators led by Majority Leader Lucas and Majority Whip 
Francis Myers (PA).  In a well-orchestrated attack, the likes of which veteran Capitol 
Hill aides had never seen, the Democrats pointed out the inconsistencies in McCarthy’s 
accusations and the lack of evidence presented.  At one point, Vice President Barkley 
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ordered Lucas to sit down for calling McCarthy a liar.  Another senator roared that if 
McCarthy’s charges turned out to be unfounded, the Wisconsin senator should be 
“scourged by public opinion from the society of decent men and women.”  Acheson 
therefore wrote an acquaintance there were “evidences that this storm is about over.”  
Unfortunately, just when the skies seemed ready to clear for the secretary, the Korean 
War exploded, precipitating a new wave of Republican criticism.12 
A combination of the Dixiecrat revolt over civil rights, McCarthyism and 
conservatives’ weariness of big government weakened Truman’s influence in Congress 
during the months before the war erupted.  The president, who owed the start of his 
political career to the Pendergast machine organization in Kansas City, believed in party 
loyalty as an act of faith.  As an aide later noted, Truman believed that you either 
supported the party or got out of it, and therefore had little patience for those unfaithful 
to him as the Democrat occupying the White House.  Early in 1950, HST grew 
increasingly wary regarding Democratic support for his legislative programs and 
policies.  For the first time during his presidency, White House aides prepared voting 
record summaries of the 81st Congress to gauge support for presidential programs.  The 
State Department got involved as well.  Undersecretary of State James E. Webb 
provided Truman an analysis of which House Democrats supported various versions of a 
Korean aid bill as it worked its way through Congress.  This report, which included a 
separate tally of Southern Democrats’ voting patterns, was bluntly titled, “Democratic 
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Members Who Voted Against H.R. 5330,” a testament that the White House was now 
taking notes on who its enemies were within the party.13 
 Rumblings of discontent among the congressional Democrats plagued the 
president in several ways, beginning with a planned move to repeal the House 21-day 
rule.  Retaliating against the “do-nothing 80th Congress” that Truman blasted during 
the1948 campaign, the president’s supporters passed this protocol in early 1949, 
empowering committee chairs to bring any bill to a floor vote that the Rules Committee 
did not act upon within three weeks.  The rule was designed to prevent a coalition of 
Republicans and conservative Southern Democrats on the Rules Committee from killing 
Truman’s Fair Deal programs.  In January 1950, an aide alerted HST that something was 
afoot on repealing the rule, and therefore a “serious threat” to his agenda.  The 
Trumanites in the House managed to keep the 21-day rule in place throughout 1950, but 
things would change following that year’s congressional elections.14 
The chief executive also suffered from having few committee leaders in his 
corner on Capitol Hill.  Writing to a Senate ally in June 1950, Truman admitted, “The 
main difficulty that I have to contend with is that in both Houses of the Congress there 
are not over four or five Chairmen of Key Committees who are friendly to the 
President.”  He had good reason to be concerned, since Congress had some thirty-four 
standing committees at the time.  Because Southerners enjoyed one-party rule in their 
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region, they generally had the most tenure, translating into control of leadership of 
important panels, particularly in the Senate.15  
Making matters worse, the White House did not have effective communication 
with Congress, a problem it wrestled with before and during the war.  In the Senate, Vice 
President Barkley had little influence even though he was a former majority leader.  
Moreover, Truman did not dedicate any staffers to congressional relations until his fifth 
year in office because he preferred to deal with legislative leaders personally, and felt 
that contacting them via his staffers demeaned them.  Instead, he had the various 
departments of the executive branch deal with Congress directly.  The absence of clear 
links between the White House and Congress, however, contrasted sharply with the 
well-defined channels between the administration and the Democratic National 
Committee (DNC).  Furthermore, Truman allies in the House and Senate complained 
about the ineffectiveness of the two Capitol Hill liaisons finally added to the White 
House staff. Truman aide Ken Hechler admitted, “Measured by the standards of other 
administrations, President Truman’s machinery for congressional relations left much to 
be desired.”16 
Members of Congress agreed with Hechler.  In a meeting with Acheson, Senator 
Benton, one of Truman’s strongest allies, was “quite critical” of the administration’s 
relations with Congress, complaining they spent too much time “conciliating our 
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opponents and not enough time working with our friends.”  Acheson concurred.  
Freshman Rep.  John C. Davies (NY) criticized the administration’s failure to acclimate 
a group of enthusiastic Democratic newcomers to the House in 1949, complaining they 
did not get enough direction or acknowledgement from the White House.  As a result, 
these Democratic rookies started to “look to their home communities and local problems 
and overlooked Administration legislation.”17   
Why, then, did Truman wait until the fourth year of his presidency to dedicate 
any staff members to congressional relations, and why did he not appoint stronger 
assistants for this role?  The president’s personal philosophy and his past political 
experiences provide the answers.  HST was comfortable with personally contacting 
members of Congress as he felt necessary and eschewed building a large White House 
staff.  An aide suspected the president remembered his dealings in the Senate, where he 
and his colleagues resented Roosevelt’s aides and their pressure tactics.  More 
importantly, Truman believed so strongly in party loyalty that he did not think he should 
have to coddle or twist the arms of his fellow Democrats to maintain their support.  If the 
president had dedicated effective staffers to help mentor the large and energetic 
freshman class of Democrats in 1949, he could have enhanced his influence in Congress 
and cut into the Southern power bloc, strengthening his power in the party during the 
war.  Although one historian suggests that the freshman class did not show the potential 
to go to war with the Southerners, a more focused effort by the White House to mentor 
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the newcomers could have armed them to combat the Southerners effectively.  Overall, a 
stronger commitment to the Democrats on Capitol Hill earlier in Truman’s 
administration would have provided some vital cohesion for the party when the Korean 
crisis occurred.  The president apparently recognized these shortcomings and later began 
holding weekly meetings with small groups of congressional Democrats.  However, 
things may have turned out better for HST had he begun such discussions earlier.18  
During the 1950 election season, unity within the Democratic Party ranged from 
one extreme to the other as is dealt with sectionalism, the outbreak of the Korean War, 
the bitter conclusion of the Tydings hearings and renewed attacks upon the State 
Department.  Early in the year, Truman already was grappling with internal political 
issues.  Angered because the president had told his former Secretary of State James 
Byrnes to “do as he damn well pleases” regarding the latter’s run for the South Carolina 
governorship, Virginia Democrats refused to attend the Democratic Party’s regional 
conference.  A White House aide concluded, “People in control of the party machinery 
in Virginia are completely out of step with the President.”19 
In February, HST went on the offensive against Southern recalcitrance and 
McCarthy’s attacks on the State Department, announcing plans for a “whistle stop” 
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campaign tour.  Repeating his successful formula from his 1948 campaign of stumping 
from trains, the president rambled to 57 towns in 16 states, primarily in the West, 
covering some 17,000 miles during the first half of May.  Built around the theme of, “A 
Report to the People,” Truman’s campaign circuit was quite successful by all accounts.  
The president even won grudging praise from Victor Johnston, who followed the tour at 
the behest of the Republican National Committee.  After witnessing a turnout of 35,000 
people at Ottumwa, Iowa, a crowd equivalent to the population of the town, Johnston 
termed Truman’s tour a “traveling medicine show,” but admitted, “Nobody hates him.”  
After offering the surprised Republican operative a ride on the train--if he would buy a 
ticket--the president said he hoped Johnston was as “highly pleased with the reception . . 
. as I have been.”  The chief executive was a hit with the livestock as well.  When a 
stubborn lamb raised a ruckus as he pinned a blue ribbon on it, HST called it a 
“Republican sheep.”  Immediately, the animal quieted down.  The whistle stop tour went 
so well that Truman believed he could reverse the trend of the incumbent president’s 
party losing seats in Congress during mid-term elections.20 
The Korean crisis forced President Truman to cancel a second whistle stop tour 
planned for the fall, minimizing his campaigning for the Democrats.  After the spring 
tour, he got involved in only two Senate races.  In his home state of Missouri, the 
president wanted to oust incumbent Republican Forrest C. Donnell, a harsh critic of the 
administration.  Although Truman boosted the candidacy of state senator Emery W. 
Allison, former U. S. Rep. Thomas C. Hennings, Jr. prevailed in the primary, much to 
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the president’s irritation.  Ironically, this helped HST in the long run.  Hennings 
triumphed in the general election, the only Democrat who unseated a GOP incumbent.  
Moreover, Missouri’s new senator went on to become a dogged opponent of Joseph 
McCarthy in the Senate.  Truman also lent some support to the campaign of Rep. Helen 
Gahagan Douglas for an open Senate seat in California, even though he once referred to 
her as “one of the worst nuisances.”  Again, chief executive’s backing was to no avail as 
Nixon trounced the Democrat in the general election.  Other than one speech on the eve 
of the election, this was the extent of Truman’s involvement in the 1950 races.  As Ken 
Hechler wrote of the president, “He put on his commander in chief’s hat and his political 
hat gathered dust.”21 
Primary elections by their nature test party unity, but the 1950 Democratic 
primaries were particularly bad news for Truman because two key incumbent senators 
who backed his foreign policies went down to defeat.  In Florida, Claude Pepper, a 14-
year veteran of the Senate, lost to George Smathers in the primary.  Smathers, a 
campaign manager for Pepper in the 1930s and recipient of a U.S. attorney post procured 
for him by the Florida senator, rode a wave of anti-communism attacks to victory.  The 
challenger equated Pepper’s support of Fair Deal programs with support of socialism.  
Unscrupulously, Smathers used superimposed photographs and headlines from the 
communist publication, The Daily Worker, to paint his opponent as an admirer of Josef 
Stalin, dubbing his opponent, “Red Pepper.”  Though Truman and Pepper disagreed on 
many issues, the Floridian agreed with the president’s international approach and 
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support of the U.N.  Another HST ally, Senator Frank Graham of North Carolina, lost 
his primary contest due to a combination of race and red-baiting.  Graham’s previous 
association with organizations having communists in its membership, such as the 
American Civil Liberties Union and the Southern Council of Human Welfare, made him 
vulnerable to this tactic.  Truman told his staff Graham’s defeat was one of the “most 
serious losses for the administration.”  In light of the president’s struggles with 
conservative Southerners, the demise of these two liberal Democrats from the region was 
particularly damaging to him.22 
McCarthyistic attacks from within the party bludgeoned other pro-Truman 
Democrats to the brink of defeat in the primaries, helping Republicans finish them off in 
the general election.  Helen Gahagan Douglas’s opponent in the California Senate 
primary, Manchester Boddy, compared her voting pattern with that of pro-communist 
Rep. Vito Marcantonio of New York.  Boddy accused Douglas of associating with a 
“subversive clique of red-hots” and called her “the pink lady,” a nickname her 
Republican opponent, Richard Nixon, used effectively in the general election. 
California’s state Democratic committee reported that the Republicans got help from 
“extreme right-wing elements” in the Democratic Party.  Something similar happened to 
the most unlikely of candidates, Millard Tydings.  A steadfast anti-communist, the 
Maryland Senate veteran seemed invulnerable to charges of failing to oppose the Red 
Menace.  Nevertheless, Tydings had to fight off two Democratic challengers in the 
primary, former congressman John Meyer and Hugh M. Monaghan II.  Meyer called 
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Tydings’ leadership of the committee investigating the State Department a whitewash.  
Monaghan latched onto the same theme, calling the committee’s dismissal of 
McCarthy’s charges a “green light to Stalin’s agents in this country.”  Although Tydings 
breezed to victory against these two Democratic challengers with 66 percent of the vote, 
Monaghan refused to endorse the incumbent in the general election, thereby lending a 
helping hand to Tydings’ upset defeat in the general election.23 
The Democrats faced a dilemma in Idaho’s Senate primary.  Glen H. Taylor, the 
incumbent and a country-western singer, had bolted the party in 1948 to run for vice 
president on the Progressive Party ticket headed by Henry Wallace.  He now found 
himself in the uncomfortable position of trying to return to the fold and win the 
Democratic primary.  Local Democratic leaders were in no mood to back Taylor, 
complaining that they were being “treated like Dixiecrats” because all the political 
favors were going to the ex-Progressive’s supporters.  This further rankled the 
Trumanites because in 1948, the Wallace/Taylor ticket had garnered less than 5,000 
votes out of 200,000 cast in Idaho.  The national party chieftains nevertheless stuck with 
the incumbent Taylor, producing heartbreak for their candidate and disaster for the party 
in the general election.  Taylor lost in the primary by 948 votes to D. Worth Clark.  The 
incumbent, however, did not go quietly, initiating a probe of the election that had its 
colorful moments, such as complaints about a Senate investigator “frequenting Boise 
clubs often inebriated conducting a propaganda campaign” for the defeated country 
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crooner.  While the investigator apparently enjoyed himself, he failed to deliver a win in 
the primary for Taylor, and Republican Herman Welker thrashed Clark 62 to 38 percent 
in the general election.24                     
Democratic unity faced another test when the conflict in Korea erupted in June, 
as Dean Acheson again became a political lightning rod.  This time, the GOP blamed 
him for policies emboldening North Korea to invade the South.   During the week the 
invasion began, and even before the commitment of American troops, Ohio senator 
Robert Taft led a Republican chorus demanding the secretary’s resignation, citing a 
January 12, 1950 Acheson speech to the National Press Club as an invitation for the 
North Korean attack.  In his remarks, the secretary had defined the U.S. Pacific “defense 
perimeter” along a line running from the Ryukyu and Aleutian islands off the coast of 
Alaska and south to the Philippines.  This line of defense did not include the Korean 
peninsula, leading Republicans to argue that the speech sent a tacit message that the U.S. 
would not defend South Korea from an invasion.  The GOP’s argument overlooked other 
references in the speech to the defense of Korea, as well as the source of Acheson’s 
definition of a Pacific defense perimeter.  The secretary emphasized that if an attack 
occurred in a region outside the defense perimeter, additional countries besides the U.S. 
should repel the aggressor by virtue of their commitments to the United Nations.  
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Contradicting the defense perimeter statement later in the speech, Acheson implied that 
Korea and Japan could expect U.S. assistance in the event of an attack.25 
The outcry over the secretary’s speech, well after the fact, was unjustified.  
Ironically, Acheson obtained the definition of his defense perimeter from General 
Douglas MacArthur, who many Republicans regarded as the foremost American 
authority on Far Eastern policy.  In a March 1949 interview with a British journalist, 
MacArthur had explained his idea of the American line of defense in the Pacific, 
matching the one Acheson articulated in January 1950.  The secretary later regretted his 
reference to the general’s strategy, calling it an example of the dangers of using military 
positions to explain the nuances of foreign policy.  In another ironic twist, the speech 
produced antagonistic statements from North Korea blasting Acheson for subjugating 
South Korea into the U.S. orbit.  Even though MacArthur had previously defined the 
defense perimeter and the overall context of the secretary’s speech clearly did not 
indicate that the U.S. was writing Korea off, Republicans blamed Acheson for the North 
Korean attack.26 
Most Democrats on Capitol Hill rallied around Acheson and the Truman 
administration from the outbreak of the war through the summer of 1950.  Senator 
McCarthy led the Republican attacks, blaming war casualties on a “group of 
untouchables” in the State Department for gutting Korean aid prior to the war, in 
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addition to the perimeter speech.  Senator Tydings, ignoring these specific charges, 
defended the administration’s foreign policy, pointing out that Korea was likely only one 
of many areas in the world in which the Soviets planned to test their ability to expand.  
Curiously, the Democrats defending the State Department never pointed out that 
MacArthur had originally articulated the Pacific defense perimeter used in Acheson’s 
controversial speech.  With better communication between the secretary and 
congressional Democrats, the latter could have used this as ammunition against 
Republican attacks.  Even though the war was not going well at the time, the Democratic 
National Committee (DNC) decided to make it an issue in the mid-term elections, 
highlighting the January 1950 defeat of a $150 million Korean aid bill in the House.  
Senate Majority Whip Francis J. Myers (D-PA) planned to emphasize that some 
politicians who earlier had demanded military cutbacks “are the loudest now in criticism 
of the lack of preparedness.”  In the face of Republican criticism in his state, Senator 
Warren G. Magnuson (D-WA) believed his constituents would respond to the need to 
rally behind the president during wartime rather than second-guessing pre-war policies.  
Although the national press did not publicize their views, a few Democrats reacted to 
Republican condemnation a bit more creatively.  Rep. Emmanuel Celler (NY) argued 
that all Americans shared blame for the Korean attack due to the demobilization 
mentality following World War II.  Tydings and Rep. Robert L. F. Sikes (FL) 
presciently noted that the U.S. military needed a new paradigm because it based its 
existing planning on fighting a major power rather than a regional war.  Recalling the 
context of Acheson’s defense perimeter speech, Rep. Mike Mansfield (MT) reminded 
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his colleagues that the plan all along had been for the U.N., not solely the U.S., to protect 
Korea.27 
On July 20, the Tydings Committee issued its report on McCarthy’s allegations 
of communist spies working in the State Department.  Party loyalty ruled the day.  The 
committee, comprised of three Democrats and two Republicans, voted to submit the 
majority members’ report in a straight party line vote.  The majority statement, calling 
the charges “a fraud and a hoax,” concluded that no one accused by the Wisconsin 
senator had committed any wrongdoing.  When the report reached the Senate floor for 
debate, partisan sparks flew.  Republican William E. Jenner (IN) lambasted Tydings for 
overseeing the “most scandalous and brazen whitewash of treasonable conspiracy in our 
history.”  The chairman reacted by charging across the room during the debate, shaking 
his fist at Jenner.  When the smoke cleared, the Senate voted three times on the report, 
and each time, all 96 senators voted with their party members on the committee, thereby 
accepting the majority report.  The vote on the Tydings Committee findings was the 
peak of Democratic Party unity during the Korean War.28 
Unfortunately for the Democrats, their solidarity again began to crumble as the 
mid-term congressional elections approached.  Republicans charged that Acheson’s 
January defense perimeter speech “electrified all Asia because Korea and Formosa . . . 
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were designated as abandoned by America,” initiating “Mr. Truman’s Korean War.”  In 
response, Rep. Michael J. Kirwan (OH), chairman of the House Democratic Campaign 
Committee issued a nineteen page summary of legislators’ voting records against Korean 
aid packages in 1949 and early 1950, proclaiming, “The isolationist bloc of the House 
must shoulder the responsibility for the Communist attack on South Korea.”  The rub for 
the Democrats was that 42 of their own, primarily Southerners, had voted against all aid 
packages for Korea and therefore fell into the “isolationist” category.  Interestingly, in 
preparing this statement the DNC intentionally took pains not to blame the Republican 
Party by name, targeting the isolationists in both parties.  Kirwan’s report, released 
during the primary season, aimed to replace anti-Truman Democrats with party faithful 
more sympathetic to the president’s foreign policy.29 
Democratic attacks upon Truman flared at the grass-roots level as well.  In 
Tarrant County, Texas, Jack Carter, a member of the State Democratic Executive 
Committee, wrote to Sam Rayburn expressing serious concern about an anti-Truman 
faction of delegates challenging the pro-administration slate officially chosen at the 
county convention.  The group attacked the president harshly, passing a resolution 
blaming the State Department for creating “the darkest hour and the most crucial period 
that ever existed in the state of Texas,” including the initial division of Korea, which 
really caused the war in the first place.  To remedy this sorry state of affairs, the 
delegates demanded, “Congress should take a common everyday weeding hoe and chop 
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down every Pansy that exists in the State and other Departments of the United States 
Government.”  Carter noted that the resolution “could have been written by Senator 
McCarthy himself.”30  
Democratic dissonance increased in Washington as the campaign season moved 
into the late summer and early fall.  Just two weeks after the Tydings report, a journalist 
shocked Truman by informing him that Rep. J. Percy Priest (TN), the Democratic Whip 
and a consistent backer of his programs, said that both Acheson and Defense Secretary 
Louis Johnson should resign to help unify the country.  HST, incredulous that a party 
leader made such a statement, told the reporter to inform Priest that Acheson and 
Johnson would stay on.  (Ultimately, the president retained Acheson but fired Johnson.)  
Truman showed increasing sensitivity to this issue in correspondence with Rep. Charles 
E. Bennett (D-FL), a first term legislator.  Bennett noted that replacing Secretary 
Acheson was a topic “pressed with great vigor by quite a number of my constituents,” 
and said Acheson should step down.  The chief executive fired back that Democrats 
“should not be accepting lies and propaganda put out by people like McCarthy.”  Non-
Southerners also began to grow concerned about the secretary, as legislators like Senator 
Paul Douglas, a staunch Fair-Dealer, confided to a colleague that Acheson had become a 
“political liability.”31 
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In August, Senator Kenneth S. Wherry (R-NE) launched a vicious personal 
attack on Acheson, telling the press, “The blood of our boys in Korea is on his shoulders, 
and no one else.”  Wherry argued that since the U.S. intervention amounted to a 
repudiation of Acheson’s pre-war Korean policy, Truman should replace him.  Rep. 
Sikes responded that what the U.S. needed was a change in military leadership in the 
field.  Without mentioning MacArthur by name, Sikes pointed out that the U.N. forces 
were taking a “terrific licking,” and suggested that someone must be available in Korea 
“who can and will get on with the job.”  While no one publicly seconded Sikes’ 
proposal, his counterattack questioning the effectiveness of MacArthur, the darling of 
the conservative Republicans, was a bold move.  Sikes, however, attracted little support 
from his Democratic colleagues.32 
By autumn, few Democrats publicly supported Acheson.  Only twelve out of 
forty-nine Democratic senators spoke out in favor of him during the election campaign.  
Of this dozen, seven had joined the Senate since 1948, meaning that their statements 
carried little political clout.  The party thus was at an impasse regarding foreign policy.  
Truman adamantly stood up for his secretary of state while most Capitol Hill Democrats 
ran from the beleaguered secretary of state.33 
In addition to Korean War policy, domestic issues divided the Democrats during 
the 1950 election season.  Fair Deal initiatives such as national health insurance and civil 
rights drew the ire of Southern Democrats, prompting concerns about support for the 
administration in key states like Texas.  Truman crony Henri Warren worried to the 
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president that anti-administration delegations from the large metropolitan areas of 
Houston, Dallas and Fort Worth could control the upcoming state Democratic 
convention.  He predicted, “Delegates will be brought in from East Texas who definitely 
know that President Truman and Roosevelt want their daughters to marry negroes,” who 
also believed that “a federal police force will require that negroes be employed in the 
shops and factories and on the farms.”  Warren complained that HST’s congressional 
allies rarely appeared at such state gatherings, and urged the president pressure them to 
attend in order to blunt attacks on the administration.34 
Civil rights concerns notwithstanding, the perceived problem of communist 
infiltration into the government drove the largest wedge between Truman and his 
Democratic comrades during the 1950 election season.  Senate Judiciary Committee 
chairman Pat McCarran (D-NV), who, like McCarthy, made anti-communism his 
signature issue, was the prime cause of this friction.  His quest to fight communism at 
home as well as in Korea came to fruition with Internal Security Act of 1950, or 
McCarran Act.  A strident Truman nemesis, McCarran patterned the bill after a similar 
one sponsored by House Republicans.   The McCarran Act required registration of  all 
members of the Communist Party with the Justice Department, and directed the 
department to compile literature containing membership and financial information about 
all Communist-related organizations.  It banned the federal government and defense 
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contractors from employing Communists, and blocked aliens advocating totalitarianism 
from entering the country.  Indicating the power of McCarthyism during an election 
year, only seven Democrats out of fifty-four voted against the McCarran Act, despite its 
restrictions on civil liberties.  With such overwhelming Democratic approval and amidst 
daily Republican attacks on his secretary of state for being soft on communism, it 
seemed the president had no choice but to sign the bill.35 
But he did not.  Truman courageously vetoed it, partly motivated by his long 
time personal dislike of McCarran, who he once described as having a “record for 
obstruction and bad legislation  . . . matched by that of only a few reactionaries.” 
Another more worthy reason was the president’s belief that the bill was a tyrannical 
infringement on the First Amendment right of free speech.  HST saw the law as another 
sedition bill.  In his veto message of September 22 the president declared, “In a free 
country, we punish men for the crimes they commit, but never for the opinions they 
have,” and argued that the bill would put the U.S. government into the “thought control 
business.”36   
The chief executive, nevertheless, could not overcome the McCarthyist 
atmosphere of the day, as Congress overwhelmingly overrode his veto.  House members 
infuriated by the veto chanted, “Vote! Vote!” forcing Speaker Rayburn to plead with 
them simply to have Truman’s veto message read on the floor.  Emotions ran high.  
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Republican maverick William “Wild Bill” Langer (ND) collapsed on the Senate floor 
while filibustering against the bill, prompting emergency personnel to cart him off on a 
stretcher.  After all this excitement, the House voted 248 to 48 (161 to 45 among the 
Democrats) to override--just one hour after the president’s veto.  The next day, the 
Senate voted 57 to 10 to do the same, with twenty-six Democrats voting to override and 
an additional ten agreeing even though they were conveniently absent.  The ten 
Democrats voting to sustain the veto took care to issue a press release distinguishing 
themselves from the “dastardly group” of Communists opposing the bill and cautioning 
the public to urge repeal of it through anti-communist organizations.  Only three 
members running for a seat in Congress in 1950 voted against the measure, and two of 
them lost.37 
Despite its bluster, the McCarran Act had little lasting effect upon America.  The 
courts ruled several portions of the law unconstitutional, and the parts that survived 
touched few individuals.  No “communist” organizations ever bothered to register with 
the Justice Department.  In the short term, however, Congress’s vote reflected the 
communist phobia of the country, for the nation seemed more than willing to sacrifice 
civil liberties to battle communism at home while its soldiers fought the “reds” in Korea.  
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Truman’s inability to scrounge up the handful of Senate votes needed to sustain his veto 
emphasized the divisions within his party forged by McCarthyism.38 
Democrats recognized that Republicans intended to “keep the Communist pot 
boiling” during the campaign, with the junior senator from Wisconsin as the lead chef.  
The GOP saw Joseph McCarthy as its “new political alchemist” in 1950, able to “turn 
fear and mistrust into votes.” Although he campaigned in fifteen states, “Tailgunner 
Joe,” as he liked to call himself, had a direct role in shooting down only one of the many 
Democrats in his sights, Millard Tydings of Maryland.39 
In July, McCarthy took over the campaign of Tydings’ opponent, political 
newcomer John Marshall Butler.  The Wisconsin senator overhauled Butler’s 
organization from top to bottom, bringing in a Chicago public relations man to organize 
the day-to-day details.  More importantly, Senator McCarthy used his personal contacts 
to raise money for Butler, enabling the challenger to outspend Tydings three to one.  The 
coup de grace that miraculously and unscrupulously discredited the incumbent’s long 
record of steadfast opposition to communism was a widely publicized photograph 
showing Tydings apparently sitting and listening thoughtfully to Earl Browder, chairman 
of the Communist Party USA.  The picture was a fake, produced by artificially merging 
two separate photos, as the two men had never met before Browder testified to the 
Tydings committee.  Maryland’s veteran senator, behaving with the confidence of any 
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incumbent running for a fifth term, avoided responding directly to the smear campaign 
until October.  By then, however, it was too late to stop the momentum of McCarthy’s 
onslaught.40 
The Democrats reacted to the Republican senator from Wisconsin in curious 
ways during the campaign.  For example, the DNC distributed a booklet titled, “Scare 
Words,” a collection of Republican quotes and predictions that had failed to materialize.  
Despite McCarthy’s notoriety, it barely mentioned the red scare.  The Democratic 
Senatorial Campaign Committee circulated a flyer lambasting the Wisconsin senator for 
publicly defending German S. S. troopers accused of murdering American prisoners of 
war in the “Malmedy Murders” case, suggesting he would similarly “leap to the defense 
of the North Korean war criminals” in the current conflict.  The harshness of this attack 
prompted one committee member to criticize it as being so badly written that it would 
damage the panel’s credibility, calling the charges against McCarthy “preposterous” and 
“gutter politics against a gutter snipe.”  Unsurprisingly, Tydings and Brien McMahon, 
another McCarthy target, had crafted the booklet.  After being on the receiving end of 
the Wisconsin Republican’s salvos, they appeared ready to plunge into the muck and 
slug it out with him.  Only one was successful.41 
The Korean War loomed even larger than Joseph McCarthy in the 1950 
campaign.  Throughout the election season, Democrats clamored for fact sheets 
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justifying the war from their Senate campaign committee.  In early August, as U.N. 
forces desperately clung to Pusan on the southeast corner of South Korea, the 
Republicans issued a perfectly timed announcement proclaiming the conflict a key 
election issue.  A survey of lead editorials in over sixty small town newspapers 
underscored the war’s importance.  Although the author of this analysis intended to call 
attention to tax policy as a campaign issue, it actually showed the war as a more 
prominent concern in small town America.  Democratic incumbents in the Senate 
struggled to respond to common questions on the campaign trail, such as, “Why did we 
stop the communists in Europe [via the Marshall Plan], but left Asia ‘wide open’ [China 
and Korea]?”42 
General MacArthur’s daring and successful counterattack at Inchon launched on 
September 15, 1950 led some Democrats to see the war as an advantage rather than a 
liability in the campaign.  As the U.N. counteroffensive forged north of the 38th parallel 
in October, cautious optimism turned to euphoria.  Senator McMahon proclaimed, “The 
lessons of this victory will be carefully studied both in Moscow and in the capitals of the 
free world,” and wrote in a published letter to the State Department that Korea had 
“exploded the legend of the Red invincibility.”  The other Connecticut incumbent 
senator running for election, William Benton, thought Korea would help Democrats get 
out the vote.  Apparently, their political opponents agreed, sending cynical letters to the 
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Democrats’ Senate campaign headquarters accusing them of timing the victory in Korea 
to coincide with the elections.43 
The Democratic celebrations of victory in Korea were premature:  Three days 
after the commander in chief listened to MacArthur’s assurances that China would not 
enter the conflict, Chinese troops crossed the Yalu River into North Korea, engaging 
South Korean troops for the first time on October 25.  The new war ushered in a new 
campaign for the Democrats. During the week leading up to election day, newspaper 
headlines screamed:  “U.S. Units Retreat 50 Miles in Korea,” “Another Acheson 
Betrayal,” and “Red Counterblows Again Throw Allies Back in Furious No. Korea 
Clashes.”  On November 7, in the midst of nothing but bad news coming from Korea, 
Americans went to the polls to elect their legislators.  Reminiscing about that day two 
decades later, Rep. Richard Bolling (D-MO) recalled, “We could feel the ground 
slipping out from under us.”44 
While the 1950 contests did not deliver control of Congress to the Republicans, 
they did rob Truman of key congressional allies and shrank the Democrats’ numerical 
margins over the Republicans in both houses.  Overall, as in the 1946 elections, non-
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Southern liberals were the most likely casualties, particularly in the House.  In the 
Senate, Majority Leader Scott Lucas and Majority Whip Francis Myers went down in 
flames, along with Tydings.  Three-term senator Elbert Thomas, another staunch 
Truman backer, lost as well.  The elections repudiated the Democratic power structure in 
the Senate, as six of the thirteen members of the steering committee lost in either the 
primaries or the general election, decimating the leaders who were strong supporters of 
the president.  With the defeats of so many HST allies in the Senate, the election was 
more of a setback for him than for his party.  Truman recognized this as he watched the 
results roll in.  Although the president frequently enjoyed his bourbon over a poker game 
with friends, an aide recalled that election night in 1950 was the only time he saw the 
chief executive using it to drown his sorrows.45  
Many reasons explained the 1950 Democrat losses.  Truman staffers and some 
members of Congress blamed the DNC leadership of William Boyle, even though the 
party outperformed the Republicans in fund-raising from 1949 through 1951.  One 
congressman groused, “The only time the Democratic National Committee shows any 
signs of life is at the cocktail hour.”  More specifically, some Democrats complained 
about the failure of the DNC to staff a permanent research division, which had 
effectively gathered facts to spotlight Republican inconsistencies and Democratic 
successes during the 1948 campaign.  Another weakness was the selection of a rookie 
senator, Clinton Anderson, to chair the Senate Democratic campaign committee.  
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Anderson had been a three-term member of the House and Truman’s Secretary of 
Agriculture before his election to the Senate in 1948.  However, since he was a senator 
from a small state with only one Senate campaign under his belt, putting Anderson in 
charge of all Senate races across the nation did not make sense.46 
At the time, Republicans and Democrats agreed with Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.’s 
assessment of the 1950 election as a “triumph for McCarthyism”; however, a closer 
examination indicates this was not the case.  The fate of Democrats voting against the 
McCarran Act demonstrates this point.  Supporting the bill did not provide political 
sanctuary for Democrats in the House, as twenty-three of the twenty-eight who backed 
the McCarran Act lost in November.  Conversely, only five of twenty-one House 
members who opposed McCarran suffered defeats, and three of those five lost in quests 
for Senate seats.47 
While McCarthy liked to take credit for Scott Lucas’s defeat in Illinois, other 
factors entered in.  Senator Anderson and at least one historian blamed the majority 
leader’s defeat on the highly publicized probe into organized crime led by Senator Estes 
Kefauver (D-TN), which uncovered corruption in the Chicago police department and 
pinned guilt on Lucas by association.  Curiously, Lucas focused on farm issues, 
attempting either to cut into opponent Everett Dirksen’s strength in rural areas or to 
deflect attention from the Kefauver investigation.  Anderson and Truman had 
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considerably different takes on how Lucas’s support of the president contributed to the 
former’s defeat.  HST claimed the majority leader lost because he was too wishy-washy, 
while Anderson suggested Lucas’s unquestioning support of the White House was to 
blame.  In light of the electoral trends elsewhere, Anderson’s explanation is closer to the 
reality.  Democrats backing the president showed significant vulnerability in the 
election.48 
McCarthy’s role in Tydings’ defeat in Maryland, however, was undeniable.  
Senate Democrats therefore followed up with an inquiry into the unscrupulous methods 
the Republican used to engineer John Butler’s surprise victory. As Senator Anderson 
pointed out in a letter to the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, the Democrats pushed for and 
obtained this probe as a matter of principle, for Tydings was not asking for a new 
election.  The Democrats had no hopes of immediate political gain from the 
investigation; instead, they hoped to teach McCarthy and those employing his tactics a 
lesson for future campaigns. Imploring his colleagues to pursue the matter, Brien 
McMahon produced a copy of “Common Sense,” a Fascist publication used against him 
in his contest, bearing the headline, “McMahon—Communist Dupe.” The Connecticut 
senator warned his colleagues, “I beat it, boys, but maybe you can’t in 1952.” After 
investigating allegations of unlawful political fundraising practices, the use of fraudulent 
campaign literature and improper involvement by groups outside the state of Maryland 
in Butler’s organization, a Senate Rules subcommittee agreed that Tydings had a 
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legitimate complaint.  Although the subcommittee called the Butler campaign’s tactics 
“despicable” and declared McCarthy played a “leading and potent” role, the Senate 
stopped short of denying the victor his seat or formally censuring either of the two.  An 
outraged Senator Benton reacted to the report by delivering the “most outspoken attack 
on McCarthy that had ever been heard in Congress,” submitting a resolution demanding 
the Wisconsin senator’s resignation.  Benton’s outburst sparked a chorus of “amens” 
from a trio of fellow Democrats and commendation from columnist Drew Pearson for 
accurately documenting McCarthy’s falsehoods.  However, the Democrat’s colleagues 
did not immediately leap to his defense and one of them half-jokingly remarked that the 
Benton-McCarthy feud could produce the “ideal double murder.”49 
McCarthy’s direct effect on the 1950 elections was spotty, but this was not the 
perception in Congress or the rest of the nation at the time.  Even though an investigative 
subcommittee unanimously agreed the Wisconsin senator had acted unethically and 
unlawfully in the Maryland senate campaign, the Senate, with its Democratic majority, 
let him off with a slap on the hands.  Newsweek aptly declared, “Democrats Fume at 
McCarthy, But He Has Them Terrorized.”50 
 The 1950 election results also stiffened the resolve of Truman’s congressional 
enemies, adding to the challenges of keeping his party together during wartime.  The 
president accurately described Congress as nominally controlled by Democrats, but 
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conceded, “The majority is made up of Republicans and recalcitrant Southern 
‘Democrats’—who are not Democrats.”  He continued, “My ‘friend,’ Harry Byrd [D-
VA] says he has the professional southerners lined up against Yugoslav Aid.  Wonder if 
he’d like being branded Stalin’s No. 2 helper in the Senate.”  Although people like Rep. 
Hale Boggs (D-LA) informally organized small groups of legislators to support Truman, 
the president faced an even steeper uphill battle as the 82nd Congress went to work.51 
The elections thus affected the dynamics of lawmaking on Capitol Hill.  In the 
House, the Democrats’ numerical edge slipped from 92 to 36, and Truman’s opponents 
took this as a cue to flex their political muscles.  On Congress’s first day in session in 
1951, Edward E. Cox (D-GA) proposed a vote to end the 21-day rule, which would 
restore the power of the Rules Committee to bottle up legislation indefinitely.  Majority 
Leader John McCormack and Adolf J. Sabath (D-IL), the dean of the House, 
spearheaded the effort to protect the rule.  As chairman of the Rules Committee, 
Sabath’s support for the rule seems surprising, since its repeal would restore enormous 
power to his panel.  However, with five Southern Democrats (of eight total) on the Rules 
Committee joining forces with the four Republican members, the chairman could not 
ensure that Truman’s legislation would reach the House floor for a vote.  Sabath 
therefore decided that the best way to support HST was to back the rule, allowing 
committee chairs to force floor votes on bills not acted upon by the Rules Committee 
within three weeks.  When the president’s congressional allies tried to persuade their 
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colleagues to keep the rule, his opponents countered that Fair Deal initiatives such as 
national health insurance and the Brannan plan for agricultural assistance were the real 
reasons behind the dispute.  At the mention of these programs, the entire floor demanded 
a vote to end the rule.  The administration lost decisively, 244 to 179, with 92 (of 235) 
Democrats joining 152 Republicans in voting to restore power to the Rules Committee, 
even though House Speaker Sam Rayburn and Majority Leader John McCormack were 
strong administration allies.  An examination of the Southern states having only 
Democrats in their congressional delegations indicates the antipathy towards Truman.  
Only 19 of 99 Dixie Democrats voted to back the president and retain the rule.  
McCormack observed that Republicans appeared content to ride along on “the tail of the 
Dixiecrat kites.”52  
Like Adolph Sabath, the scarce Truman allies chairing other committees 
struggled to maintain control during and after the 1950 campaigns.  In May 1950, House 
Foreign Affairs Committee chairman John Kee (D-WV) complained to Truman and 
Secretary of State Acheson that fellow Democrats on his committee were causing 
problems.  Early in 1951, Clarence Cannon (D-MO), the powerful chairman of the 
House Appropriations Committee, faced open revolt as a group of Democrats allied with 
Republicans voted to remove his power to name members of subcommittees.  Such a 
maneuver would have empowered them to run the committee rather than Cannon.  
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Fortunately for the chairman, the mutiny lasted only a few days, probably due to his long 
tenure in the House.53 
Under Secretary of State James E. Webb tried to help the president improve his 
relationship with Southern senators shortly after the elections.  A North Carolinian 
experienced in regional politics, Webb explained that the Southerners felt they were 
spending a lot of energy defending themselves politically against Truman’s civil rights 
initiatives, and pointed out that they had generally supported the president’s foreign 
policy.  (For example, the Senate’s Southern leader, Richard Russell, shared the 
president’s belief in the futility of funding Chiang Kai-Shek by the late 1940s.)  
Suggesting the administration could find common ground with the Southerners in areas 
other than racial issues, the under secretary floated a “what if”  scenario in which 
Truman and Russell would agree to warn each other privately of impending  
disagreements over policy before going public with them.  HST, who once disparaged 
Russell as “the great Georgian Senator, representative of the National Chamber of 
Congress, the Coca-Cola Company, etc.,” expressed appreciation for the letter but little 
else.  While there is no known evidence of a rapprochement between the two along these 
lines, Russell later helped the administration immensely through his conduct of the 
Senate inquiry into the firing of General MacArthur.  However, the residual enmity 
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between the president and the South over civil rights probably was too much for either 
the Georgian or Truman to overcome.54 
This hostility manifested itself in Congress as Dixie Democrats formed coalitions 
to bury Truman’s Fair Deal agenda.  Southerners organized the “Committee of 78,” an 
unofficial opposition group opposing the pro-Truman leaders in both houses.  In 
addition, House Democrats from the 11 former Confederate states and Kentucky headed 
by William G. Colmer (MS) built a Dixiecrat-Republican alliance in early 1951 that 
became an imposing political force.    Originally formed to oppose civil rights 
legislation, the scope of the group grew to controlling the fate of all appropriations bills.  
Each state had a designated member of this secret committee and most named an 
alternate as well.  A subset of these Democrats formed a “Liaison Committee” with key 
Republicans, who supplied a GOP staffer to scrutinize appropriations bills and plan 
amendments as needed.55   
This alliance grew powerful enough to challenge Sam Rayburn.  After personally 
taking the floor to push for a project for his district, the speaker looked on in dismay as 
his colleagues scuttled it.  Rayburn reportedly cornered Rep. Cox and said, “Gene, you 
knew that item was my pet baby.  Why did you oppose it?”  Cox replied, “Sam, you 
should have informed our group that you were interested in this item.”  Incredulously, 
Rayburn asked, “What group?”  Cox retorted, “Our special group to consider what items 
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should be defeated.”  According to an observer, the speaker was “infuriated to the point 
that he had to restrain himself to keep from taking a swing at Cox.”  All House 
Democrats knew the project was important to Rayburn, and that the purpose of killing it 
was to “chastise” him.  This defeat of the Texan’s bill, along with his ignorance about 
the coalition’s existence, illustrated how far the Truman’s congressional allies had fallen 
in political influence.56 
Democratic unity faced another challenge shortly after the elections when the 
Chinese drove the U.N. forces from North Korea.  After anticipating MacArthur’s 
pledge to have the troops home for Christmas, America’s misfortunes in Korea became 
particularly distasteful.  As was the case following the outbreak of the war, Dean 
Acheson became the lightning rod for attacks against the administration.  Before the 
Christmas recess, both the Senate and the House Republican Conferences submitted 
resolutions to Truman demanding that he fire Acheson because the secretary had lost the 
support of Congress and the American public. 
The secretary of state also lost the support of congressional Democrats—again.  
Under Secretary Webb conceded that a big part of the problem was the bombardment of 
letters from the public to their legislators demanding Acheson’s resignation.  As 
columnist James Reston noted, Acheson’s problem was not as much with the 
Republicans as with Democrats who, due to the election results, had decided he had 
become a drag on the party and therefore needed step down.  Of six Democratic senators 
up for re-election in 1950 who had strongly backed Acheson, only three won:  Herbert 
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Lehman of New York, and William Benton and Brien McMahon of Connecticut.  Some 
Republican operatives even suggested easing off the Acheson attacks, believing they 
could avoid blame for eliminating the secretary by allowing the president’s party to do 
the job.  Webb told the White House of the need to recharge the Democrats, saying 
many were “disturbed in their own minds.”  Although the under secretary wisely 
recommended enlisting moderate Democrats such as Carl Hayden, Lister Hill and 
Harley Kilgore rather than staunch Trumanites to defend Acheson, there is no evidence 
that they stepped forward or that Truman asked them to do so.  A handful of House 
Democrats endorsed Secretary Acheson, with one declaring, “He and his 
accomplishments will live in history long after the names of his detractors are 
forgotten.” In the Senate, however, “not one Democrat rose .  .  . to defend Acheson.”57 
Rep. Richard Bolling (D-MO) blamed public animosity towards the State 
Department on a combination of things.  In analyzing the demise of Democrats in the 
recent congressional elections, Boling claimed that Republicans intentionally employed 
the “McCarthy technique of big lies, little lies, half-truths” to confuse the public about 
the administration’s foreign policy aims.  Since he believed that voters who understood 
Truman’s policies usually supported the president, Boling saw the “get Acheson” 
movement as an education problem.  Moreover, he attributed confusion among the 
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voters to their Democratic legislators, admitting in a letter to HST that it was “an 
unfortunate fact that a great many politicians do not . . . understand our foreign policy.”58 
This problem festered for the Democrats as the Korean conflict continued.  
Limited war was a new concept to the American public and to its political leaders.  On 
the heels of the unconditional surrender of America’s World War II foes, how could the 
administration convince the electorate that total war against North Korean and China 
was not a wise objective, particularly when the top military commander in the field 
advocated just that?  As a result, most Democrats stood aside and allowed Truman to 
take the heat as he stood firmly behind his Secretary of State.  However, the furor over 
Acheson in late 1950 paled in the face of the firestorm the commander in chief would 
ignite just a few months later, straining Democrat Party unity yet again.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
A FALLEN ICON AND A LOST ELECTION, 1951-1952 
 
“President Truman must be impeached and convicted,” proclaimed the front page 
of the Chicago Tribune the day after the president fired General Douglas MacArthur 
from his U. N. command in Korea.  Truman, the paper continued, was “unfit, morally 
and mentally, for this high office.”  MacArthur’s dismissal heralded the largest 
outpouring of public outrage against HST during his presidency.  Yet the furor 
evaporated quickly, thanks to a helping hand from an unexpected source.1 
Other challenges unfolded as HST struggled to keep the Democrats together 
during his final two years in office.  Charges of corruption persisted against the White 
House, giving political ammunition to the president’s detractors within the party.  Joseph 
McCarthy and his allies in both parties had not gone away, either, and seemed positioned 
to capitalize on the sacking of MacArthur.  These issues, along with the ongoing 
Southern resentment of Truman seemed capable of sweeping the Democrats from power 
in the 1952 elections, despite the president’s early withdrawal from the race.  The 
Korean War also returned to prominence as the campaign heated up between Adlai 
Stevenson and Dwight Eisenhower.  This chapter analyzes the forces tearing at 
Democratic unanimity during the final two years of the Truman presidency, and 
describes how the curtain fell on the Democrats’ two-decade reign in Washington. 
On April 11, 1951, the commander in chief shocked the nation by terminating 
General MacArthur for insubordination.  The general had made several public criticisms 
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of American foreign policy.  Early in the war, he openly advocated using the Chinese 
Nationalist forces in the U.N. contingent and urged a vigorous defense of Formosa 
against a possible Communist attack, which contradicted the administration’s intent to 
keep the Nationalists out of the war.  Defying the president’s subsequent ban on 
unauthorized statements to the press, the general later publicly complained about the 
“existing limitations upon our freedom of counter-offensive actions.”  In the spring of 
1951, MacArthur wrote to House Minority Leader Joe Martin promoting expansion of 
the war into mainland China.  The letter, read into the Congressional Record on April 5, 
was the last straw.  Truman fired him.2 
Immediately, thousands of letters and telegrams swamped the White House, 
initially running two to one against the president.  HST remained unflappable, writing in 
his diary, “Quite an explosion.  Was expected but I had to act.  Telegrams and letters of 
abuse by the dozen.”  In the midst of the unprecedented public tumult, Republicans 
demanded an inquiry designed to put the president’s Far East foreign policy on the hot 
seat.  The Senate decided on joint hearings of the Armed Services and Foreign Relations 
committees.3 
One senator’s response to a disgruntled citizen portrayed the prevailing public 
view of MacArthur’s firing.  Answering a constituent who demanded to know why 
Truman rejected the general’s attempt to enlist the help of the Nationalist Chinese in the 
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fight against the Communists, Senator Clinton Anderson pointed out that Chiang Kai-
shek had already squandered four billion dollars in arms and supplies from the West.  He 
had also frittered away an army of four million in losing the Chinese civil war.  
Anderson added that Chiang had never asked to land troops in China and was “delighted 
to remain on Formosa.”  The senator concluded, “You would think that Generalissimo 
Chiang was a ferocious bulldog tied by a leash which is held by the United States and 
that if we would just let go . . . he would paddle across the water, take on the Chinese 
Communists and they would lay down their arms.”4   
In a replay of December 1950, MacArthur’s firing sparked Republican calls for 
Dean Acheson’s scalp.  This time, Acheson’s crime was creating policies the general did 
not like.  Joseph McCarthy proclaimed the secretary should resign and go to the Soviet 
Union, “for which you have been struggling and fighting so long.”  Few Democrats 
defended the secretary.  In a letter to Truman, Senator William Benton reported that 
Eleanor Roosevelt was pleading with him to participate in a debate on her television 
program because, “The Republicans are eager to talk and I can’t find Democratic 
senators to talk against them.”5  
Two freshman Democratic senators, however, were ready to spar with 
Republicans--using their fists.  Hubert Humphrey (MN) and Herbert Lehman (NY) took 
the excitement up a notch in the aftermath of MacArthur’s firing by getting into a “little 
brawl” with Republican Homer Capehart (IN) in a Senate recording studio following a 
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foreign policy debate on the radio program, “Meet Your Congress.”  Even though the 53 
year-old Capehart weighed in at 220 pounds, giving him advantages of 60 pounds in 
weight over Humphrey and 20 years in youth over Lehman, the senate rookies waded 
into battle like prizefighters.  The issue causing the altercation was the wisdom of 
Acheson’s refusal to bring Chinese Nationalists into the war, a view that many 
Republicans, like Capehart, despised.  When Lehman and Humphrey rejected the 
Indiana Republican’s argument, he said he could only conclude that they were 
communist sympathizers.  As soon as the broadcast ended, Humphrey angrily confronted 
Capehart, calling him a son of a bitch and blasting the Republican for “vilification, 
character assassination, and malicious unfounded” statements.  Capehart thereupon 
grabbed Humphrey by the arm and raised his fist to club the Minnesotan before Lehman 
and others stepped in to prevent any bloodletting.  Such were the hazards Democrats 
faced when defending Acheson policies.  Regarding his adversaries, Lehman noted, 
“Anybody who disagrees . . . is dubbed a Communist.”6 
A surprise policy reversal by Acheson’s own department added to the 
Democrats’ problems.  In a May 1951 speech, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern 
Affairs Dean Rusk affirmed American support for the Chinese Nationalists, saying the 
U.S. would not “acquiesce in the degradation that is being forced upon them,” adding 
that they would “continue to receive important aid and assistance from the United 
States.”  Rusk’s remarks attracted significant attention, and rightfully so, since 
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Acheson’s China white paper in 1949 had concluded that such aid no longer made sense.  
The State Department swiftly issued a statement insisting that Rusk’s remarks did not 
mean a policy change, further muddying the waters.  One Democrat telegrammed 
Truman that Rusk’s speech “seems worse than MacArthur’s program,” adding that in the 
upcoming elections, the State Department’s  constant “apologizing and backing water”  
would “get a lot of Democrats beat unnecessarily.”7 
Many Democrats jumped on the Republican bandwagon to oust the Secretary of 
State.  Rep. Omar Burleson (D-TX), correctly believing there was no chance that he 
could convince Truman to fire Acheson, sent a private letter to the secretary asking him 
to resign, citing a loss of confidence in his leadership.  Later, he released the letter to the 
press.  Senator Paul Douglas (D-IL), a Fair Deal ally of the president, agreed that 
Acheson should leave, declaring, “In a war you recognize your casualty, take him out of 
the field and put him in a field hospital.”  The Illinois senator claimed he had even asked 
Republicans to ease up on their sniping about the secretary to enable him to resign 
honorably.  Just before Acheson testified at the MacArthur hearings, a cohort of 
influential congressional Democrats reportedly visited Truman to ask for the secretary’s 
resignation, including Senate Majority Leader Ernest McFarland, Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee chairman Tom Connally, Senate Democratic Whip Lyndon 
Johnson, Senate Campaign Committee chairman Clinton Anderson, House Majority 
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Leader John McCormack, and House Speaker Sam Rayburn.  A knowledgeable Senate 
staffer observing Acheson’s testimony at the hearings noted that several senators on the 
committee clearly were out to get the secretary, who increasingly looked like an 
albatross for the Democrats.8 
The attacks on Dean Acheson took their toll on the Truman’s allies.  Rayburn, 
normally a beacon of optimism, lamented to his old friend, former Vice President John 
Nance Garner that the Democrats were “as low as the bottom of the ocean now and do 
make many mistakes.”  John A. Carroll, a former congressman added to the White 
House staff in 1951, wrote that the “liberal Democratic forces seem to have lost their 
fighting spirit.”9 
Yet, the controversy swirling around Acheson subsided again during the 
MacArthur hearings, managed by Senator Russell.  Chairman of the Armed Services 
Committee, Russell intentionally jockeyed for leadership of the joint MacArthur 
hearings, aiming to complete the proceedings with minimal political damage to his party.  
He probably also saw this as an opportunity to bolster his presidential candidacy for 
1952.  The Georgian ran the hearings with a minimum of controversy, and banned 
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reporters, microphones and cameras from the hearing room.  By avoiding live television 
broadcasts that could have been viewed by some 30 million Americans, Russell defused 
the emotions of the moment, focusing the public on the content of the transcripts 
released daily.  Democrats probed the war hero during his testimony courteously, but 
thoroughly.  Under Russell’s leadership, the inquiry eventually exposed MacArthur’s 
insubordination and ignorance of international issues outside the Far East, dousing the 
political firestorm over the general’s removal.  The leader of the Southern Democrats 
became, in one historian’s words, the “hidden rock against which MacArthur was 
shattered.”10 
  By August, the political climate had changed considerably.  When Republicans 
attempted to remove Acheson by cutting off his salary as part of an appropriations bill, 
the Democrats dug in their heels.  Rep. John J. Rooney (D-NY) led the charge on the 
House floor, shouting that the people of his district did not like “slippery, snide, and 
sharp practices,” and accusing the Republicans of using “lynching” tactics against the 
secretary.  The House defeated the measure 171-81 with only two Democrats voting for 
it, a remarkable turnabout in the party’s support for Acheson.11 
The MacArthur hearings thus solved a major public relations problem for the 
Truman administration surprisingly quickly, blunting the assaults on the Secretary of 
State.  Senator Russell’s management of these proceedings underscored his political 
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importance to Truman as a consistent supporter of the president’s foreign policies.  By 
the fall of 1951, the ruckus over the firing of MacArthur had faded from the public’s 
consciousness like an “old soldier,” as did the outcry for Acheson’s head. 
Yet, the Democrats had other issues threatening to fracture the party during the 
last two years of the Truman administration--corruption scandals collectively dubbed the 
“mess in Washington.”  In May 1950, Senator Estes Kefauver (D-TN) launched an 
inquiry into organized crime.  Washington Post publisher Philip Graham suggested it to 
Kefauver as a way to further his political ambitions.  It worked.  The Tennessean’s 
investigation got plenty of publicity, with some of the hearings broadcast on the brand-
new medium of the day, television.  Moreover, the probe kept Kefauver’s name in the 
newspapers for a long time as the hearings dragged on until the end of 1951, just in time 
for the 1952 campaign season.12 
The president never thought much of Kefauver or his crusade against organized 
crime, seeing the investigation as a political move to enhance the senator’s national 
image.  Truman described the Tennessean as having “had no reputation for anything in 
particular but his being unable to understand what was going on” in Congress, and saw 
Kefauver’s inquiry as divisive to the party.  HST complained that the committee unfairly 
tainted him in its muckraking expedition in East St. Louis, Illinois, giving “the President 
of the United States . . . all the credit for Illinois crime.”  Accusing the Tennessee senator 
                                                 
12 Graham’s role in Savage, 167.  
 
 68
of profiting on speeches and book sales from his investigation, Truman concluded, 
“What a President this demagogic dumb bell would make!”13 
The Kefauver probe, which took its traveling show to some fourteen cities, 
revealed little of substance.  It found local and state government officials facilitating 
illegal gambling operations, which came as no surprise to the local residents.  However, 
the inquiry made for great television, attracting an estimated 20-30 million viewers 
anxious to see notorious crime figures such as Greasy Thumb Guzik and Frank Costello 
(seeing only his hands and hearing his raspy voice), as well as Virginia Hill, a former 
actress and mistress of famed Las Vegas figure Bugsy Siegel.  The closest the 
investigation got to Truman was through the testimony of William O’Dwyer, a former 
mayor of New York City now serving as a U.S. diplomat.  O’Dwyer admitted to 
appointing friends and relatives of known gangsters to political office during his stint as 
mayor, which was one of the issues forcing him to resign, making him a convenient 
choice as the ambassador to Mexico.  HST steadfastly refused to recall the ex-mayor 
from his diplomatic post, giving him a ringing endorsement for being “a fighter, just like 
I am.”  The president’s backing of O’Dwyer, coupled with Kefauver’s visit to Kansas 
City reminding people of Truman’s roots in machine politics, began to convince the 
public to believe there was a mess in Washington.14   
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Influence peddling by members of his administration produced another 
corruption scandal pestering Truman.  Federal officials were obtaining government 
contracts for businesses and, as compensation for their services, charging a five percent 
cut of the contract, a down payment and a monthly retainer fee.  Congress launched 
several investigations of the “five percenters,” including one headed by Senator William 
Fulbright (D-AR) that found questionable dealings with the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation (RFC).  Initially created to make federal loans to help banks and industrial 
concerns recover from the Great Depression, the RFC had deteriorated, as exemplified 
by a case uncovered by the Fulbright committee.  Responding to a housing shortage, the 
RFC made a multi-million dollar loan to the Lustron Corporation to build prefabricated 
homes.  After the RFC finalized the loan, its chief examiner, E. Merl Young, a 
Missourian and former Senate aide to Truman, left the agency to go to work for Lustron.  
Young’s new employer paid him a handsomely—some two and a half times his RFC 
salary.  The inquiry also discovered Young had given his wife, a White House 
stenographer, a $9,540 mink coat paid for by a Lustron lawyer.  Lustron eventually went 
bankrupt and defaulted on its RFC loan.  To the public, it looked like Truman’s Missouri 
cronies were working for the federal government, taking bribes and buying their spouses 
mink coats with the proceeds, an image that the Republicans hammered upon during the 
1952 campaign.15 
The Lustron incident did not smell right to the investigating committee.  When 
the panel discovered Young’s activities, Fulbright and two other committee members 
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took their findings to Truman to try to minimize the political damage, asking him to do 
something to reform the RFC.  The president, however, saw the investigation as a 
personal attack, and later vented his anger on a committee member.  Pulling him from a 
meeting, HST said,  “The real crooks and influence peddlers were members of this 
committee, as we might soon find out,” adding that “a great many members of Congress 
had accepted fees for their influence in getting R.F.C. loans for their constituents.”  
Truman proceeded to dig up correspondence between members of Congress and the 
RFC, including loans Fulbright obtained for a resort hotel in his home state.   The chief 
executive’s reaction largely came from his personal dislike for Fulbright stemming from 
previous political clashes, privately calling him “Senator Halfbright” and “an 
overeducated Oxford s.o.b.”  Fulbright, concluding that the president did not intend to 
reform the RFC reform, submitted the committee’s preliminary report in February 1951.  
Its title was short and devastating:  “Favoritism and Influence.”16 
Although the Fulbright committee probe dragged on for months, hearing 
testimony from a number of administration officials, the only high-level casualty was 
DNC chairman William Boyle, Jr., who resigned in October 1951.  Yet, the RFC 
investigation was not the end of the corruption story.  Improprieties in the Bureau of 
Internal Revenue (BIR) and the tax division of the Justice Department produced more 
headaches for Truman and his party.  As Truman aide Ken Hechler wrote, “The situation 
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with five per centers and the RFC was penny-ante stuff,” compared to the tax agency 
scandals.17 
A congressional investigation into the BIR produced startling discoveries.  
Officials in the agency showed favoritism to gamblers under investigation for tax 
evasion and used the department to dole out political patronage.  Ultimately, the 
government convicted a number of BIR employees of bribery, extortion, embezzlement 
and, to the outrage of American taxpayers, tax evasion.  The culprits included about ten 
collectors overseeing BIR activities in large cities throughout the U.S.  All of them were 
products of political machines, casting an additional shadow over the Truman 
administration due to the president’s longtime ties to the Pendergast machine based in 
Kansas City.18 
Conditions within the tax division of the Justice Department were no better.  A 
House probe learned that Theron Lamar Caudle, head of the division, accepted gifts 
from tax lawyers and business people under investigation for tax violations, including a 
new car, plane trips to Florida, and, again, mink coats.  Attorney General Howard 
McGrath did little when investigators began closing in on Caudle, forcing Truman to go 
around McGrath and terminate Caudle himself.  Making matters worse, the Attorney 
General refused to cooperate with an assistant hired to ferret out the problems uncovered 
by Congress.  HST then asked McGrath for his resignation, firing him over the telephone 
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during the president’s staff meeting.  Truman’s appointments secretary, Matt Connelly, 
eventually served prison time for activities associated with the tax division scandal.  
Unlike the organized crime and five percenter investigations, the chief executive actually 
responded to the tax probes by proposing BIR reforms, probably due to the larger 
number of people who lost their jobs and earned criminal convictions.  The fact that the 
tax scandals were emerging as a hot button issue for the electorate with the 1952 election 
looming contributed as well.  Yet, Truman’s response was too late to keep corruption 
charges out of the Republicans’ arsenal.19 
Of the corruption issues publicized by the Kefauver, RFC and BIR probes, the 
latter produced the loudest public outcry.  Because the BIR and Justice Department 
scandals surfaced as Truman was pushing through frequent tax increases to support the 
Korean War and overall defense build-up, Americans became particularly incensed to 
learn that government officials were dodging their income taxes and helping their 
cronies do the same.  Moreover, a Gallup poll reported that 82 percent of Americans 
knew about the BIR corruption probe, an exceptionally high level of awareness.  
“Indignation against any monkey business in the collection of income taxes,” according 
to one assessment, was “bound to be as hot as a blow torch.”  The report continued that 
the administration had suffered “substantial damage” due to the public perception about 
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the mink coats, plane trips and tax evasion, suggesting problems in the 1952 campaign 
unless the president “gets rid of the smoke and the smell by putting out some fires.”20  
Due to the fallout from the investigations and scandals, the Republicans found a  
third prong for their 1952 campaign strategy to go along with the issues of the Korean 
War and Communism they had used two years earlier:  Corruption.  The Republicans 
hoped their “K1C2” formula would regain control of the White House and Congress for 
the first time in decades. 
The Democrats, however, handed the GOP another weapon that was a hangover 
from the 1948 election, the rebellion of the Southern wing of the party against the 
Truman liberals.  Many Southern Democrats made it clear they would not support Harry 
Truman in 1952 for another term under any circumstances.  At a Jefferson-Jackson Day 
dinner in June 1951, Senator Harry F. Byrd (VA) vowed to oppose any Fair Dealer, 
particularly the president.  Calling on Democrats to restore a convention rule that would 
aid Southern influence by requiring a two-thirds majority to select a candidate, Byrd, 
sounding like Truman’s worst Republican enemies, accused the administration of 
“corruption,” “irresponsibility,” and “moral and ethical turpitude.”21 
  Truman loyalists fought back.  At New York’s Democratic state committee 
gathering a few days later, state chairman Paul Fitzpatrick counterattacked, lambasting 
the “infamous, reactionary Dixiecrats” for making their “unholy alliance” with 
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Republicans to kill the Fair Deal.  Friction between the Fair Dealers and their Dixiecrat 
opponents heated up at the November 1951 Southern Governors Conference in Hot 
Springs, Arkansas.  Ironically, this meeting traditionally had avoided political 
speechmaking, but the Southerners broke this precedent in flamboyant fashion.  The 
loyalists, led by host Governor Sid McMath, maneuvered behind the scenes to arrange 
for House Speaker Sam Rayburn to speak, without bothering to seek approval from 
states-righters such as Governor James Byrnes of South Carolina.  Responding to 
criticism for breaking the Southern governors’ tradition of avoiding partisanship at their 
meeting, McMath retorted that the key speaker at the group’s 1949 gathering was 
Governor Byrnes, who had used the occasion to berate the Truman administration.  
Rayburn gave his audience a strong admonition to be loyal to the Democratic Party, 
defending its record since the New Deal era.  The Speaker went on to remind the 
governors that Southern Democrats controlled key committees in Congress, and electing 
a Republican president in 1952 would jeopardize their power.  Harkening back to 1948, 
he urged the former Dixiecrats in his audience to recall the futility of backing a third 
party candidate and invoked patriotism as the incentive to back the president regardless 
of whether they loved or hated President Truman.22 
Rayburn’s speech brought Democratic internal strife into the open.  “The best 
way to avoid a split in the party is for Mr. Truman not to be nominated,” grumbled 
Georgia’s governor, Herman Talmadge, and Texas Governor Allan Shivers added, 
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“Some fellow once wrote, ‘methinks thou protests thy virtue too loudly’.”  Conveniently 
forgetting his 1949 speech to the group, Byrnes accused Rayburn of being the one to 
break the Southern Governors’ tradition of avoiding political discussion.  Despite the rift 
it exposed in the party, Rayburn expressed no remorse, writing a friend, “I do not think I 
enjoyed making a speech in my life more . . . especially to the Dixiecrat crowd of them. . 
. .  I told some of them if they were tired of hearing that kind of speech they would get 
more tired between now and 1952.”   President Truman, of course, loved the speaker’s 
message, telling Rayburn it “hit some people in the raw in exactly the right place.”23 
Truman and Rayburn enjoyed getting their digs in against the former Dixiecrats, 
but this attack did not make political sense.  While the president and the speaker had 
endured challenges to their leadership of the party through the rejection of the 21-day 
rule in the House and the formation of anti-Truman coalitions, these governors were not 
direct participants in the Democrats’ intra-party clashes in Washington.  It therefore may 
have been easier mend the party’s fences through dialogue with the governors than with 
the Trumanites’ Democratic adversaries in Congress.  Despite Governor Byrnes’ 
ongoing feud with the president, Rayburn could have taken a more conciliatory stance 
towards the others that might have encouraged party unity.  This confrontation also was 
a bad idea because it occurred only six months after Senator Russell had led the 
MacArthur hearings to a conclusion that proved very helpful to HST.  The Georgian 
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helped Truman’s cause immensely, and the president and his people could have tried to 
build upon that.  Instead, they elected to go on the attack against the Dixiecrats. 
  A few days after the Southern Governors conference, the president made a 
momentous announcement to his senior staff.  Vacationing in Key West on November 
19, 1951, Truman read a memorandum he had written to himself in 1950 before the war 
erupted:  He would not run for another term.  Incredibly, to their credit, his staff kept a 
lid on this bombshell.  HST nonetheless was determined to play kingmaker and 
immediately began working behind the scenes to find a Democratic standard-bearer for 
1952.  His first choice was Fred Vinson, a good friend who happened to be Chief Justice 
of the Supreme Court.  Vinson declined, forcing the chief executive to turn to his NATO 
commander, Dwight Eisenhower.  When Ike announced in January 1952 that he would 
run—as a Republican, Truman approached Illinois governor Adlai Stevenson, who 
vacillated for six months.24 
Publicly, the president was coy about his intentions.  The day after he told his 
staff he would not be a candidate, Truman spoke to the National Women’s Democratic 
Club.  Calling the upcoming election “a matter of considerable interest to me,” HST said 
he was not going to disclose who the candidate would be, although he did “have some 
ideas on that subject.”  The Dallas Morning News, assuming the worst, interpreted this 
as his clear intent of his candidacy.  On February 18, 1952, the chief executive met with 
six of his closest advisors and discussed possible nominees, himself included.  They 
                                                 
24 Truman, note to self, April 16, 1950; PSF:  Longhand Notes File, April 16, 1950 folder; Truman Papers, HSTL; 
Jerry N. Hess, “Oral History Interview with Admiral Robert L. Dennison,” November 2, 1971, 
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/dennisn3.htm#193 , pp. 193-196, (March 1, 2007) describes the staff keeping 
Truman’s intentions confidential;  For Truman’s kingmaking activities, see Hamby, Man of the People, 600-03. 
 
 77
were divided over whether he should run.  A few days later at an address to fellow 
Masons, while discussing the job of being president, he remarked, “Just between you 
and me and the gate post, I like it.”  In March, Truman released a book of his 
presidential papers, Mr. President.  Unusual because presidents typically did not release 
personal papers while still in office, the book fueled rumors that the HST was 
considering another run.25 
Other Democratic presidential hopefuls waited on the sidelines for “Give ‘em 
hell Harry” to announce his intentions, save one.  Estes Kefauver jumped into the race 
first and emerged as the early leader even though Truman turned down his request for an 
endorsement.  A loner in the Senate, Kefauver’s organized crime probe had made him 
popular with the voters but unpopular with Democratic leaders, some of whom were 
smarting from the fallout over the investigation.  Others worried about the presence of 
political mavericks such as Robert La  Follette, Jr. in the senator’s organization.  When 
the Tennessean announced he would enter the California primary, Florida’s Democratic 
governor issued a press release calling the candidate a “fabulous faker” and a “political 
phony,” and offered to debate this “cunning conniver.”26 
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Kefauver affected the race in an important way by helping nudge Truman out of 
the contest.  The president did not campaign for the March 11 New Hampshire primary.  
Yet, he left his name on the ballot, probably due to a combination of his distaste for 
Kefauver and a desire to test the political waters.  The Tennessee senator, after stumping 
vigorously in the state, soundly thrashed the president 55 to 44 percent.   Despite 
Truman’s lack of campaigning, the results shocked his state chairman.  After the 
primary, HST again discussed the possibility of running with his top advisors.  This 
time, they unanimously agreed that he should step aside.  The New Hampshire verdict 
and a job approval rating languishing between 23-25 percent told the president what he 
needed to do.  On March 29, at a Jefferson-Jackson Day dinner, Truman announced he 
would not actively campaign for another term nor accept a draft at the convention,  
provoking cries of, “Oh, my God!” and “Oh no!” among the party faithful in attendance.  
Still, he wielded considerable power in the selection of his successor as the party’s 
standard-bearer.27 
The South pinned its hopes on the candidacy of Richard Russell.  The Georgia 
senator had enhanced his already solid credibility within the party during the MacArthur 
hearings.  Truman thought highly of him, saying Russell had “all the qualifications as to 
ability and brains.”  Influential members of the Senate shared the president’s sentiments 
in spite of their ideological differences with Russell. Even though Senator Russell tried 
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to portray himself as a moderate and emphasized his internationalist approach to foreign 
policy, he could not overcome the stigma of being a regional, anti-civil rights candidate.  
As Truman noted, the Georgia senator was “poison to Northern Democrats and honest 
Liberals.”28  
Southern Democrats made contingency plans in case the nominee did not appeal 
to them.  One tactic was to change Electoral College rules to allow Democratic slates of 
presidential electors to cast their votes for an opposition candidate, even if the 
Democratic ticket carried the state.  Truman aide David D. Lloyd, recalling Virginia 
passing a law in 1948 empowering the state’s Democratic committee to instruct 
Democratic presidential electors, wisely pushed the administration to mount a legal 
opposition to such moves, and tried to spur the Democratic National Committee (DNC) 
to commit resources to do the same.  In Alabama, a court battle ensued over an attempt 
to permit Democratic presidential electors to vote for candidates from other parties.  
During the litigation, one witness even declared under oath that he would be willing to 
steal votes to prevent Truman’s nomination.  HST loyalists successfully challenged this 
move, winning a U.S. Supreme Court decision binding Alabama electors to support the 
party’s candidate.  However, Trumanites failed to stop Georgia from passing a law that 
banned showing the names of presidential candidates on the ballot, listing the names of 
the presidential electors instead.  This freed electors from the moral and legal obligation 
to vote for a particular candidate, enabling them to select as they pleased.  Such activities 
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emphasize the potential value of HST trying to patch things up with the Southern 
governors, who could have helped shape the fate of state laws designed to circumvent 
the national party.29          
In Texas, where the intensity of Democratic disharmony matched the size of the 
state and its strength in the Electoral College, Governor Allan Shivers pursued a 
different strategy to undermine the Truman loyalists.  After slapping the administration 
in the face by coordinating a speaking tour by General MacArthur in Texas, the governor 
facilitated the first Republican primary in state history for the 1952 elections.  Shivers’ 
was not planning to jump to the GOP, but he did want to help Dwight Eisenhower get 
the Republican nomination in case a Trumanite became the Democratic candidate.  By 
legalizing cross-filing, which would permit the names of local Democratic contenders to 
appear on both parties’ slates, conservative Democrats could vote for Eisenhower as the 
Republican nominee and select Democratic candidates for state office in the Republican 
primary.  A worried Truman supporter wrote the president, “Something must be done or 
we real Democrats are blown up.”  The president, perhaps weary of the internal 
divisiveness in the party, responded that if Texas wanted to vote Republican, he could do 
little about it.30 
Shivers’ moves in Texas drew national interest, inspiring Republican dreams of 
finally returning to power on Capitol Hill.  Senator Karl Mundt (R-SD) jumped on the 
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opportunity to woo anti-Truman Democrats, suggesting Texas could “pull most of the 
South along on some effective program of political realignment.”  Mundt went on to 
make a bizarre proposal that would have allowed Rayburn to continue as House Speaker 
and Southern Democratic committee chairs to retain their posts in return for their support 
of Republicans, if the GOP became the majority party following the 1952 elections.31   
The few Southern Democrats responding to the Mundt plan did so quite 
cautiously, lulling the White House into a false sense of security about the upcoming 
elections.  After meeting with a key Texan on the DNC, Truman advisor Clark Clifford 
dismissed the Shivers crusade, “The South cannot get anywhere by leaving the 
Democratic Party.”  Clifford failed to recognize political realities.  Shivers and company 
were not trying to engineer another Dixiecrat third-party revolt like in 1948.  The whole 
point of the cross-filing bill was to allow Democrats to oppose Truman or any other Fair 
Dealer for president without leaving the party.32 
 Governor Shivers’ opposition to Truman, like that of other Southern Democrats, 
had little to do with the Korean War.  Southerners were determined to stop the 
continuing expansion of federal government power at the expense of the states, begun 
during the New Deal and attempted by Truman through the Fair Deal.  Thus, the South’s 
main concern early in the campaign was halting federal programs such as Fair 
Employment Practices (FEPC) legislation, a civil rights initiative, and the Brannan 
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agricultural plan.  Some Southerners publicly endorsed the “principles of 1840,” 
apparently waxing nostalgic for the days when whites reigned supreme.  However, the 
war handed them a campaign weapon against the liberal wing of the party because it 
gave McCarthyism a new lease on life, reviving fears of communist infiltration at home.  
The South believed that redbaiting could help their cause against the Trumanites, leading 
Shivers to trumpet, “I’m tired of a lot of ultra-intellectual parlor pinks and so-called 
liberal crackpots running the Democratic Party.”  Such rhetoric gave credence to 
Newsweek’s report on the eve of the national convention that if HST tried to nab the 
nomination, then conservative Southern Democrats would definitely “try to blow the 
Democratic Party to bits.”33 
One historian called the 1952 Democratic convention “relatively harmonious,” 
while another called it a “free-for-all marked by confusion, uncertainty and near-chaos.”  
They were both right.  Compared to the 1948 convention featuring a Dixiecrat walkout 
and another faction splintering into the Henry Wallace Progressive Party, 1952 could 
indeed have looked relatively tranquil.  On the other hand, the lack of a clear front-
runner for the nomination and the chaos over Southern recalcitrance made the 
convention far more exciting than the staged coronations of recent decades.34 
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The Chicago convention focused on domestic issues, almost to the exclusion of 
foreign affairs and the Korean War.  Little debate occurred over a frequent source of 
division, the policies of Dean Acheson.  Since this was the first time  in twenty years that 
the Democrats did not have an incumbent president to nominate, opponents of Franklin 
Roosevelt and his legacy saw a window of opportunity.  Would the party maintain the 
trend begun by Roosevelt and continued by Truman advocating an activist federal 
government in areas such as civil rights, or would Southerners regain control of the party 
and rein in Washington?  Determined to prevent a recurrence of the Dixiecrat walkout, 
DNC chairman Frank McKinney told the press that the main mission of the Platform 
Committee would be “to remove the disunity that existed in 1948.”  Liberal Democrats 
therefore bent over backwards to appease the Southerners, diluting the party’s civil 
rights plank, backing away from enforcing loyalty to the national candidate, and 
accepting a compromise candidate opposed to much of  the  Fair Deal.35       
A pair of Southern states managed to create crises of party unity before the 
convention even got started.  Mississippi’s controversy was a carryover from its bolt to 
the Dixiecrat Party.  The 1948 Democratic convention ended up seating the Mississippi 
delegation with limited credentials, which gave the state organization the authority to 
oppose the presidential ticket and the party platform even though its delegates 
participated in the national convention.  The Mississippi state convention selected its 
delegates in June 1952 with similar instructions, apparently expecting to get the same 
concessions as in 1948.  Protesting this threat to party unanimity, a breakaway group of 
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Mississippi Democrats loyal to the national party held a rump convention on July 5 and 
picked its own slate of delegates.  Two Mississippi delegations thus showed up in 
Chicago, challenging the convention to decide which group to seat without provoking 
another Dixiecrat walkout.  The Kefauver and Averell Harriman forces immediately 
went to work on behalf of the loyalists, but to no avail.  The convention seated the 
former Dixiecrats.36 
Texas also produced two slates of delegates, one group elected by HST loyalists 
and the other by Shivers Democrats opposed to the president; Truman called them 
“Texas Bolsheviks.”  The Shivers contingent, naturally, refused to promise their 
unconditional support for the party’s nominee.  Legally, they had a strong position and 
could threaten to bolt if the convention refused to seat them, possibly sparking a reprisal 
of the 1948 Dixiecrat exodus.  Harriman and Kefauver again backed the loyalists.  
Although sympathizing with the Trumanites, convention chairman Sam Rayburn met 
privately with Governor Shivers when the Texans arrived in Chicago, producing an 
agreement that sent the pro-Truman delegates home.  Rayburn came away believing that 
he had agreed to seat the Shivers delegation in return for the governor’s promise to 
support the party nominee, no matter who it was.  Later, the speaker found that Shivers 
thought otherwise.37 
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The controversy over the seating of the Texas and Mississippi delegations 
precipitated a larger debate over an attempt to enforce party unity in the upcoming 
presidential contest.  Senators Humphrey, Lehman and Blair Moody (MI) drafted a 
resolution stating, “No Delegate shall be seated unless he shall give assurance to the 
Credentials Committee that he will exert every honorable means available to him in any 
official capacity he may have” to ensure that the party’s nominees appeared on their 
states’ ballots.  They could do this by printing the candidates’ names on the ballot, or by 
listing the electors’ names, specifying that they were committed to voting for the 
Democratic ticket.  Moody explained that the resolution merely intended to keep 
delegates from actively trying to prevent the convention’s nominees from appearing on 
state ballots.  Although the newspapers termed the Moody resolution a loyalty “oath,” 
this was an overstatement because it did not require delegates to swear they would back 
the convention’s nominee.  The liberals in the party were asking the Southerners to meet 
them in the middle, stopping short of mandating support for the convention’s candidate, 
but demanding that delegates not obstruct Democratic nominee’s name from appearing 
on the ballot.38 
Nevertheless, the resolution sent many Southerners into an uproar, for it 
potentially could have barred as many as six state delegations from participating in the 
proceedings, including heavyweights such as South Carolina Governor James Byrnes 
and Senator Harry F. Byrd (VA).  Byrnes “trembled with rage” at the prospect of being 
booted from the convention, and moderate Southerners intentionally jockeyed to keep 
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him off the podium, which would have risked negotiations on the Moody resolution.  
Texas took the pledge because, as Shivers pointed out, it did not require delegates to 
support the nominee personally.  Mississippi and Georgia took a different approach, 
simply sending polite, but noncommittal, letters to the Credentials Committee.  The 
committee seated them.  Louisiana, South Carolina and Virginia, however, refused any 
such gesture.  Their strategy, according to a defiant Senator Byrd was to “not 
communicate with the credentials committee, just remain in our seats and let them be the 
aggressors and let them read us out of the convention or throw us out bodily if they 
will.”  The loyalists blinked first.  Even though the Louisiana, South Carolina, and 
Virginia delegations refused to sign the loyalty pledge, Rayburn seated them anyway for 
the sake of party unity.39 
Sectional divisions in the party manifested themselves at the convention in other 
ways.  Civil rights was the only issue producing significant debate on the platform in 
contrast to foreign policy, where delegates adopted a “stay the course” position.  Party 
liberals and Southern conservatives eventually compromised on the civil rights plank, as 
the liberals abandoned a proposal to ban Senate filibusters and avoided explicit 
endorsement of FEPC legislation.  Instead, the platform advocated the “right to equal 
opportunity of employment” and a commitment to fight racial discrimination.  This 
compromise represented a significant step back from the party’s 1948 stand on civil 
rights.  Yet, one journalist called these provisions the “largest concessions that Southern 
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Democrats have ever consented to.”  Reflecting the goal of preventing another Southern 
exodus at all costs, platform committee chairman and House Majority Leader John 
McCormack congratulated a colleague for producing “a strong platform, and above all--
maintaining unity in this Party.”  For some Southerners, even the platform and loyalty 
pledge conciliations were not enough.  As Eleanor Roosevelt provided the most stirring  
moment of the convention with a speech that electrified the attendees, the entire Shivers 
Texas delegation remained seated throughout.  When the audience rose to cheer the 
former First Lady, Senator Byrd stalked out.40 
The Democrats then turned to selecting a candidate.  Coming into the 
convention, no one was close to having a majority of delegates, but a “draft Stevenson” 
committee hit the ground running once the proceedings began.  On Thursday of 
convention week, the governor called Truman, asking if the president would be 
embarrassed if he allowed his name to be placed in nomination.  In his memoirs, Truman 
said he responded with “a show of exasperation and some rather vigorous words” and 
then gave his enthusiastic assent.  After the first two ballots, Kefauver took the lead, 
with Stevenson running a close second and gaining ground.  Yet the Tennessean had 
little chance of winning, and not just because of the animosity of the party’s leadership.  
Since Kefauver had led the unsuccessful crusade to take a hard line against the 
Southerners over the loyalty pledge issue, delegates labeled him as an extremist.  He and 
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other candidates dropped out and endorsed Stevenson, giving the Illinois governor the 
nomination he had resisted for so long.41 
A big reason for Stevenson’s acceptability as a compromise candidate was his 
moderate approach to government activism.   He believed that on the civil rights issue 
the federal government should not “put the South completely over a barrel,” leaving 
enforcement to the states.  The irony of the governor’s selection by a convention 
dominated by domestic issues was that he proved much more passionate about world 
affairs.  His nomination amounted to a ringing endorsement of the administration’s 
Korean policy.  Later, on the campaign trail, Stevenson declared that if the president had 
not fought in Korea, “Munich would follow Munich.”42 
Governor Stevenson chose Alabama Senator John Sparkman as his running mate, 
but six Southern delegations refused to endorse the ticket immediately.  Sparkman had 
supported most Truman policies, except civil rights.  The delegations of South Carolina, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, Georgia, Texas, and Virginia decided to have follow-up state 
conventions after departing Chicago to decide whether they would support the nominee.  
The state gatherings in Louisiana, Georgia and Virginia endorsed Stevenson.  
Conventions in Texas, South Carolina and Mississippi went the opposite direction, 
deciding that by law their delegates did not have to support the national nominee.43 
                                                 
41Stevenson’s call to Truman in Hamby, Man of the People, 608-9; Harry S. Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman: 
Volume 2, Years of Trial and Hope (Garden City, New York:  Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1956), 496; David, et al, 
150 analyzes opposition to Kefauver. 
 
42“Over a barrel” quoted in Martin, John Barlow, 540; “Munich” quote from Divine, 21.  
 
43 Frederickson, 229-232 describes efforts to free delegates from national party loyalty; “Georgia Endorses 
Democrats’ Ticket,” NYT, 5 August 1952, p. 10; Smith, William H., “Va. Party Gives Adlai Lukewarm Support,” 
Washington Post, 29 August 1952, p. 8.  
 89
The results of these state conventions, however, did not show the whole picture 
of Southern sentiment towards the Stevenson-Sparkman ticket.  South Carolina’s state 
convention paradoxically voted to support the ticket, but allowed its delegates the 
freedom to support Eisenhower.  Some key Southerners got behind the nominees.  
Richard Russell pledged to deliver not only Georgia, but also the entire South to 
Stevenson.  Mississippi Governor Hugh White, who had fought for his delegation’s right 
not to endorse the national ticket at Chicago, called Stevenson “an elegant gentleman 
and a very capable man” who would unite the party.44 
Yet, many Southerners decided they liked Ike.  “Democrats for Eisenhower” 
organizations developed in several states.  Governor Byrnes blasted his party even 
though the South Carolina’s state convention endorsed the Stevenson-Sparkman ticket.  
He refused, however, to go so far as to approve of a scheme allowing Democratic 
presidential electors to cast their votes for Eisenhower as the Republican nominee.  
Byrnes instead approved a petition containing 53,000 signatures (only 10,000 were 
required) to list Eisenhower and running mate Richard Nixon on the state’s ballot as an  
independent ticket, apparently enabling the South Carolina governor to support Ike 
without the guilt of voting with the opposition party.  This provision let Democrats cast 
their votes for Eisenhower/Nixon as independents rather than as Republicans.  
Mississippi did the same thing.  Byrnes subsequently came out publicly for Eisenhower, 
adding to the hard feelings between Truman and his former Secretary of State.45 
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Virginia Democrats also produced a splinter faction for Eisenhower, even though 
Governor John Butler and the state’s organization threw their weight behind Stevenson.  
The backing of the state’s convention, however, turned out to be worthless because the 
Virginia Democrats were controlled by a bitter foe of the Truman administration, 
Senator Harry F. Byrd.  The Virginia senator differed a bit from most of his Southern 
colleagues because he had been vehemently opposed to the New Deal from day one, 
fighting the Social Security Act and the National Recovery Act.  He also believed the 
Marshall Plan had been a waste of money.  Byrd loathed Truman.  Although the senator 
was unwilling to campaign for Eisenhower, he made sure the Democratic machine did 
little to help Stevenson.  Byrd called the main issues of the campaign “usurpation of 
power by the Executive” and “trends to socialism.”  In response, Vice President Barkley 
retorted that Democratic defectors were “like the woman who keeps her husband’s name 
. . . but bestows her favors to the man across the street.”  Thanks in part to Byrd, in 1952 
Eisenhower became the second Republican to carry Virginia since Civil War 
reconstruction.46  
Unlike Virginia, the state organization in Texas repudiated the ticket and its 
leadership actively campaigned for Eisenhower.  Governor Allan Shivers concocted 
what became the top issue of the campaign in his state.  Texans prided their oil, and they 
had been fighting with the federal government since the 1930s over revenues from 
offshore drilling lands, or the “tidelands,” as the Southerners disingenuously termed 
them.  According to the Truman administration’s estimates, some $40 billion of 
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petroleum revenues were at stake for coastal oil-producing states like Texas, California, 
Louisiana and Alabama.  Furthermore, the Korean War had increased the demand for 
petroleum products, leading the U.S. Petroleum Administration for Defense to predict 
that world demand for oil would exceed supply by the end of 1951, increasing the stakes 
in the tidelands fight.  The U.S. Department of the Interior quantified a deficit in 
domestic oil production of 276,000 barrels/day along with a significant shortfall in 
natural gas.  Shivers therefore decided to make the tidelands the litmus test for whether 
to support Stevenson.47 
Key politicians alerted the candidate to the sensitivity of the tidelands issue, 
suggesting it could cost the Democrats Texas, Louisiana, and perhaps Alabama and 
California in the election.  Even Southern states without offshore oil saw the tidelands as 
a states-rights issue.  Nevertheless, Stevenson told Shivers that he could not support 
Texas’ claim for the tidelands, prompting Senate Majority Whip Lyndon Johnson (D-
TX) to call him a “goddamned fool” for allowing the Texas governor to pin him down 
on the issue.  Rejecting Stevenson’s offer to work out a compromise, Shivers 
immediately renounced his support for the Democratic nominee and campaigned for 
Eisenhower, who supported state claims for tidelands oil.  Believing Shivers had reneged 
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on his promise to back the party’s nominee, Sam Rayburn fumed, “He lied to me. . . .  
You don’t lie to me.  I don’t want the son of a bitch at my funeral.”48 
 Governor Shivers did a masterful job in using the oil rights controversy against 
Stevenson.  “Most people in Texas didn’t give a damn about the Tidelands,” a Shivers 
aide conceded.  The key was:  “We made them feel they were losing something.”  Rep. 
Frank Boykin  (D-AL) noted that during a visit to Texas “a taxicab driver told us that we 
were trying to take the school children’s lunch money away” by opposing the state’s 
rights to the tidelands.  Yet, the ballyhoo over offshore oil revenue was a smokescreen 
Shivers used to oppose any Democrat endorsing an activist federal government of the 
Truman tradition.  In a brass knuckles campaign in which the Shivercrats ridiculed 
House Speaker Rayburn as a “pinhead” and “peanut-brain” for backing Stevenson, they 
delivered Texas for Eisenhower.49 
The tidelands issue had little effect elsewhere in the South.  Although Louisiana 
and Alabama both stood to profit from gaining state  control of offshore mineral rights 
tax revenue and had joined the Dixiecrat revolt in 1948, Stevenson carried them handily 
in the election.  However, as far as other Southerners were concerned, there was a more 
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important reason to oppose Adlai Stevenson.  Harry Truman had endorsed the Illinois 
governor, which, in their eyes, was the ultimate curse.  
 In Mississippi, a faction of former Dixiecrats kept the spirit of 1948 alive.  They 
felt the national party had been in danger since 1948, a condition continuing in 1952 
even though Truman had decided to forgo another term.  Railing against “active and 
dangerous minority and racial groups,” the Mississippians blasted the Truman wing of 
the party.  The ex-Dixiecrats warned, “As long as this gang, with its pinks and punks, is 
in control of the National Democratic Party those who stand for Constitutional 
government and States’ Rights can expect absolutely nothing.”  The States Rights 
Democrats also threatened to organize a splinter group, suggesting a third party could 
prevent any candidate from gaining a majority in the Electoral College and throw  the 
election into the House of Representatives, where they believed (for reasons known but 
to them) that Richard  Russell could be elected.  The hatred of this group towards the 
Fair Dealers was striking, as was their adamant refusal to compromise with the 
Trumanites.  Nevertheless, due to Governor Hugh White’s leadership, these Dixiecrats 
did not get their way in the general election; Stevenson carried Mississippi handily.50        
   Other influential Southerners such as Strom Thurmond and Louisiana governor 
Robert Kennon backed Eisenhower.  Interestingly, Stevenson managed to carry these 
Deep South states anyway.  However, with help from disaffected leaders such as Texas 
Governor Allan Shivers, Eisenhower carried the traditionally Democratic states of 
Florida, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia, providing a final indicator of the 
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disenchantment of many Southern Democrats with the Truman wing of their party.  In 
these five states, the president’s backing of Stevenson was the kiss of death.     
The president’s elation over the nomination of Stevenson dissipated when the 
candidate took charge of his campaign.  The nominee moved his headquarters to 
Springfield and replaced DNC chairman Frank McKinney, a Truman man tainted by 
charges of financial improprieties.  The governor named Stephen Mitchell, a “reform-
minded” Chicago lawyer who recently had served as counsel for the House’s 
investigation of the Justice Department, as the new DNC chairman.  Although Mitchell 
was relatively unknown in political circles, his appointment was designed to ease tension 
within the party over the corruption issue.   HST initially kept a stiff upper lip, inviting 
Stevenson and Sparkman to a meeting at the White House to discuss campaign strategy, 
where they agreed that the president would wait until October to hit the campaign trail.  
However, when a reporter baited Stevenson into conceding that there was a mess in 
Washington that needed cleaning up, Truman’s resentment bubbled over.  Venting his 
anger in an unsent letter, HST told the nominee to “take your crackpots, your high 
socialites with their noses in the air, run your campaign and win if you can,” describing 
himself as “a bystander who has become disinterested.”  Newsweek reported, “Harry S.  
Truman was good and mad at him, and didn’t care who knew it.”51 
Republicans mistakenly believed that the other “C” in their K1C2 formula, 
Communism, could be useful due to the apparent success of Joseph McCarthy’s antics in 
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the 1950 elections.  The Wisconsin senator campaigned in thirteen states for Republican 
incumbents, and was instrumental in the unseating of a personal nemesis, Senator 
William Benton (D-CT), a victory that had eluded them in a special election two years 
earlier.  Yet, McCarthy wielded little other influence in the 1952 campaign.  Even in the 
Connecticut race, Benton garnered more votes than Stevenson in a losing effort, showing 
the limits of McCarthy’s potency in a race he treated as his second-highest priority 
(after, of course, his own re-election).  This trend held true in every state where 
McCarthy specifically targeted Democratic senatorial candidates.52 
The Illinois governor stood with Truman against McCarthyism.  Most notably, he 
refused to abandon Dean Acheson.  The Secretary of State delivered two major speeches 
during the campaign attacking the Soviet Union, and Stevenson defended him by 
reminding voters of recommendations by both Eisenhower and MacArthur to pull 
American troops out of Korea prior to 1950.   While he allowed a key backer to predict 
his administration would have a new Secretary of State, Stevenson refused pleas by 
DNC chairman Mitchell and India Edwards, the top woman in the party organization, to 
announce that Acheson would retire after the election.53  
The Democratic nominee faced the challenge of supporting Truman’s foreign 
policies while avoiding political damage from the president’s abysmal approval rating, 
holding steady at 32 percent through the last half of 1952.  Moreover, Stevenson was in 
                                                 
52 McCarthy’s targeting on Benton and overall effect on campaign in Oshinsky, 238-9, 242-5; Hyman, 478 contrasts 
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the ticklish situation of managing an incumbent president wanting badly to mix it up 
with the Republicans on the campaign trail.  During the final month of the election, 
Korea became the most prominent element of the Republican K1C2 formula.  
Paradoxically, this occurred due to Harry Truman’s success on campaign trail and his 
and failure to produce an armistice.54   
By late September, Republican attacks on the president’s record had riled him up 
so much that he could not help himself; he had to enter the fray whether Stevenson 
invited him in or not.  After hearing Eisenhower criticize his foreign policy, Truman 
said, “I nearly choked to hear him,” believing the general had been heavily involved in 
the development of the administration’s international approach.  HST made a difference 
in the campaign despite his lame duck status.  Over the next several weeks, the 
commander in chief threw himself into a whistle-stop trip covering 19,000 miles in 
which he made 211 speeches.  Truman energized voters with his freewheeling attacks on 
the Republicans, contrasting with Governor Stevenson, who sometimes talked above 
their heads.  As one historian wrote, “Truman’s most valuable contribution to 
Stevenson’s cause was to take on Eisenhower personally, and thus end the pretense that 
the General stood above partisan politics.”  Among other things, the president hammered 
on the fact that Eisenhower had recommended withdrawal of troops from Korea in 1947.  
The president recalled years afterward that he “took the hide off” Eisenhower, and 
“skinned him from the crown of his head to the heel of his foot.”  Truman’s tactics 
started to work by early October.  One poll showed that the gap between Stevenson and 
                                                 
54 George Gallup, The Gallup Poll:  Public Opinion, 1935-1971, Vol. 2, 1949-1958 (New York:  Random House, 
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Eisenhower had shrunk to four percentage points, prompting a Republican research 
service to report there was “little doubt that Truman is responsible for this alarming shift 
of public opinion.”  An analysis for the Democratic campaign said Truman was the 
“only threat to the whole farm vote falling into Ike’s lap . . . and it is a real threat.”55 
The Republicans responded by making the war the top issue for the rest of the 
campaign.  Polling data indicated that Korea was the number one concern of 
independent voters weary of armistice negotiations that had gone on for over a year with 
seemingly little progress.  A Gallup poll produced the most dramatic numbers, indicating 
that two-thirds of potential voters thought Eisenhower was the candidate best able to 
handle Korea, versus 9 percent for Stevenson.  Shortly thereafter, events in the war 
intervened.  Following a July-August U.N. bombing campaign designed to induce 
communist concessions at the peace talks, the negotiations broke down on October 8 
over the repatriation of POWs.  The Truman administration refused to force North 
Korean and Chinese prisoners to return home if they did not want to, recalling the 
Russian POWs executed or sent to Siberia after World War II, and those who committed 
suicide rather than accept such fates.  With the fifteen month-old armistice talks stalled, 
the war escalated, producing some 1,000 American casualties per week.56 
The war presented a tough problem for Stevenson.  Some Democrats had 
optimistically predicted the war would end since the summer of 1951, creating 
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disillusionment among the electorate. Yet, the nominee stuck by Truman’s policies, 
backing the continued armistice talks even though they were at a temporary halt.  The 
governor mused, “Many wars have been avoided by patience and many have been 
precipitated by reckless haste.”  He was right, but the public was in no mood for such 
analysis.  Stevenson also affirmed Truman for going into Korea, making Wilsonian 
statements like, “God has set for us an awesome mission:  nothing less than leadership of 
the free world.”57 
The Democrats also countered the Republican emphasis on Korea by attacking 
Eisenhower, attempting to use his war hero image against him.  The DNC reminded the 
public of a January 1951 statement in which Ike said that military draftees should 
receive little pay, if any, because they were simply fulfilling their obligation to their 
country.  Stevenson’s team attempted to undermine the Republican’s credibility, pulling 
out a 1948 quote of the general saying, “The necessary and wise subordination of the 
military to civil power will be best sustained . . . when life-long professional soldiers . . . 
abstain from seeking high political office.”  In addition, the Democrats tried to take 
advantage of previous Eisenhower statements supporting Truman’s actions in Korea, 
such as his November 1951 assertion that there was “no recourse but to do what 
President Truman said and did.”   Democrats reminded the electorate that in June 1952, 
the general had supported the armistice talks, saying he did not think it “possible for our 
forces to carry through a decisive attack,” and that the best bet was to “try to get a decent 
                                                 
57 For examples of Democrats’ premature premature predictions of the end of the war, see Senator Blair Moody-
Speech before Indiana Young Democrats, July 21, 1951; Box 634; and “Research Institute of America 
Recommendations,” July 26, 1952; Box 663; Theodore F. Green Papers, MDLOC; Stevenson quoted in Divine, 67, 
74. 
 
 99
armistice out of it.”  HST dared Ike and his “snollygoster foreign state advisers” to tell 
the public how he proposed to end the war.58 
Eisenhower did not help himself much on Korea early in the campaign.  In 
August, he cited “the really terrible blunders that led up to the Korean war,” but added, 
“I do not see how these conditions, having occurred and having been created, how you 
could stay out of the thing.  I don’t know.”  In an October speech foreshadowing the 
Vietnamization crusade of America’s next limited war, the general said of the Korean 
conflict, “If there must be a war there, let it be Asians against Asians, with our support 
on the side of freedom.”  While it played well with his Republican base, Eisenhower’s 
comment seemed racist to several UN observers.  On October 8, the same day that 
armistice negotiations collapsed, the GOP nominee criticized Truman for entering the 
peace negotiations because it allowed the enemy forces to regroup.59 
  Ike’s best move, however, was soon to come.  On October 24, speaking in 
Detroit, Eisenhower responded to the president’s challenge to tell the nation how to end 
the Korean War, delivering the knockout punch of the election.  The Republican began 
by railing that the current administration “cannot be expected to repair what it failed to 
prevent.”  Then, he made the dramatic announcement:  “The job requires a personal trip 
to Korea.  I shall make that trip.  Only in that way could I learn how best to serve the 
American people in the cause of peace.  I shall go to Korea.”  Even though Eisenhower 
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failed to say what he would do in Korea, the media immediately declared him the victor 
with election day still two weeks away.  Reporters told an aide of the general, “That does 
it—Ike is in.”  Newsweek trumpeted that the Eisenhower campaign had “hit its peak in a 
single sentence.  Even the editors of the liberal New Republic later agreed, admitting, 
“twelve million parents found it hard to turn down a five-star General who assured them 
he would protect their sons from enemy fire.”60 
Eisenhower defeated the Illinois governor in a landslide, taking 55 percent of the 
popular vote and carrying 39 states, including the home states of both Stevenson and  
Truman, and four Southern states in the Democrats’ traditionally “solid South.”  
Americans showed much more interest than in the previous presidential race, with 
thirteen million more people casting ballots than in 1948.  Ironically, Governor 
Stevenson garnered two and a half million more votes in a losing cause than the 
victorious president did four years earlier.  Yet, a quarter of the people who said they 
voted for Truman in 1948 voted for Eisenhower in 1952.  Thus, the contest rejected the 
conventional wisdom that higher voter turnout favored the Democrats because they had 
more registered voters than the Republicans.61 
The election results surprised most Democrats.  Hoping for a repeat of 1948, they 
apparently were counting on an Election Day switch to Stevenson that never 
materialized.  Some took it hard.  A New York grocer turned in five false fire alarms the 
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day of the election, arrested by police as he tried for a sixth.  A Democratic renter, upset 
by the “triumphant smirks” of his Republican landlord, took out his frustrations by 
setting her house ablaze.  “I just didn’t like her attitude,” he explained to firefighters.  
Others took the defeat more gracefully as they paid off losing bets to Republicans.  In 
Alabama, a girl had to eat the front page of the pro-Eisenhower Montgomery Advisor, 
but not before burning it and dunking it in her coffee.  A Lowell, Massachusetts 
Democrat allowed a triumphant friend to pelt him with custard pies.  Perhaps the taste of 
defeat was not so bad, after all.62 
Democratic politicos, of course, had a more bitter taste in their mouths.  Senator 
Guy Gillette (IA) confided to a colleague that he expected to lose the White House and 
the House, but not the Senate, lamenting the second consecutive loss of the Democrats’ 
majority leader in the Senate.  This time, Ernest McFarland (AZ) bit the dust.  Senator 
Clinton Anderson consoled his fallen colleague, “My guess is that every person who was 
cussing President Truman voted against you.”63 
Eisenhower had short coattails.  The Republicans picked up only one seat in the 
Senate, but it was enough to give them a single seat majority.  In the House, the GOP 
gained twenty-two seats, which left them with a meager eight-vote majority.  Moreover, 
eighteen of the twenty-three Democrats running for a Senate seat ran more strongly in 
their states than Stevenson did against Ike, another indication that the crossover vote 
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went to Eisenhower specifically, but not to Republicans in general.  Nevertheless, for the 
first time since the Herbert Hoover administration, the GOP had control of the White 
House and both houses of Congress.   
Analysis of the issues affecting the election results yielded some surprises.  One 
pollster found that only three percent of voters brought up negative views about the 
Truman administration’s “softness on communism” or its suffering from communist 
infiltration as factors in their voting decision, despite their prominence in campaign 
rhetoric.  Southern voting produced interesting patterns.  Stevenson lost only four states 
in Dixie, but the popular vote told a more complete story.  In the eleven states of the 
former Confederacy, Governor Stevenson collected 51 percent of the vote, compared to 
Truman’s 53 percent and Dixiecrat Strom Thurmond’s 17 percent in 1948.  Thus, even 
without a Dixiecrat party to siphon away white Democratic votes, the governor did not 
do as well as the president.  Among blacks throughout the nation, Stevenson did as well 
as HST in 1948.  Why, then, did a large chunk of the white South vote for Eisenhower?   
According to pollster Louis Harris, Southern whites voting for Eisenhower did so out of 
concern for economic issues, the Korean War and the “mess in Washington” rather than 
Stevenson’s views on civil rights.  A regional economic concern was tidelands oil, the 
main factor in Texas and probably contributing to California going Republican.  The 
tidelands matter was also a psychological issue symbolizing the president’s perceived 
attack on states’ rights.64 
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Ultimately, just about everyone agreed that the Korean War was the biggest 
factor in voters’ minds.  Did Truman deliver victory to Eisenhower by choosing to 
suspend the peace talks in October rather than compromising with the Communists on 
the POW repatriation issue and possibly ending the war before election day?  The 
answer is no.  The Pentagon and the American public backed the president’s stand, and 
anything perceived a capitulating to the adversary would have made things even tougher 
on Stevenson.  Nevertheless, political scientists noted, “Foreign policy became a 
dynamic component of total public motivation in 1952 in a manner which contrasted 
sharply with the ‘bipartisan’ era of 1948.”  The war thus accounted for the big increase 
in voter turnout in 1952 because, unlike 1948, debates on foreign affairs were no longer 
taboo.  Secretary of the Interior Oscar Chapman, a key Truman political operative, said 
the Democrats lost due to “Korea, more than anything else.”  Virtually all the media 
agreed with him, and so did Stevenson.  Political analysts noted that the ability to handle 
the war was the most frequently mentioned positive quality voters saw in Eisenhower.  
Based on interviews of Massachusetts voters, James MacGregor Burns and Philip 
Hastings wrote that Eisenhower “served as a symbol of national security much as 
Roosevelt served as a symbol of economic security in the 1930s.”65          
During the latter half of 1951, Truman assistant Ken Hechler prepared a voting 
summary of Democratic committee chairs and other congressional leaders for the period 
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of January 1947-July 1951 that revealed insights into the harmony between them and the 
administration’s agenda.  The breakdown of seventeen Democratic Senate leaders 
indicated that six consistently backed the president (all Westerners), while four of them 
(three Westerners and one Southerner) steadfastly opposed him.  The remaining 
“middle” group of six Southerners indicated a drastic reduction in support of Truman 
beginning in 1949 and lasting through 1950.  Yet, this group’s support of the president 
rebounded strongly into the plus column in 1951.  Analysis of the twenty-one 
Democratic leaders in the House showed that eleven (including two Southerners) 
consistently backed Truman’s programs.  The remaining ten, all from the South, 
indicated the same trend as the “middle” group in the Senate, with steeply declining 
support of Truman in 1949-1950 that rebounded sharply the following year.  The 
UAW’s report on Congress’s 1951 performance noted that a strong majority of 
Democrats backed the president on rearmament and foreign policy issues.66 
What does this all mean?  First, it surprisingly shows that in the Senate, 
most Southern leaders did not oppose Truman throughout his administration.  
Certainly, the erosion of support among Southerners in 1949-1950 stemmed from 
a reaction to Truman’s 1948 civil rights initiatives and the Communist victory in 
China.  As a result, the commander in chief entered the war in a very weak 
position within his party in June 1950.  With a lack of Democratic solidarity at 
the war’s outset, HST faced an increasingly difficult time rallying support for the 
war as it descended into stalemate.  An unexpected conclusion from the Senate 
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analysis is that Truman’s most consistent detractors among the Democrats came 
from the West rather than the South.  The failure of the Democrats to rally 
around Acheson gave McCarthyism a boost following the 1950 elections, but did 
not significantly affect Truman’s conduct the war.  Finally, Hechler’s report 
indicates that Democratic support of Truman survived the furor over China’s 
intervention into the war and the termination of MacArthur, rebounding in the 
first half of 1951.  The president, however, did not content himself with 
demanding party loyalty as he conducted the war.  He believed that in foreign 
policy, the opposition party should also rally around the president. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
ON-AGAIN, OFF-AGAIN:  BIPARTISANSHIP, 1945-1950 
 
It is most important that every effort be made to maintain a true bipartisan 
foreign policy.  It will be my purpose . . . not only to keep the members of 
the minority currently informed, but to solicit their views and take them 
into serious account in both the formulation and implementation of our 
foreign policy. 
 
--President Harry S Truman, April 18, 1950 
 
To hell with all that. 
 
--Senate Foreign Relations committee chairman Tom Connally (D-TX), 
November 27, 1950, responding to Republican demands for more input 
into foreign policy.1 
 
 
World War II was a time devoid of political partisanship over foreign policy; it 
was in the national interest for the United States to present a united front “at the water’s 
edge.”  The idea of a bipartisan or nonpartisan foreign policy suggested that political 
give and take would help America’s enemies exploit its weaknesses.  Debate on 
international issues between Democratic and Republican politicians therefore was a 
delicate matter in the 1940s.  Once the president made a policy decision, ostensibly after 
getting input from both parties, he expected them either to support him or to refrain from 
publicly criticizing him.  Moreover, during World War II foreign policy issues were 
taboo during electoral campaigns.       
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The Korean War presented major challenges to bipartisanship.  The 
overwhelming endorsement of Truman’s decision to intervene evaporated quickly, and 
the Republican Party unapologetically made the war a campaign issue in the 1950 mid-
term elections.  In the spring of 1951, the commander in chief’s termination of 
MacArthur drove the final nail into the coffin of the nonpartisan foreign policy. 
Part II of this study evaluates the ways that bipartisanship—or the lack thereof—
manifested itself under Truman’s leadership during Korea.  Unlike Ronald J. Caridi and 
David R. Kepley, who examined the Republican dynamics of bipartisan foreign policy, 
this analysis scrutinizes the ways that HST and the Democrats approached the issue.  
How did the president and his party define bipartisan foreign policy, and did they 
practice what they preached?  Did the administration solicit Republican input?  To the 
Democrats, what was the real purpose of bipartisanship in foreign affairs?  How did 
McCarthyism influence nonpartisanship?  The answers to these questions will describe 
the degree of unanimity as Truman oversaw the war.2 
Two chapters are devoted to this topic in chronological order.  This one traces the 
birth a nonpartisan foreign policy during World War II and the political events affecting 
inter-party relations leading up to Korea.  Next, it examines the political dynamics and 
the beliefs of the key players involved in bipartisanship.  The chapter then analyzes how 
McCarthyism and the Tydings Committee hearings influenced the administration’s 
conduct of international affairs.  Subsequent issues are bipartisanship in the nation’s 
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conduct of the war through the Chinese intervention, and the significance of Far East 
policy debates during the 1950 elections.  Chapter IV begins by analyzing HST’s efforts 
to retain Republican support in the aftermath of China’s entry.  It looks at the effects of 
MacArthur’s termination upon the bipartisan foreign policy, and examines the 
president’s counter-attacks on Republicans through his probe of the China Lobby.  The 
chapter concludes with a study of the bipartisan support for Truman’s stand against the 
forcible repatriation of POW’s. 
The idea that both parties should work together to craft U.S. foreign policy took 
shape during World War II.  As the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration began planning 
an international organization to prevent a third world war, they were determined to avoid 
repeating Woodrow Wilson’s failure to sell the League of Nations to Congress.  
Wilson’s team at Versailles included himself, three other Democrats, and only one 
Republican, contributing to disaster when the Senate rejected the treaty.  In March 1944, 
Secretary of State Cordell Hull asked the Senate Foreign Relations committee to form 
the “Committee of Eight” to evaluate drafts of what became the U.N. charter.  Breaking 
with tradition, Foreign Relations committee chairman Tom Connally balanced the 
subcommittee members evenly by party rather than giving his Democrats the majority.  
The Roosevelt administration supplemented the Committee of Eight by including key 
Republican leaders from both houses in the U.N. planning process.  FDR’s team wisely 
took pains to involve all GOP factions rather than selecting only those Republicans 
friendly to the administration.  Their strategy paid off handsomely when the Senate 
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approved the U.N. charter 89-2, marking the official beginning of the bipartisan foreign 
policy.3 
HST encouraged bipartisanship when he became president.  Following the 
Truman Doctrine speech of March 1947, the foreign affairs panels in both houses 
unanimously endorsed aid for Greece and Turkey as the president requested, although 
Republicans were annoyed that he did not tell them about the speech beforehand.  
Truman included prominent Republicans such as Senator Arthur Vandenberg (R-MI) 
and John Foster Dulles in early discussions on the Marshall Plan, paving the way for 
unanimous approval by the Senate Foreign Relations committee.  The committee also 
backed the North Atlantic Treaty without dissent in 1949, leading the Senate to pass it 
by an 82-13 landslide.  It is noteworthy, however, that these foreign policy successes all 
dealt with European affairs.  After the Communist victory in the Chinese civil war, some 
suggested that there had never been the same bipartisanship in the formation of Far East 
policy as with European issues.4 
Truman and his secretary of state defined an unpartisan foreign policy in 
different ways.  HST wrote that bipartisanship meant “the President can repose 
confidence in the members of the other party and that in turn the leaders of that party 
have confidence in the President’s conduct of foreign affairs.”  He appreciated 
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Vandenberg’s input on issues and, more importantly, that the Michigan senator did not 
attempt to undermine administration policies he disagreed with.  To Truman, 
bipartisanship could not work unless he and the Republicans could trust each other not to 
use disagreements on foreign policy for political gain.  Acheson viewed the idea more 
cynically, calling it the “holy water sprinkled on a political necessity.”  The secretary 
believed the executive branch should run foreign policy, and getting the GOP on board 
helped grease the friction between the executive and legislative branches created by the 
Constitution’s checks and balances.  Acheson declared the way to execute a nonpartisan 
approach was to proclaim to Capitol Hill and the public that  “politics stops at the 
seaboard—and anyone who denies that postulate is a son-of-a-bitch and a crook and not 
a true patriot, ” adding, “Now if people will swallow that, then you’re off to the races.”5  
Changes in leadership of the Senate Foreign Relations committee prior to the war 
influenced the dynamics of conducting international affairs.  The Democrats regained 
control of the Senate following the 1948 elections, causing Vandenberg to relinquish the 
chairmanship to Connally.  The Michigan senator was the straw stirring the drink of 
bipartisanship, and Truman revered him, even though he did not always agree with the 
president and distanced himself from the administration in such situations.  Acheson 
respected Vandenberg as well, a sentiment he did not share regarding Connally.  The 
Texan had an inferiority complex about his Republican counterpart, which sometimes 
hampered bipartisan efforts.  Connally once attempted to have the chief White House 
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usher fired for placing the Michiganian ahead of him in a reception line.  Another time, 
when asked about Vandenberg’s views on an issue during a press conference, Connally 
railed, “Van, Van; that’s all I hear is Van!  Who gives a damn what Vandenberg thinks?”  
The Texan was not the student of foreign affairs that Vandenberg was, nor was he as 
dedicated to the concept of a nonpartisan foreign policy.  Moreover, Connally’s 
insistence on being the “first to know” made it difficult for Acheson to have direct 
dialogue with Republican members of congressional foreign affairs committees.6 
The power structure in Congress in the late 1940s consisted of an alliance of the 
Democrats and the internationalist wing of the Republican Party led by Vandenberg and 
Senator William Knowland (CA).  An isolationist faction of the GOP led by Robert A. 
Taft (OH) opposed them.  Although Taft was not on the Foreign Relations committee, he 
was able to hinder Truman’s agenda once Vandenberg fell ill to cancer in the spring of 
1950 because no other GOP heavyweights were on the panel.  Vandenberg’s absence 
removed the only Republican on the committee that the president respected and trusted 
enough to consult with, weakening bipartisanship in foreign policy.7 
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The Democrats shot themselves in the foot when they regained control of the 
Senate following the 1948 election.  During 1947-8, the GOP majority aligned the 
Foreign Relations committee with seven of its own against six Democrats.  When the 
election transformed the 51-45 Republican majority to a Democratic edge of 54-42, 
things changed in a larger way than expected.  Connally, upon regaining the committee 
chairmanship in January 1949, pledged to strengthen bipartisanship, saying, “It is 
“essential that we have an American foreign policy, rather than a Republican or a 
Democratic policy.”  The Texan reportedly tried to fight off an attempt to increase the 
numerical edge of Democrats in the committee, but two days later, Vice President 
Barkley dropped a bombshell:  The Democrats would appoint 8-5 majorities (rather than 
the usual 7-6) on several key committees, including Foreign Relations, justifying the 
move by their larger majority than the GOP previously had.  Vandenberg, with his 
typical moderation, called the announcement “not particularly impressive in its 
bipartisan hospitality.”  Senator Wayne Morse (R-OR) called it a “shocking repudiation 
of a bipartisan foreign policy.”8 
  Korea forged another crack in the bipartisan coalition before the war erupted.  
In January 1950, the House rejected an $11 million aid package for Korea, 192-191, the 
first major foreign policy bill rejected by Congress in four years.  Although Congress 
passed the bill the following month, it came with a price for Truman.  In return for the 
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Korea funds, the administration had to postpone cutting off funds to the Chinese 
Nationalists until June.9 
While Congress deliberated the fate of aid to Korea, Joseph McCarthy began 
attacking the administration with his accusations of communist infiltration into the State 
Department.  The Tydings Committee, formed to investigate McCarthy’s charges, began 
twelve weeks of hearings in March.  The committee members included Democrats 
Tydings, Theodore Green (RI) and Brien McMahon (CT), along with Republicans Henry 
Cabot Lodge, Jr. (MA) and Bourke Hickenlooper (IA).  McCarthy declared it a good 
committee.  With Lodge having a solid history of supporting Truman’s foreign policy, 
and with Hickenlooper the only McCarthy supporter, Tydings had an opportunity to get 
some Republican help in reining in the Wisconsin senator’s wild charges.  Instead, 
enraged by McCarthy’s antics, Tydings opted for a total offensive to squash him 
quickly.10 
The chairman’s strategy backfired when he made no attempt to conduct impartial 
hearings.  Minutes after the proceedings began, they degenerated into a partisan 
donnybrook.  Tydings immediately attacked McCarthy, refusing even to let him finish 
his opening statement.  As the panel’s chairman, the Maryland senator should have 
postured himself as the mediator of the hearings rather than the chief protagonist, 
regardless of McCarthy’s infuriating tactics.  Tydings’ behavior behind the scenes gave 
credence to McCarthy’s claim that the Democrats had conducted a whitewash.  The 
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chairman worked closely with the State Department, planning issues to emphasize and 
witnesses to call.11 
Press coverage of the hearings during March supported Tydings in spite of his 
tactics, and McCarthy seemed headed for irrelevance.  However, things changed in April 
when the chairman’s zeal began to make observers feel he was not delving into the 
charges deeply enough.  This came to a head over the investigation of Owen Lattimore, a 
professor accused of having Communist ties.  After Tydings pronounced Lattimore 
innocent, Lodge disagreed and asked for more testimony.  Newspaper stories now 
blamed Tydings as much as McCarthy for the chaos of the hearings.  Behind the scenes, 
the Maryland senator continued his quest.  Truman told a staffer that Tydings said he 
intended to “finish the discrediting of McCarthy.”  The next day, after another call from 
the senator, HST quipped that Tydings was the “most nervous individual” he had ever 
seen, as the negative press began taking its toll.  By June, the embattled chairman was in 
a panic, besieging the White House daily with phone calls and even asking the president 
to set a deadline for completion of the hearings.  Wisely, Truman declined, knowing 
such interference would invite blame for cutting off the investigation.  The president 
believed Tydings had totally botched the hearings and now wanted Truman to save him.  
As the hearings wound down, Tydings continued his pursuit of openly trying to refute 
McCarthy’s charges while the other Democrats on the committee either sat in silence or 
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skipped sessions altogether.  One journalist called the probe “an inquiry which in its 
bitterness and partisanship was unique in the annals of Congress.”12 
The Tydings Committee hearings damaged bipartisanship in foreign affairs.  
McCarthy’s salvos triggered Republican calls for Secretary Acheson’s resignation, 
causing the State Department to create a special group of people inside and outside of 
the government to investigate and rebut McCarthy’s charges.  Truman counterattacked 
the GOP vigorously.  In a press conference, the president said he was “fed up” with the 
criticism, declaring that this attempt to “torpedo” his nonpartisan policy was “just as bad 
. . . as it would be to shoot our soldiers in the back.”  After praising key Republicans 
who were supporting foreign policy, such as senators Vandenburg and Leverett 
Saltonstall (MA), the president singled out Minority Leader Kenneth Wherry (NB) and 
Styles Bridges (NH) as McCarthy’s co-saboteurs of the administration’s international 
policies.  In the middle of the press conference, Truman paused to rephrase his 
assessment for the record:  “The greatest asset that the Kremlin has is the partisan 
attempt in the Senate to sabotage the bipartisan foreign policy of the United States.”13 
Soon, however, the president tried to shore up his relationship with a key 
Republican antagonist, Senator Styles Bridges (NH).  The Tydings Committee 
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proceedings, which began to sour for the Democrats in April, and Vandenberg’s illness 
probably nudged Truman in this direction.  Bridges, who was the ranking minority 
member of the Armed Services committee at the time and became the GOP floor leader 
in 1951, had clout.  HST met with Acheson and Bridges on April 18 and had a fruitful 
conversation on a range of international issues.  All agreed that such discussions needed 
to continue to maintain a bipartisan foreign policy, and Truman publicized his “very 
satisfactory talk” with Bridges in a press release, pledging to solicit Republican input.  
He followed up, telling Acheson to set up meetings with senior Senate Republicans to 
discuss an upcoming foreign affairs summit.  Connally, who reportedly “snorted like a 
Texas longhorn” and called the president’s olive branch a “blunder” and an “affront,” 
stepped in and limited the secretary’s meetings to only the Republicans on the Foreign 
Relations committee.  Truman’s efforts paid off, as Bridges stifled his attacks on 
Acheson for a year.14 
Connally’s reaction again shows how he complicated HST’s efforts to enhance 
nonpartisanship in foreign affairs.  Although “Texas Tom” had good relationships with 
Republicans Alexander Wiley (WI) and Lodge on his committee, his animosity towards 
Bridges hampered bipartisanship.  If a president as partisan as Truman could extend the 
olive branch to Bridges in spite of the latter’s attacks on Acheson, the Texan could and 
should have done the same.  Moreover, turf issues drove Connally’s refusal to invite 
Republican leaders to confer with the Secretary of State, for he insisted that only the 
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Foreign Relations committee would have a say in diplomatic issues.  The president may 
have been better off had Vandenberg stayed healthy and the GOP maintained a majority 
in the Senate.15 
The Democrats worked in other ways to foster harmony with the Republicans 
during the Tydings hearings.  Rep. Brooks Hays (D-AR) visited Acheson, asking him to 
rekindle bipartisanship, suggesting that GOP congressmen such as Walter Judd (MN) 
actually “held a kinder feeling” toward Acheson than some of his public comments 
indicated.  The secretary responded positively, but had to be skeptical because Judd, a 
charter member of the China Lobby, had been screaming for his resignation.  Acheson 
made a remarkably conciliatory response when Republican New York governor Thomas 
Dewey phoned to clear an upcoming speech with him.  Dewey’s draft noted in “strong 
terms” that the Democrats had given China away at Yalta and blamed the Communist 
victory on the administration’s policy reversals regarding support for the Nationalists.  
Secretary Acheson accepted these criticisms without complaint.  He did ask Dewey to 
amend a passage characterizing Formosa as the only hope of the Far East, which the 
governor agreed to do.  Moreover, at Acheson’s suggestion, Dewey agreed to reword a 
couple of sections that seemed to condone McCarthyism.  Truman took pains to 
congratulate former president Herbert Hoover for his speech exhorting the need for unity 
of moral purpose in the struggle against communism.  Notably, HST refused to criticize 
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Hoover’s call in the same speech to oust all Communist nations from the U.N., a 
position the administration opposed.16 
The president added two Republicans to the State Department during the Tydings 
hearings to bolster bipartisanship.  In March, the administration named John Sherman 
Cooper, a Kentucky Republican, as a consultant to the Secretary of State.  Unfortunately, 
Cooper turned out to be a lackluster choice due to his lack of previous foreign policy 
experience.  Truman did better by appointing John Foster Dulles, a former senator, to a 
similar position on April 6.  Just two weeks earlier, the president had said that he would 
never appoint a “stuffed shirt” like Dulles, despite the Republican’s extensive experience 
in foreign affairs.  Pressure from the Tydings hearings and the ailing Vandenberg, 
however, probably persuaded Truman to change his mind.  Political expediency entered 
into the equation as well.  Acheson confided to Senator Herbert Lehman (NY), who had 
recently ousted Dulles from his Senate seat, that an advantage of this move was to 
prevent the appointee from running for the Senate in 1950.  On the day the White House 
announced his appointment, Dulles was still haggling with Acheson about his job title.  
Although he claimed he “personally was not concerned about rank,” it actually 
consumed Dulles.  Rebuffed after bucking for the title of “Ambassador at Large,” the 
Republican, wanting to make sure he outranked Cooper, asked that the word “top” be 
added to his job title of Consultant to the Secretary.  Truman refused to placate him on 
the wording, but the appointment accomplished its purpose.  The administration made 
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sure the press understood the New Yorker’s importance.  A New York Times headline 
proclaimed, “Dulles Named U.S. Adviser to Renew Bipartisan Policy.”17 
 As the Tydings hearings raged on, the administration announced a 
reorganization of the Foreign Relations committee designed to enhance congressional 
input into policy formation.  The new system created eight bipartisan subcommittees of 
three to four senators each corresponding to principal areas of the State Department, 
such as European affairs, U.N. affairs, and Far Eastern affairs.  Leaders of these 
functional units in the State Department were to meet with these subcommittees monthly 
to consult with the senators about international issues in their areas.  Although Connally 
took credit for creating the reorganization, he merely blessed the final product.  Jack 
McFall, Assistant Secretary of State in charge of congressional relations, recalled he 
initiated the plan, convincing Foreign Relations to go through with it by allowing the 
chairman to call it “The Connally Plan.”  Francis Wilcox, chief of staff for the Foreign 
Relations committee, claimed he was the one who pitched it to Connally.  McFall most 
likely hatched the scheme as a way to quell the Republican attacks arising during the 
Tydings hearings.  He probably pitched it to Wilcox, who had the Texan’s ear and 
convinced the senator to restructure the committee.18 
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The reorganization of the Foreign Relations committee ultimately became a 
missed opportunity to enhance bipartisan support for Truman’s policies.  The new 
system seemed like it could not help but improve communication between the State 
Department and the Senate, and it was an effective symbolic gesture.  Senator H. 
Alexander Smith (R-NJ) of the Foreign Relations committee promptly telegrammed his 
congratulations to Connally when he found out about the reorganization.  Yet, the devil 
was in the details, as some subcommittees were more bipartisan than others.  Four 
senators (two Democrats and two Republicans) comprised the U.N. Affairs and 
European Affairs subcommittees, foreign policy areas with the strongest traditions of 
cooperation between the political parties.  The remaining subcommittees, most notably 
Far Eastern Affairs, contained two Democrats and one Republican.  Since the 1949 
Communist triumph in China, Republicans, including Vandenberg, had complained that 
Democrats had not solicited their input on Asian issues.  The imbalanced representation 
on the Far East subcommittee lent credence to GOP complaints.19 
Democrats and Republicans temporarily united when the Korean War broke out.  
Senator Bridges announced, “I approve completely what has been done.”  Republican 
Charles Eaton (NJ), an ordained Baptist minister, proclaimed, “We’ve got a rattlesnake 
by the tail and the sooner we pound its damn head in, the better.”  When even Senator 
Taft, Truman’s most persistent nemesis, admitted he supported the “general policies” 
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laid out by the commander in chief, White House Press Secretary Charlie Ross 
exclaimed, “By God!  Bob Taft has joined the U.N. and the U.S.”  Limited as it was, 
Taft’s response “caused great joy at the White House.”20 
 The administration did what it could to maintain this spirit of unanimity.  
Acheson contacted Senator Wiley, the second-ranking Republican on the Foreign 
Relations committee, early during the first week of the crisis to apprise him of the 
situation.  Significantly, the secretary turned down a request from Senator Elbert 
Thomas (D-UT) to speak at a state Democratic gathering in late July.  Even though 
Thomas was a staunch administration ally, Acheson demurred, with Truman’s blessing, 
saying there was a “great deal of business to get through on a unified basis” in the 
upcoming months.  This showed remarkable sensitivity to avoiding political partisanship 
despite the looming mid-term elections.  The president took time in the midst of the 
crisis to pen a heartfelt letter to Vandenberg, who was recovering from surgery.  
Although HST was responding in part to refute the senator’s criticisms of Far East 
policy prior to the war, he also was making it a point to reply swiftly to the ailing 
Republican out of respect for his views.  Truman forthrightly justified his policies 
because he believed Vandenberg had “decidedly wrong information and wrong 
impressions” about the causes of the Korean crisis.  Nevertheless, HST concluded, “We 
have never needed you so badly.”21 
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A progressive bloc of the GOP provided the Democrats an opportunity to forge 
bipartisan ties at the war’s outset.  Republicans from the public and private sectors 
calling themselves the Republican Advance emerged from a secret gathering with a 
thirteen-page “Declaration of Republican Principles.”  This faction aimed to separate 
itself from the attack dog tactics against Truman’s foreign policy that the Taft was 
planning for the upcoming elections.  The Republican Advance called for the party to 
stop its “purely negative opposition” to administration objectives ranging from domestic 
issues to Far East policy, and to create progressive party initiatives.  This group, while 
opposing some aspects of Truman’s Asian policies, formally endorsed the Korean 
intervention.  The declaration of principles attracted the endorsement of only twenty-one 
GOP congressmen and four senators, but several publicly backed the proposal.22 
Yet, the administration did nothing to enlist the Republican Advance in its quest 
for a bipartisan foreign policy.  This was a mistake, albeit not a calamitous one.  Unlike 
the Taft wing of the GOP, the Advance seemed willing to put aside opposing just for the 
sake of opposing.  The progressive Republicans, despite their lack of numbers in 
Congress, did count among their ranks Rep. Judd, who carried influence regarding Far 
East policy, as well as H. Alexander Smith of the Senate Foreign Relations committee.  
While it would not have guaranteed broad Republican support for a nonpartisan foreign 
policy, Democratic overtures towards this faction could have been helpful.  
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Political unanimity behind the decision to go to war dissolved in a couple of 
weeks.  As U.N. troops retreated to Pusan and headlines screamed, “G.I.’s Curse Lack of 
Tanks, Planes,” legislators returned to their partisan ways.  Senator Hickenlooper 
demanded an accounting of all defense spending since 1947, lamenting in a “choking 
voice” that the U.S. seemed incapable of stopping the “alleged bandit raid.”  When 
Senator Lucas replied that he would speak when Hickenlooper stopped choking, the 
Republican shot back that the war was “enough to make a great many of the American 
people choke.”  Senators Capehart and Connally had a sharp exchange over the number 
of troops that European allies had sent to Korea.  After the Texan asked Capehart if he 
felt the U.S. should surrender because it was fighting alone at the moment, the Indiana 
Republican called him a “clown” putting on a “vaudeville act.”  By mid-July, both 
parties already were discussing Korea as an issue for the 1950 elections.23  
The Republicans obstructed bipartisanship early in the war by making 
unreasonable demands upon the administration.  Senator Knowland suggested Truman 
should give the GOP more say in foreign policy by replacing some Democrats in his 
Cabinet with Republicans.  Knowland probably recalled FDR creating a bipartisan 
Cabinet in 1940 by nominating Republicans Frank Knox and Henry Stimson to the posts 
of Secretary of the Navy and Secretary of War, respectively.  While Roosevelt clearly 
did this to gain Republican support for his foreign policies, he had additional 
motivations.  Roosevelt was preparing a third run for the White House and wanted to 
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remove international affairs as a campaign issue.  Moreover, Knox’s and Stimson’s 
predecessors had become difficult to work with, making Roosevelt more than willing to 
replace them.  Moreover, the end of a presidential term was a logical time to make 
changes to his inner circle.  Things were different in 1950.  Truman had just appointed 
two Republicans to high-ranking positions in the State Department, and had no Cabinet 
members he wanted to get rid of at that moment.  Defense Secretary Louis Johnson’s 
open warfare with Acheson did lead HST to replace him several months later, presenting 
the best opportunity to add a Republican to the cabinet.  This exception aside, the 
president was in the middle of his term, and arbitrarily asking Cabinet members to step 
down because they were Democrats was unthinkable for someone like HST, who was 
loyal to a fault.  Such changes would have heightened the sense of crisis surrounding 
Korea, which the administration was trying to downplay at this early stage of the crisis.24 
Knowland followed up with a worse idea, saying Truman should not stump for 
Democrats in the 1950 congressional elections.  Asking a sitting president, the leader of 
his party, to remain on the sidelines veered from the purpose of a nonpartisan foreign 
policy.  Although Republicans rightfully asked Democrats to consult them on 
international issues as a way to seek a national consensus, the Californian’s suggestion 
was an attempt to manipulate the bipartisan foreign policy issue for political gain.  
Nevertheless, Knowland’s wish largely came true.  While HST campaigned little in 
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1950, he was not trying to placate the Republicans; he simply was too busy with the war 
to hit the campaign trail.25 
The day after the outbursts by Knowland and others demanding more GOP input 
into the conduct of the war, Dulles met with Republican senators to get suggestions.  
Their main proposition was to push other U.N. members to send soldiers to bolster the 
ground troops in Korea.  Dulles handled this well, assuring them the administration 
could achieve such ends by “working quietly.”  After the meeting, Senator Smith said 
that although historically there had been no bipartisanship in Far East policy, he felt the 
administration was moving in that direction.  Taft felt otherwise, saying, of Republican 
views, “I haven’t seen any evidence that the Administration wants any.”  Thus, the GOP 
senate leader had discarded the idea of a nonpartisan foreign policy from the outset of 
the war, if not sooner.  Truman’s Republican appointments in the State Department did 
not matter, nor did his rapport with Vandenberg.  Either the president had to follow all of 
Taft’s wishes in Far East policy, or the Ohioan would fight him.  The problem was that 
Taft knew little about foreign affairs, yet wielded significant power in the Senate.26 
Meanwhile, the Tydings Committee wrestled with partisan acrimony as it drafted 
its final report.  Democrats on the committee tried in vain to get the endorsement of at 
least one of the two Republicans, with Senator Lodge the obvious choice.  Even though 
Tydings tried to entice him with a trip to Europe to “investigate” State Department 
security from abroad, Lodge refused to sign the report.  The Massachusetts Republican 
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correctly believed that the Democrats were more interested in attacking McCarthy than 
in investigating the State Department.  With no hope of getting Lodge’s support, the 
committee report made no attempt to compromise with the GOP.  It called McCarthy’s 
charges “perhaps the most nefarious campaign of half-truths and untruths in the history 
of the republic,” and ripped the Republicans on the committee for their poor attendance 
and lack of zeal.27   
The debate got ugly when the majority report hit the Senate floor on July 20.  As 
the session began, Minority Leader Kenneth Wherry asked for the removal of Edward 
Morgan, counsel for the committee Democrats, from the Senate floor.  When this effort 
failed, Wherry cornered the lawyer near the back door of the room and called him a 
“dirty son of a bitch” for writing the report.  The GOP leader and former undertaker 
thereupon threw a wild punch at the athletic Morgan, grazing his shoulder.  Others 
quickly separated them and the lawyer later quipped, “I could have punched his lights 
out.”  All Senate Democrats approved the report, and all Republicans voted against it.28 
By the time the Senate voted on the Tydings Committee report, Republicans 
previously considered friendly to administration foreign policy were planning attacks on 
the Democrats’ Korean strategy in the upcoming elections.  Smith decided to push for a 
GOP statement on Far East policy “so that the Democrats will not claim that they saw 
the issues” correctly, as the Republicans did.  On August 13, Smith and the other 
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minority members of the Foreign Relations committee released a manifesto covering 
Cold War policies since 1945.  Three of the four authors, Smith, Lodge, and Wiley, were 
part of the Vandenberg faction of the party.  They believed their statement reflected the 
spirit of a nonpartisan foreign policy, striking a compromise position between the 
Taft/Wherry wing, which was demanding Acheson’s resignation, and Truman’s 
approach.  The statement declared, “The major tragedy of our time was the failure and 
refusal of American leadership in 1945 to recognize the true aims and methods” of the 
Soviets.  In the Far East, the Democrats had tried to convince Republicans that Chinese 
communism was “only a great agrarian reform movement.”  The Republican 
internationalists blamed the opposition party for Korea’s division at the 38th parallel in 
the first place due to agreements at Yalta.  Far East policy had given the Kremlin a 
“green light to grab whatever it could in China, Korea, and Formosa.”  In Asia, the 
Republicans claimed, “This was never a bipartisan policy.  It was solely an 
Administration policy.”  The GOP senators warned, “The American people will not now 
excuse those responsible for these blunders.”29 
One historian has characterized the Republican statement as “temperate.”  This is 
a bit generous.  Taft endorsed the manifesto, and never would have done so unless he 
believed it would help his party hammer the Democrats.  The fact that Smith came up 
with the idea for the statement with an eye to the election was apparent in the threat that 
the public would hold the “blunderers” accountable for their foreign policy gaffes.  In a 
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New York Times story about the statement, “Truman is Blamed,” Republicans 
nonetheless insisted, “In this crisis there can be no ‘politics as usual.’”  Such apparent 
doubletalk foreshadowed the GOP strategy of supporting the war effort while criticizing 
the policies leading up to it.  As one Republican senator quipped, “We’ll man the pumps 
and unroll the hose, but damned if we’ll sing, ‘Hail to the Fire Chief.’”30 
The Democrats justifiably perceived the GOP statement as an attack and 
responded in kind.  Connally called it a purely political statement and suggested that if 
the Republicans really wanted international peace, they should pursue “unity at home 
instead of quarrelsome and pettifogging attacks on the Administration.”  He pointed out 
that Dulles had been in Korea only days before the attack, yet had reported no imminent 
danger.  Senator Brien McMahon (D-CT) chimed in, “These masters of hindsight seek to 
cut themselves in on the victories of our foreign policy and to divorce themselves from 
our defeats.”  Although the president’s advisors felt he should not react in any way that 
would be perceived as harmful to the bipartisan foreign policy, HST confided his belief 
that Republicans such as Taft, Wherry and McCarthy had invited the North Korean 
invasion through their criticism of the administration, presenting a divided America to 
the Communists.  Privately, the president called the statement “demagogic,” and accused 
Dulles of instigating it.  (Although Dulles did not initiate the idea, the authors did enlist 
his support.)  When Wherry declared that the blood of casualties on Korea was on 
Acheson’s shoulders, Truman took off the gloves, calling the Nebraskan’s comment a 
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“contemptible statement and beneath comment.”  Wherry retorted, “The President’s 
failure to remove Acheson, after repudiation of his stupid foreign policies, is 
contemptible.”31 
The nature and source of the August GOP statement made it nearly impossible 
for HST and his party to pursue any semblance of a bipartisan foreign policy until the 
conclusion of the 1950 elections.  The Republicans on the Foreign Relations committee 
laid the blame for Korea on the Democrats and made it a campaign issue.  They believed 
Truman had cut them out of Far East policymaking from the beginning, Acheson had 
made a mess of it, and the Democrats needed to pay.  As journalist William S. White 
wrote, the Republicans were “genuinely and profoundly bitter about the Far East, where, 
they think, some sort of Socialist virus within the Administration has worked a great, 
historic wrong.”  Since 1945, the Foreign Relations committee, under Vandenberg’s 
influence, had been the one entity of government where legislators had laid their party 
affiliations aside.  But due to the strident criticism, even coming from people like Smith, 
Wiley, and Lodge, Truman’s minions had no choice but to hit back.32 
Nevertheless, the president backed up his bipartisan foreign policy rhetoric with 
several Republican appointments in the midst of the campaign mudslinging.  Pundits 
praised Truman for selecting people based on competency rather than as paybacks for 
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political favors, thereby attracting support from both parties.  Most notably, HST named 
Robert A. Lovett and Walter S. Gifford to the posts of Deputy Secretary of Defense and 
Ambassador to Great Britain, respectively.  Gifford represented a noteworthy 
appointment in that Truman previously had promised the job to one of his chief 
fundraisers, but reneged in order to name the GOP businessman to the post.  Lovett, an 
experienced bureaucrat, added another Republican to the top echelons of the State 
Department to supplement Dulles and Cooper.  Yet, the GOP cared little about these 
gestures.  Their chief interest lay in improving their numbers in Congress.33 
The Republicans followed up on the Smith statement with their white paper on 
Far East policy, Background to Korea.  The party designed this pamphlet of nearly sixty 
pages for GOP candidates and the public, which traced U.S. policy in China and Korea 
from the late 1940s forward.  The white paper opened with a blunt statement:  “The area 
of bipartisan foreign policy is clearly defined.  Asia, including China and Korea, has 
been excluded.”  Moreover, it declared that a “spirit of consultation” was “totally 
lacking.”  This was a valid criticism, to a point.  As the Korean crisis unfolded, Truman 
did meet with bipartisan groups of Congress, but strictly to inform them of his decisions 
rather than to solicit input.  The document, naturally, ignored the recent additions of 
Republicans to the State Department.  Reaching back to 1948 testimony from George 
Marshall that defending Korea was infeasible, the pamphlet was an “I told you so” 
document.  It included a chronology of events sprinkled with quotes criticizing 
Democratic policies such as one from Senator Homer Ferguson (R-MI).  Ferguson, 
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reacting to the administration’s January 1950 decision not to intervene in the Chinese 
civil war, sputtered that the bipartisan foreign policy had been “kicked out the window” 
by Truman and Acheson.  The booklet reproduced portions of a July 1950 speech made 
on the floor of the House by Rep. Walter Judd (R-MN) complaining that, “In Europe we 
insisted that . . . the governments must keep the Communists out, but in China we 
insisted that . . . the government must take Communists in.”  Judd’s comments 
overlooked the fact that post-war Europe had a smaller Communist presence than China.  
More importantly, Allied troops occupied much of Western Europe following World 
War II, which was not the case in China.  The U.S. therefore was in a much better 
position to ward off Communist influence in Europe than in China.  This reality, 
however, did not prevent the Republicans from attacking the administration as the 1950 
election season began.34 
A solitary Republican voice spoke out against using foreign policy missteps by 
the opposition as campaign fodder.  In September, Senator Lodge wrote an article for the 
New York Times analyzing the response to the August GOP statement (that he had 
helped write) and describing his definition of bipartisanship.  Lodge felt that the primary 
value of the statement lay in its recommendations for future direction in policy, rather 
than in its critique of the past.  He was dismayed that the announcement was “cheered by 
many Republicans as a blow for party victory in November” and “denounced by many 
Democrats as an ending of the bipartisan foreign policy.”  Rebuking the Taft faction, the 
Massachusetts senator wrote, “The opposition should not follow the desires of some 
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3, 45, 49-50. 
 
  
132
Republicans who say that we . . . should always oppose the Democrats no matter what 
they do,” lest they be accused of “me-tooism.”  He also criticized Democrats who 
defined bipartisanship as the GOP going along with the administration no matter what.  
Lodge argued that Republicans should focus on steering Truman toward the best 
possible policy.  Unfortunately, the heat of campaign rhetoric obliterated his wise 
counsel.  Even internationalist Republicans continued to attack the administration, while 
the Trumanites branded their opponents as isolationists.  By ignoring Lodge, the 
Democrats missed a chance to foster the idea of a bipartisan foreign policy.35 
Instead, the Democrats made GOP opposition to a bipartisan foreign policy a 
campaign issue.  Averell Harriman, the president’s foreign policy guru who rarely soiled 
himself in political mudslinging, surprisingly got into the act.  Harriman attracted 
attention across the nation with a speech at an organized labor convention.  Ripping Taft, 
in Time’s words, for his “constant guerilla warfare” against administration foreign 
policy, Harriman declared that after examining the senator’s record, “You cannot escape 
the conclusion that if the Congress had adopted his positions, Communist objectives 
would thereby have been furthered.”  When asked at his press conference if he agreed 
with Harriman’s harsh assessment, HST said yes, Taft’s record spoke for itself.  Not to 
be outdone, the Ohioan replied that until recently, Harriman and the president believed 
“Joe Stalin was ‘Good old Joe.’”36 
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Effects of campaign in Kepley, 96-8.   
 
36 Harriman and Taft quoted in “Situation Fluid,” Time, October 2, 1950, 
http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,813404,00.html (April 12, 2007); “Truman Backs Harriman, Says Taft 
Views Aid Reds,” NYT, 22 September 1950, p. 35. 
 
  
133
Democrats used the nonpartisan foreign policy in other ways.  Their Senate 
campaign committee defended Senator William Benton (CT), who was fending off 
accusations that he was a Communist because he frequently had voted with Claude 
Pepper (D-FL) and Glenn Taylor (D-ID), losers during the primaries victimized by red-
baiting tactics.  Examining thirty key votes on foreign policy issues, the committee 
reported that Pepper had voted “against the Communists,” and, therefore, in favor of the 
bipartisan foreign policy twenty-seven times for a “batting average” of .900.  Taylor, the 
erstwhile Progressive, came in with at a much less spectacular average of .344.  Both 
Pepper and Taylor, however, came in with higher anti-communist batting averages than 
thirty-two Republican senators, most notably Minority Leader Wherry at .233.  The 
committee’s point was that Benton’s voting with Pepper and Taylor was not such a bad 
thing.37 
Truman pounded on the bipartisanship issue in his only speech of the campaign, 
broadcast nationally just days before the election.  Repeatedly taking care to note that 
some Republicans were working with Democrats on international affairs, the president 
labeled opponents of his foreign policy as isolationists.  HST railed that the isolationists 
had “dragged foreign policy into politics,” and wanted the U.S. to “shut ourselves off 
from the rest of the world and abandon our friends and allies,” prompting cries from the 
crowd of, “Give ‘em hell, Harry.”  He proceeded to do just that, chastising certain 
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Republicans for besmearing the bipartisan foreign policy, losing “all proportion, all 
sense of restraint, all sense of patriotic decency.”38 
Truman’s attack on Republican isolationism was a questionable tactic.  The main 
GOP beefs had been why the U.S. had not done more to support the Chinese Nationalist 
regime, Acheson’s defense perimeter speech supposedly inviting the North Korean 
attack, and steady bleating about lack of consultation of Republicans by the White 
House.  The commander in chief would have been better off emphasizing the roles of 
Republicans Dulles and Cooper in decision-making, the recent appointment of Lovett, 
and how he had selected them in a spirit of bipartisan cooperation, arguing that it was 
impossible to satisfy the GOP, no matter what he did.  By now, however, the opposition 
party had a new foreign policy issue with which to pummel the administration. 
China, after some initial skirmishes in late October, entered the war just days 
before the election.  On Election Eve, the magnitude of the Chinese intervention spread 
to the nation and the Republican National Committee responded immediately with a 
press release.  The announcement noted that the crisis showed “clearly the 
ineffectiveness of our United States foreign policy where it has not been a united 
policy,” contrasting it with bipartisan measures such as the Marshall Plan.  Criticizing a 
State Department “intent on appeasing the Chinese Communist Revolution,” the 
Republicans said the administration had “inexcusably turned its back on those patriotic 
Chinese groups,” referring to the Nationalists.  Then, the politicizing kicked in:  “This is 
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the issue on which the American people are called upon to express themselves as they go 
to the polls on Election Day.”39 
Americans then went to the polls and shrunk the Democrats’ majority in both 
Houses.  Yet, some in the administration believed there was still hope for Truman’s 
bipartisan foreign policy in the 82nd Congress.  A White House analysis of the effects of 
the elections began with a summary of how frequently senators supported the 
administration on thirty key foreign policy votes between 1947 and the outbreak of the 
war, as shown in Table 1 below: 
 
 
TABLE 1 
 
Senators Serving in 81st Congress, 2nd Session- Votes on Key Foreign Policy Issues 
 
Number of Senators Frequency of Supporting Truman, 1947-June 1950 
32 100% 
15 90-99% 
11 80-89% 
10 70-79% 
4 60-69% 
7 50-59% 
17 0-49% 
 
 
 
Nine of the thirty-two “100 per centers” lost their seats in the elections.  Opponents of 
Truman’s foreign policy replaced four these nine, with the remaining five supplanted by 
either Democrats or Republicans that were expected to back the administration.  In 
Missouri, a Democrat expected to staunchly back Truman unseated a Republican, 
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resulting in a net reduction in the 100 percent category from 32 to 29.  The elections 
produced no net change in the 90-99 percent category, leaving the White House with 44 
senators expected to support foreign policy issues 90 percent of the time or better.  Since 
the administration would need 49 votes to win, their remaining 5 would have to come 
from the 11 senators in the 80-89 percent bracket.  Because this group included 4 
Republicans perceived as “internationalists” along with 4 Democrats, the White House 
believed it could scrounge up 5 votes from this group on nearly all foreign policy 
initiatives.40 
The administration’s use of the “isolationalist” label to describe enemies of 
bipartisanship underscored how the Korean War changed the nature of foreign policy 
debate.  The above analysis mainly reflected how senators voted on early Cold War 
issues such as the Marshall Plan and aid to Greece and Turkey, in which the discussion 
was about whether the U.S. should commit itself to situations around the globe.  
However, the Communist victory in the Chinese civil war coupled with North Korea’s 
invasion redefined the challenges to Truman’s attempt to maintain a nonpartisan foreign 
policy.  After these events, most of the commander in chief’s opponents were not 
Republicans isolationists trying to prevent American entanglement in other nations’ 
business.  Rather, much of the opposition came to disagree with the president in the 
locale and degree of U.S. involvement in international situations.  China’s entry into the 
Korean fray became a springboard for this change in debate.  Truman’s main challenge 
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was no longer merely trying to overcome Republican (and Democrat) isolationists.  
Instead, he had to convince them how far the U.S. should go to contain Communism in 
Asia.  
A combination of Democratic losses in the elections and the specter of world war 
brought on by the Chinese invasion led HST to push anew for bipartisan support of his 
war policy.  The Republican leadership did not make it easy for him.  In late November, 
Taft and Wherry called for Truman to re-examine his policies in response to the election 
results.  Acheson responded by likening the “re-examinists” to a farmer who pulls up his 
crops every morning to see how they did overnight.  Senator Eugene D. Millikin (R-CO) 
responded by calling the secretary’s policies, “Achesonian Jackassery.”  As Time 
observed, “There was no harmony of suggestions.”  Connally displayed the 
administration’s difficulties at a press conference announcing Acheson’s forthcoming 
meetings with the foreign affairs committees in both Houses to discuss the world 
situation.  Initially, the Texan responded calmly and positively when reporters asked him 
about Republican demands for input, saying the administration was “always prepared to 
reexamine anything we don’t think is right.”  But when the journalists continued harping 
on the subject, Connally “pounded the table and let fly,” barking, “That’s all they have 
been doing—reexamining, complaining and growling.”  Asserting the Democrats had 
consulted Republicans all along, the Texan asked of the GOP, “Do they want to undo all 
  
138
of these things?  I don’t think they do,” even if “some of their big-mouthed advocates 
do.”41 
Nevertheless, Acheson and Truman kept on trying to include Republicans in the 
process.  The secretary reported that his meetings with the House Foreign Affairs and 
Senate Foreign Relations committees went well, believing that both groups came away 
“sobered by the events in Korea” and now more fully realized what the nation faced.  On 
December 1, the president had the Joint Chiefs of Staff brief thirty top congressional 
leaders from both parties.  While Republicans asked about troop commitments by U.S. 
allies and poor intelligence regarding Chinese troop strength before Mao intervened, 
they emerged from the meeting in a spirit of cooperation.  Noting that Truman asked for 
increased military appropriations and soon, Wherry said, “He’s going to get it.”  Within 
two hours, lawmakers began drafting the legislation.  A couple of days later, the State 
Department hastily summoned floor leaders from both parties along with ranking 
members of foreign relations committees from both chambers to solicit their input into 
the worsening situation in Korea.  Undersecretary of State James Webb bluntly asked the 
attendees what they thought the administration should do.  Rep. John Vorys (R-OH) 
exhibited the mood of lawmakers exiting the meeting, saying, “I think I had better keep 
my trap shut.”  Soon afterward, a group of eight legislators, four from each party, sent 
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Truman a letter commending his decision not to abandon Korea in the face of the 
Chinese intervention.42 
Paranoia over U.S.-British relations, however, was about to make a decided dent 
into the newfound spirit of unanimity.  In his November 30 press conference, the 
president alarmed his British allies so much that he provoked a five-day unscheduled 
summit with the prime minister of the U.K.  Responding to reporters’ questions about 
MacArthur’s options for dealing with the Chinese intervention, Truman said that he was 
considering use of atomic weapons in the war.  When astonished journalists repeated the 
question a couple of times, probably to allow the president to qualify his response, he not 
only confirmed his answer, but also made it sound like MacArthur could use nuclear 
weapons at his discretion.  This brought a very nervous Prime Minister Clement Attlee, 
across the Atlantic to discuss Truman’s intentions in Korea.43 
    Attlee’s meetings with the president proceeded to make many Republicans 
nervous, who justifiably feared the Brit intended to convince Truman to withdraw from 
Korea and endorse seating Communist China in the U.N.  The day the meetings began, 
Senator Knowland challenged the prime minister about Britain’s reliability as an ally.  
Hinting that future American support for Europe could be at stake, Knowland said the 
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U.S. hoped to meet future threats with staunch allies “in the common cause of freedom, 
not just regional freedom, Mr. Prime Minister.”  Democrats, including Connally, chose 
not to respond to Knowland, possibly to avoid drawing attention to him.  GOP criticism 
intensified the next day when Taft demanded that the commander in chief give the 
nation “more complete information” about the Korean crisis.  The Ohioan complained 
that the administration was informing congressional Republicans about decisions after 
the fact rather than consulting with them beforehand, conveniently ignoring Webb’s 
recent session with legislators.  He also proposed that the president make a public report 
on his talks with Attlee at their conclusion.  Senator George Malone (R-NV) was 
harsher: “I prophesy that we will do exactly what England and France tell us to do, for 
we still have officials without the backbone to stand up to Europe leaders.”44 
Republican paranoia peaked on the third day of the Attlee-Truman talks.  
Twenty-four GOP senators submitted a resolution requiring the president to obtain 
Senate approval before making any “understandings or agreements” with the prime 
minister.  The Republicans intended to stretch the Senate’s constitutional power of 
approving international treaties as far as possible, fearing HST could make an agreement 
to withdraw from Korea or restrict American use of nuclear weapons in the conflict.  
Despite Majority Leader Scott Lucas and Connally swiftly blocking the resolution from 
coming to a floor vote, the Democrats generally continued their “passive spirit” 
regarding these opposition outbursts, which included—again—a demand for Acheson’s 
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ouster.  Since three of the six on the Foreign Relations committee Democrats had been 
defeated in the 1950 elections, it must have been particularly difficult for the lame ducks 
not to lash out at the GOP.  Nevertheless, the State Department “appealed in the 
strongest terms” for Democrats not to counter with attacks on General MacArthur, 
darling of the Old Guard Republicans, for his failure to anticipate the Chinese 
intervention.  Acheson showed notable restraint, since the GOP was trying to have him 
fired.  Senator Paul Douglas (IL) demonstrated the Democrats’ stance, quipping, “It’s 
about time we stopped fighting one another and started fighting the Chinese 
Communists.”45 
The administration did, however, notice the Republican uproar.  Truman recalled 
that during dinner with Attlee one evening, he discussed problems with his opponents in 
the Senate, “who seemed to be violently determined to disrupt the nation’s foreign 
policy.”  Acheson displayed his sensitivity to the GOP concerns during “one of those 
close calls that lurk in summit meetings.”  On the last day of the talks, the president and 
the prime minister emerged from a private meeting, happily announcing they had agreed 
for neither the U.S. nor the U.K. to use nuclear weapons without consulting each other 
first.  A perplexed Acheson reminded the commander in chief that HST had repeatedly 
insisted that no other country or entity could limit his use of atomic weaponry if needed 
for defense of the U.S.  Moreover, the resolution of the twenty-four Republican senators 
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gave “fair warning of the temper of Congress,” which would not stand for an agreement 
to consult with the British before using an atom bomb.  The secretary argued that going 
public with the proposed measure would provoke a “most vicious offensive” against 
Truman and Britain by the Republican opposition.  Acheson proved persuasive, and the 
two heads of state agreed to a less specific language in which Truman said he hoped 
never to have to use atomic weapons and that he planned to “keep the Prime Minister at 
all times informed of developments which might bring about a change in the situation.”46 
Acheson’s reaction highlighted how reactive the administration became to 
Republican criticism in the wake of China’s entry into the war.  Most of the twenty-four 
Republicans signing the proposed resolution were anti-communist hawks like Wherry 
and McCarthy.  Taft, the Republican feared most by the Truman team, did not sign the 
resolution.  Neither did any of the GOP senators from the Foreign Relations committee, 
the Republicans perceived as being the easiest to work with.  Thus, only the hard-core 
opposition Republican senators proposed the resolution; yet, the administration greatly 
feared their wrath in the event of a misstep during the Attlee meetings.  The Truman 
administration knew that its gamble to reunify the Korean peninsula had backfired, 
making them vulnerable to Republican criticism. 
The White House therefore responded to GOP cries for inclusion.  Several 
congressional Republicans dined at a luncheon aboard the presidential yacht during the 
summit, producing a victory of sorts for bipartisanship.  The icy atmosphere melted 
                                                 
46 Truman’s quote from his Memoirs, Vol. 2, 409; Acheson quoted in his memoir, Present at the Creation, 484; “Joint 
Statement Following Discussions With the Prime Minister of Great Britain,” December 8, 1950, PP, 
<http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=991&st=&st1=> (May 10, 2007). 
 
  
143
when Senator Wiley (WI), ranking Republican on the Foreign Relations committee, 
spotted dessert.  Wiley, grinning broadly, announced, “Mr. Prime Minister, you are 
privileged to eat America’s choice dessert,” Wisconsin bleu cheese.  The meals and 
meetings concluded, as Taft suggested the president issued a press release summarizing 
what the two heads of state had discussed.  Reaction from the Republican right was 
mixed.  Wherry complained of a lack of additional allied troop commitments to battle 
the Chinese, while Senator Owen Brewster (ME) stayed on the fence, saying the 
agreements “are very good, as far as they go,” but cautioned, “The proof of the pudding 
is in the eating.”  Acheson followed up the next day by giving a synopsis of the world 
situation and the Attlee talks to the Senate Foreign Relations committee.  Connally and 
Wiley issued a joint statement acknowledging the meeting with the secretary, which 
noted that he “made clear that the United States is definitely and firmly opposed to any 
appeasement in the Far East.” 47  
The same day, White House aide Charles Murphy proposed that Truman begin a 
series of monthly meetings with legislators from both parties to discuss international 
issues.  Murphy suggested the floor leaders from both chambers, the chairs and ranking 
minority members of the committees dealing with defense and foreign affairs, the 
Speaker of the House and the Vice President as attendees.  Interestingly, even though 
Taft was not on any of these committees, nor was he the Republican floor leader, 
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Murphy asked the president to give “serious consideration” to including the Ohio 
senator.  Murphy said there were signs that Taft was “seriously concerned about the 
present situation and would honestly like to try to help.”  This, combined with his 
influence in the Senate, convinced Truman’s counsel that Taft should sit in on the 
meetings.  It probably took Murphy a bit of courage to make this suggestion, knowing 
the president’s weariness of Taft’s naysaying.48  
Truman did not follow up on Murphy’s suggestion, but did resume impromptu 
sessions with Republicans following the Attlee summit, which had stopped during the 
1950 campaign season.  Although the White House did not keep notes on the topics of 
these meetings, it is reasonable to assume that HST was more likely to consult with 
Republicans on foreign affairs rather than on domestic issues.  Whatever the topics, the 
president was keeping communication lines open with the opposition.49 
On December 11, three days after the end of the Attlee talks, Truman announced 
he was convening a bipartisan meeting of key congressional leaders to solicit their input 
on foreign policy.  Particularly, he was considering declaring a national emergency in 
response to the Chinese intervention.  Until this point in the Korean crisis, the president 
had resisted ordering a full mobilization like that employed at the outset of World War II 
for a simple reason:  He did not want Americans nor the international community to fell 
that a third world war was  underway.  Now, the gravity of the situation warranted a 
                                                 
48 Charles S. Murphy, Memorandum for the President, December 9, 1950; PSF:  General File; Murphy, Charles S. 
folder; Truman Papers, HSTL.   
 
49 List of Meetings at White House with Republican Leaders, April 17, 1945-March 1, 1951; Box 59, Foreign 
Relations-Hechler Study in Bipartisan Foreign Policy folder; George M. Elsey Papers, HSTL. 
 
  
145
higher level of mobilization, making GOP support desirable.  Moreover, this bipartisan 
gathering was not merely a response to Taft’s December 5 demand for Republican input; 
Jack McFall of the State Department had been pushing for such a meeting since late 
November.50 
The bipartisan conference marked some notable changes in the president’s 
dealings with the GOP.  For the first time in over three years, HST included Senator Taft 
in a consultative meeting at the White House.  This was a significant gesture recognizing 
that while Taft was not a member of either the Armed Services or Foreign Relations 
committees, he held the powerful post of chairman of the Republican Policy committee.  
Moreover, the president was asking for input from the opposition before making a final 
decision on a policy announcement, unlike at the war’s outset, when Truman simply 
called congressional leaders in to tell them he had decided to commit armed forces to 
Korea.  The commander in chief’s change of approach attracted attention from the 
national media.51 
Eighteen congressional leaders, eight of them Republicans, marched into the 
White House at 10 a.m. on December 13 to share their thoughts on foreign policy.  As 
they filed in, Senator Wherry jovially greeted Acheson, “You are looking square at your 
opposition.”  When the secretary reddened and Wherry’s GOP colleagues squirmed in 
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their chairs, the Nebraskan quickly and disingenuously added, “I mean your constructive 
opposition.”52 
Truman began by reading a summary of a CIA report, “Probable Soviet Moves to 
Exploit the Present Situation.”  He then recommended that the legislators read the full 
top-secret report, showing surprising deference by merely saying he hoped they would 
not leak the information rather than ordering them to keep their mouths shut.  The 
president appeared particularly interested in soliciting Taft’s support, which was a tall 
order.  When HST discussed declaring a national emergency, Taft unsuccessfully tried to 
pin him down on the degree of mobilization the commander in chief envisioned.  Their 
dialogue indicated a typical struggle between the executive and legislative branches 
during wartime.  Truman requested the power to make the preparations needed in case 
the country had to mobilize fully, without committing the U.S. to complete mobilization 
immediately.  He wanted flexibility.  Taft argued that the chief executive should explain 
exactly what he believed the country needed in terms of defense appropriations and tax 
increases, and then come to Congress as needed throughout the conflict to get its 
approval.  HST opposed the senator’s approach as being too time-consuming.53 
The meeting, which lasted an hour beyond its scheduled duration of one hour, 
proceeded with Truman going around the table asking each congressman his views on 
declaring a national emergency.  House Minority Leader Joe Martin (MA) was the first 
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Republican called upon, and said he was unsure what a declaration of a national 
emergency involved.  HST responded by handing Martin a list of powers automatically 
afforded the president during a national emergency.  Martin said he was not against 
declaring an emergency.  Taft was the next Republican to give his views.  He began 
tentatively, saying he spoke only for himself and “with some hesitation.”  The Ohioan 
questioned the psychological value of declaring a national emergency that Truman had 
touted, and believed the “exact size of the military program ought to be decided.”  He 
therefore was “generally inclined against” declaring a national emergency without 
knowing the specifics of the military buildup.  Senator Wherry spoke next from the GOP 
side and, like Taft, said he preferred the Truman come to Congress with specifics on 
resources and authority needed.  The president opposed this approach, declaring, “Time 
is of the essence.”  Wherry then suggested that the commander in chief should ask for all 
powers short of declaring a national emergency, whatever that meant.  After agreeing 
with Taft, Senator Eugene Millikin (R-CO) said the U.S. needed to strengthen itself 
immediately, “pounding the table with his fists” in excitement as several responded, 
“Aye, aye.”  Three Republicans, Rep. Charles Eaton (R-NJ), Senator Wiley, and House 
veteran Dewey Short (MO) endorsed the national emergency declaration outright.54  
The Democrats lined up behind the commander in chief with varying levels of 
courage.  Vice President Barkley was the first Democrat called on for his views and gave 
a persuasive explanation of how he had abandoned his initial skepticism.  House Speaker 
Sam Rayburn showed little leadership, declining comment when called upon because he 
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wanted to hear from committee chairmen first.  Senator Tydings, smarting from his 
recent electoral defeat, said he was speaking only because Truman asked him to, noting, 
“I’ve had my horse shot out from under me.”  Having licked his wounds, Tydings gave 
Truman a ringing endorsement, as did several other Democrats.  Connally responded in a 
surprisingly diplomatic fashion, supporting the declaration of an emergency while 
agreeing with the Republicans that the public needed details about what such a 
declaration would mean for the nation.  Walter George (GA), completing this thirtieth 
year in the Senate, emphasized the importance of bipartisan backing and endorsed Taft’s 
call for details on the effects of mobilization on taxes.  Senator Lucas, another lame 
duck, made a more pointed appeal for bipartisanship, imploring Taft, Wherry and Martin 
by name not to tell the press they opposed Truman about the national emergency 
declaration after the meeting concluded.55 
Taft and company heeded Lucas’s plea.  Before leaving the White House 
following the meeting, the Ohio senator drafted a statement and cleared it with Truman 
before releasing it to the press.  It noted Taft’s agreement with the administration that a 
“dangerous emergency” existed for the U.S. and endorsed a rapid military escalation.  
However, because he did not believe the Republicans were “sufficiently advised as to 
the legal effect” of a declaration of a national emergency, they could not take a “final 
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position on that question.”  The president’s press release on the meeting accurately 
reflected the concerns of Taft and his GOP comrades.56 
Truman’s gathering with congressional leaders was closest the two parties came 
to working together once the war started.  The administration’s gesture toward the GOP 
might have seemed like a charade because of widespread reports that the president was 
planning to declare a national emergency before he met with the congressmen.  
However, the meeting was valuable due to the way the president conducted it.  Instead of 
simply giving the legislators a sneak preview of an impending press release on war 
policy, HST took time to hear the views of the opposition and respond to their concerns.  
He also reached out to Taft, a distasteful chore, since the Ohio senator was the 
Republican most responsible for making foreign policy a political issue in the 1950 
elections.  The president also deserves credit for his treatment of the GOP even as many 
of them were trying to force Acheson out.  But because Truman took the time to listen to 
the opposition, each side portrayed the meeting in a positive light to the press, 
emphasizing common ground and qualifying their differences.  This was good for the 
country in a time of crisis.57 
Truman believed that a nonpartisan foreign policy was in the national interest.  
The president indicated such at a staff meeting in November 1950, in which he called 
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their attention to an article in Pravda discussing how divided the American people were 
over the Korean War.  HST remarked that this article indicated how foreign policy 
opponents were at least partially responsible for China’s entry into the war.  Yet, 
Truman inconsistently nurtured bipartisanship during the early stages of the conflict.  A 
White House report (see Table 2 below) provided a rough, but useful, measure.   
 
 
TABLE 2 
 
Selected List of White House Appointments with Republican Congressmen and 
Other Leading Republicans 
 
Year Number of Meetings 
1948 25 
1949 28 
1950 38 
 
The second session of the 80th Congress in 1948 was one of the most contentious in 
history.  In the 1948 elections, the Democrats regained control of Congress and Truman 
pulled off an upset victory.  They were in no mood for bipartisanship in 1949, and the 
Democrats loaded up key committees with inordinate majorities.  The number of 
presidential consultations with Republicans only increased by three from 1948-1949, 
indicating no special effort to reach out to them, particularly when accounting for the 
election recess in the fall of 1948.  In 1950, HST dramatically increased his meetings 
with Republicans, driven by McCarthyism and Korea, particularly after China entered 
the fray.58 
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Changes in GOP leadership and behavior contributed heavily to the 
inconsistency of bipartisanship through 1950.  Taft began to voice his views in foreign 
affairs as he contemplated a run for the White House in 1952, filling the Republican void 
created by Vandenberg’s illness.  Unlike the Michigan senator, Taft believed that 
pointing out the differences between the parties on international issues would help his 
party politically.  The 1950 elections seemed to prove him right.  Yet, Truman would 
face an even greater challenge to the “sacred cow” of bipartisan foreign policy in 1951. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
THE DEATH OF BIPARTISANSHIP, 1951-1952 
 
 
Bipartisan Foreign Policy Dead 
 
--columnist James Reston, June 3, 1951, New York Times1 
 
 
Senator Robert Taft declared throughout 1950 that the bipartisan foreign policy 
had been dead for months.  Sometimes, he said it died when Dean Acheson became 
Secretary of State; other times, he proclaimed Truman’s election in 1948 as the end of 
nonpartisanship.  Although Taft’s assessment arguably represented an extremist 
viewpoint at the time, it became the national consensus by the summer of 1951.  The 
commander in chief’s decision to fire a revered military commander, who also happened 
to be a Republican, delivered this blow to bipartisanship.  Responding to the resulting 
GOP explosion, the administration lashed out at its enemies while touting the Holy Grail 
of bipartisanship.  Surprisingly, however, both parties backed HST on an issue that 
ground the armistice negotiations to a halt during his final months in the White House.2 
The bipartisan cooperation of Truman’s December 13, 1950 meeting with 
congressional leaders concerning the national emergency vanished quickly.  Two days 
later, Republicans in both houses overwhelmingly passed resolutions demanding 
Acheson’s resignation.  Even GOP senators who normally cooperated with the 
administration joined in.  Henry Cabot Lodge called the Senate Foreign Relations 
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committee office complaining that he could not get an answer to a question that 
“everybody in the country” was asking, “Why do we stay in Korea?”  Francis Wilcox, 
the committee’s chief of staff, admitted privately it was “entirely possible that no policy 
has yet been worked out.”  H. Alexander Smith complained that the administration’s 
relationship with Republicans amounted to “complete non-cooperation” on Far East 
issues.  Senator Margaret Chase Smith (ME) foolishly insisted that HST had to consult 
Republicans such as Joseph McCarthy to have a legitimate foreign policy, even though 
she had publicly castigated McCarthy’s methods only months before.  All of this took 
place in the midst of bad news from the war front between December 1950 and February 
1951 as the Chinese onslaught forced U.N. troops to retreat.3 
Leaks from executive sessions of the Foreign Relations committee plagued the 
cause of bipartisanship.  On one occasion, when General Omar Bradley testified that the 
U.N. probably needed to abandon Korea, his words appeared in newspapers three hours 
later.  Such breaches in confidence created a dilemma for the administration.  If the leaks 
continued, the executive branch would be reluctant to share confidential material or 
frank assessments with the committee.  If they withheld information, the Republicans 
would blast the Democrats for failing to consult them.4 
The Republicans tried to implement a bipartisan policy forcibly in the “Great 
Debate” over Truman’s decision to commit four divisions of American troops to Europe.  
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When the Korean War erupted, the president and other Western leaders believed the 
Soviet Union ordered the North Korean attack and feared it could be a prelude to 
Communist aggression elsewhere.  Europe looked vulnerable, with only twelve NATO 
divisions in West Germany to defend against twenty-seven Russian divisions in East 
Germany.  When the president made a brief announcement of his plans to dispatch the 
four divisions to Europe on September 9, 1950, his political opponents said nothing.  In 
December, their silence changed to bedlam.  A few weeks after China invaded Korea, 
NATO representatives gathered in Brussels to finalize their plans to defend Europe from 
the Soviets, including the commitment of additional American forces.  The Chinese 
intervention, however, cast serious doubts on whether the U.S. could fulfill its troop 
allotment to NATO.  The Brussels conference also worried some Republicans that 
Truman planned to abandon Korea and Formosa to support Europe.5 
The GOP therefore tried to impose its will, seeking to force HST to obtain 
congressional approval before committing troops to Europe.  The debate raged from 
December 1950 to April 1951.  Truman believed that as commander in chief, he had the 
constitutional authority to send American troops anywhere, whenever he desired.  
Although prominent Democrats such as senators Harry Byrd (VA) and Walter George 
(GA) expressed some interest in joining the efforts led by Taft and Kenneth Wherry, the 
Great Debate was largely partisan.  Calling NATO a “tremendous mistake,” Taft said, 
“The president has no power to agree to send American troops to fight in Europe.”  
When Taft argued that the Soviets would not necessarily attack Europe if the U.S. did 
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not station forces there, Senator Connally replied that Soviet puppets were presently 
killing Americans in Korea.  “In Texas,” he snorted, “we are strongly of the opinion that 
when a person shoots at you, he is being unfriendly.”6 
The two sides ultimately compromised, albeit over Truman’s strenuous 
objection.  The Senate passed a non-binding resolution approving the four divisions to 
Europe, but banning the dispatch of additional troops without its approval.  Both parties 
claimed victory.  However, the Great Debate damaged the mutual respect exhibited by 
the legislative and executive branches regarding their respective responsibilities for 
national defense.7 
The administration nevertheless continued to promote bipartisanship.  The 
president vigorously rejected GOP calls for Acheson’s resignation, calling them “old, in 
the sense that they are the same false charges.”  Yet, he carefully acknowledged there 
were “some Republicans who recognize the facts and the true reasons for these attacks 
on Secretary Acheson, and who do not agree with their colleagues.”  Dean Rusk of the 
State Department met with H. Alexander Smith in an unsuccessful attempt to alleviate 
the Republican moderate’s concerns about Far East policy.  The White House and the 
State Department took the time to thank some Republicans simply because they had 
commended the president’s state of the union address.  In February 1951, Truman asked 
his staff to prepare a report showing the “extent of bipartisan cooperation and 
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congressional cooperation in foreign policy” for Vice President Barkley to use in an 
upcoming speech.  The president suggested including things like Republican 
appointments in the State Department and U.N. delegations, bipartisan agreement in the 
Marshall Plan, and GOP support of the Defense Production Act, the law that mobilized 
the U.S. for the Korean conflict.  Aide Ken Hechler ultimately compiled a list of all 
meetings the president had with Republicans even though he had little proof of their 
content.  Barkley’s speech, unfortunately, attracted scant coverage in the national media 
that made no mention of bipartisanship.  Still, when a Democratic senator suggested of 
the GOP, “Let’s have our foreign policy, let them have theirs and may the best man 
win,” Hechler argued that the bipartisan foreign policy was “too much of a sacred cow to 
trample underfoot.”8 
The events leading to Truman’s recall of MacArthur demonstrated that the 
general was nearly as sacred.  John Foster Dulles, the Republican advisor recently 
named to the State Department, happened to be in the Far East for consultations with 
MacArthur when the North Koreans invaded the South.  Dulles’s report to the president 
on his trip painted an unflattering portrait of the general’s performance.  When news of 
the attack initially reached Tokyo, MacArthur downplayed it, saying the South Koreans 
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could handle it alone.  Later that evening, word arrived that the ROK was in full retreat, 
prompting Dulles to ask the MacArthur’s staff to inform their boss.  They refused, 
fearful of violating the general’s “strict orders” not to disturb him after office hours, 
forcing Dulles to notify MacArthur himself.  The next day, a despondent general told the 
diplomat and the rest of the delegation, “All Korea is lost.”  When Dulles returned to 
Washington, he told Truman he should recall MacArthur immediately.  HST, however, 
explained that due to MacArthur’s status in the Republican Party, such a move would 
provoke a massive reaction.9 
Ironically, Truman could have saved himself some grief had he heeded his 
Republican advisor’s advice at the war’s outset.  While removing MacArthur in July 
1950 would have precipitated a political firestorm (and possibly sacrificed the benefits 
of the Inchon counterattack), the president could have used Dulles’s influence to 
mitigate the GOP uproar.  By 1951, the political climate had worsened such that Dulles 
could not have helped the commander in chief justify removing the general, even if the 
GOP advisor had wanted to. 
MacArthur’s speech written for a Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) convention 
in August 1950 was a key step leading to his dismissal, escalating partisan acrimony.  
Policy regarding Formosa was the point of contention.  The administration had 
dispatched the U.S. Seventh Fleet into the Strait of Formosa at the start of the war to 
deter conflict between the Nationalists on the island and the Communists on mainland 
China.  Truman designed his neutrality policy to quell fears of his U.N. allies that he 
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intended to occupy the island.  Perceived aggressive behavior by the U.S. regarding 
Formosa could play into Soviet charges that America was using the Korean crisis to grab 
nearby territory.  MacArthur thought otherwise, saying, “Nothing could be more 
fallacious than the threadbare argument by those who advocate appeasement and 
defeatism in the Pacific that if we defend Formosa we alienate continental Asia.”  
Adding, “Those who speak thus do not understand the Orient,” the general went on to 
extol the strategic importance of the island.  MacArthur thus publicly disagreed with 
U.S. policy and called the administration incompetent.  The general distributed advance 
copies to the media, and the State Department found out about the speech from an 
Associated Press ticker report.10 
Truman ordered MacArthur to withdraw his statement.  He complied, but the 
damage was done, as U.S. News and World Report had already printed the speech in its 
next edition, which was already in the mail.  The president also considered removing 
MacArthur from his post as commander of the Far East, but leaving him in charge of 
Japan.  After some thought, HST decided against it because he felt such a move would 
look like a demotion, and he “had no desire to hurt General MacArthur personally.”  The 
commander in chief probably had political motivations as well, with good reason.  
Republicans jumped on the policy disagreement, slapping Truman by entering 
MacArthur’s rescinded speech into the Congressional Record.  House Majority Leader 
John McCormack (MA) warned Republicans against using the episode as a campaign 
issue, pointing across the aisle and chiding them for their “desperation and extreme 
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political emotionalism.”  In a note thanking McCormack, HST recalled his own role in 
advancing MacArthur’s career.  Senator Wherry called the general a martyr, saying the 
only thing boosting the U.S. at the time was “our faith in the rugged Americanism of 
General MacArthur.”11 
MacArthur ensured his demise—and the ensuing Republican upheaval—in late 
March 1951.  Learning that the president planned a peace overture to Communist China, 
the general upstaged him by issuing his own statement proposing armistice talks, taking 
the State Department and U.N. by “complete surprise.”  One could “almost hear the 
swish of the MacArthur sword as it cut through the air” upon reading the announcement.  
A problem with the statement was that the general had not cleared it with the State 
Department, violating a presidential directive designed to curb MacArthur’s tendency to 
conduct diplomacy on his own.  Moreover, he threatened to expand the war into 
mainland China if Mao rejected his offer, something the administration was not prepared 
to do.  The State Department therefore swiftly repudiated MacArthur’s veiled ultimatum.  
Though the administration seethed, Congress paid the general’s announcement little 
heed, distracted by the Easter recess and the Great Debate.  Truman, however, decided 
he would have to relieve his field commander; it was just a matter of time.12 
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   MacArthur created a major stir on Capitol Hill when Minority Leader Joe 
Martin read a letter from the general on the House floor on April 5, the day after the 
Great Debate ended.  Responding to a previous note from Martin, MacArthur wrote that 
he agreed wholeheartedly with the legislator’s push to enlist Chiang Kai-shek’s help in 
the fight against Communist China.  Regarding the Nationalists, Martin asked his 
colleagues, “Why in God’s name, are we not using them?”  Conflicting signals from key 
leaders did not help the Democrats’ cause.  On the same day that House Speaker Sam 
Rayburn had said the U.S. was in “terrible danger” of a third world war, Senator 
Connally assured the public that World War III would not start in 1951.  Martin 
therefore blasted the administration for failing to “come clean” with Congress.  Senator 
Robert Kerr (D-OK) quipped that he had added MacArthur’s name to his “list of letter-
writers who need the writer’s cramps.”13 
Others joined the fray.  Taft demanded an end to the “tragic and ridiculous policy 
of . . . neutralizing the Chinese Nationalist Army.”  A House Republican recommended 
bringing MacArthur stateside for foreign policy consultations, while a GOP senator 
proposed sending a congressional delegation to the general in Japan to get his input on 
international policy.  Such radical suggestions prompted Democratic rebuttals.  Senate 
Majority Leader Ernest McFarland (D-AZ) naively questioned why MacArthur, who 
was aware of “our constitutional history that the civilian arm and not the military makes 
policy,” would help the Republicans circumvent Truman.  McCormack called the Senate 
proposal “the most unusual thing I ever heard of.”  Kerr said the “Big Chief in the Far 
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East” was not satisfied with “all that big brass on his head” from his multiple job titles.  
The senator suggested MacArthur was trying to grab another hat, the “high silk topper of 
the diplomat.” 14 
Meanwhile, the White House maintained an ominous silence regarding the 
Martin letter, making the GOP increasingly nervous amid press speculation about 
whether Truman would reprimand the general or do something more forceful.  H. 
Alexander Smith was “much concerned” about it, and, after meeting with Dean Rusk, 
worried about an apparent “rupture” over MacArthur’s comments.  After learning of a 
meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Senator Knowland hypothesized that the 
“hatchetmen of the Administration have been turned loose” to the undoing of the U.N. 
commander.  Concern turned to desperation when Senator Bridges tried a bipartisan 
approach of sorts, accompanying Senator Pat McCarran (D-NV) to see Acheson on April 
10.  McCarran, an ally of McCarthy in his crusade against alleged Communist 
infiltration of the administration and a constant critic of Truman, asked Acheson to urge 
the president “not to make any changes in so far as General MacArthur’s status was 
concerned.”  McCarran said he was making his appeal as a fellow Democrat, as if party 
loyalty had ever influenced his dealings with HST.  But by then, it was too late.  The 
“Caesar of the Pacific” had less than twenty-four hours left on his throne.15 
                                                 
14 Taft quoted in “Taft Supports General,” NYT, 7 April 1951, p. 4; Republican proposals and McFarland in Lawrence, 
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Truman’s firing of MacArthur predictably sparked a partisan reaction.  
Democratic Senator Hubert Humphrey (MN) said, “We cannot have two policies. . . .  It 
was MacArthur’s obligation to stay within that policy or resign his commission.”  
Eleanor Roosevelt was succinct, declaring, “I do not think a general should make 
policies.”  Republicans, naturally, saw it otherwise.  Senator Wherry suggested, 
“Compare the monumental record of General MacArthur with that of his accusers—with 
their record of moral decay, greed, corruption, and confusion.”  Referring to the Chinese 
Communists, Senator Richard M. Nixon (R-CA) railed, “President Truman has given 
them just what they were after—MacArthur’s scalp.”  Thus began what Francis Wilcox 
called a “big knock-down drag-out fight” on the Senate floor over an issue he felt would 
“widen the cleavage” between the parties.16 
The GOP leadership pounced.  On the day of the firing, a cadre of key 
Republicans, including John Foster Dulles of the State Department, held a number of 
meetings to plan a congressional inquiry into Far East policy.  Since MacArthur had 
“unsurpassed knowledge of the political and military conditions” in the region, they 
decided to invite him to address a joint session of Congress.  Martin and the Republican 
National Committee (RNC) worked to maximize the political benefits of bringing 
MacArthur to Washington while stressing the need to portray the general in an apolitical 
light.  To that end, the RNC made sure no committee member would be in San Francisco 
for MacArthur’s return, even though it had assembled the schedule for his appearances 
by the fourth day after his termination.  The Senate Republican Policy Committee also 
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decided not to officially sanction MacArthur’s visit.  Interestingly, even though Senator 
Eugene Millikin (CO) announced this to the press, it never made the major papers.  
Perhaps the media took Republican hypocrisy for granted.17 
The Democratic National Committee’s (DNC) response was the opposite of its 
Republican counterpart.  The day after the firing, senators were already asking the White 
House staff for information to use to answer questions from constituents and defend 
Truman against the GOP.  Ken Hechler expressed his frustration with Charlie Van 
Devander, DNC public relations director, in three conversations in one day ranging 
between “the exploratory, the explanatory, and the hortatory.”  Hechler wanted the DNC 
to help provide ammunition for the Democrats.  Van Devander, however, thought the 
controversy was a “national issue, and should not be made a partisan football,” and felt it 
would be “dangerous to have the news circulate that the Democratic National Committee 
is spreading propaganda.”  The DNC told another Truman aide that it wanted to stay 
“non-partisan” regarding MacArthur, an amazing statement from a partisan organization.  
Hechler thought it was amazing, too, telling Van Devander that the RNC was “shooting 
information up to the Hill in an endless belt,” and did not think the Democrats should 
“sit around with our hands tied.”  Eventually the DNC relented.  Yet, when asked to put 
together some speeches, Van Devander claimed he was “not too clear” about what they 
should contain.18 
                                                 
17 Unsurpassed knowledge in Kepley, 123-4; Tyler Abell, ed., The Drew Pearson Diaries:  1949-1959 (New York:  
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Some Republicans launched vicious attacks.  Senators McCarthy and William 
Jenner (IN) called for Truman’s impeachment.  McCarthy said if the Democrats would 
not help, they would be labeling themselves the “party of betrayal.”  Jenner declared that 
a “secret coterie . . . directed by agents of the Soviet Union” controlled the country; 
therefore, the nation needed to “cut this whole cancerous conspiracy out of our 
Government at once.”  Martin emphasized that the GOP was considering multiple 
impeachments, including Acheson and others.  Others, such as Rep. Frederick R. 
Coudert, Jr. (NY) and Senator Robert C. Hendrickson (NJ), recognizing that Truman had 
not committed an impeachable offense, proposed constitutional amendments to enable 
Congress and the public to recall the president if they did not approve of his 
performance.  Countering the Democrats for calling the GOP the “war party” for 
backing MacArthur’s desire to expand the war into China, Republicans came up with a 
new epithet of their own when Senator Wherry proclaimed, “This is Truman’s war.”19 
Not all Republicans subscribed to these assaults.  Senator James H. Duff (PA) 
was one of few GOP senators calling for national unity in the aftermath of MacArthur’s 
demise, and the Massachusetts duo of Henry Cabot Lodge and Leverett Saltonstall 
publicly backed Truman’s decision.  H. Alexander Smith privately hoped he could get 
some Democrats to support a centrist policy.  Determined to hit Truman’s “fear-ridden 
appeasement mentality hard,” Smith wanted to enlist Chiang’s help while avoiding a 
                                                                                                                                                
their conversations.  Thus, the quotes are Hechler’s words describing what Van Devander said except for the last 
quote, which is a direct quote from Van Devander. 
 
19 Martin, McCarthy, Jenner and Coudert in Spanier, 212-3; Hendrickson in White, William S., “M’Arthur Inquiry 
May Begin Monday,” NYT, 24 April 1951, p. 4; war party and Truman’s war in ”M’Arthur Due Back in U.S. Next 
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wholesale invasion of China.  Smith believed that supporting the Nationalists might 
encourage the Chinese Communist regime to collapse.  Interestingly, he mused that, in 
this scenario, Chiang’s forces could “precipitate themselves into a wider sphere of 
action,” requiring the U.S. to “go ahead and back them up,” which sounded a lot like an 
American invasion of mainland China.  The New Jersey senator exemplified the 
quandary of the Eastern internationalist wing of the GOP.  They rejected the general’s 
strategy for winning the war before and after his firing.  Thinking ahead to the 1952 
presidential race, the moderates feared that if the party backed MacArthur’s aggressive 
strategy they would push Dwight Eisenhower into the Democratic camp.  The partisan 
atmosphere around the general’s firing, however, led them to express such concerns 
quietly.20 
The Democrats scored a few points during the week between MacArthur’s 
removal and his address to Congress.  Without mentioning the general’s name, Truman 
got his licks in at a Democratic fundraiser, remarking, “It’s been categorically stated that 
Russia will not come in if we bomb Manchuria.  That statement was made to me about 
the Chinese not coming into Korea.  And it was made on good authority, too, and I 
believed it.”  Senator McMahon defended the administration as effectively as anyone 
did.  Speaking at a fundraiser for Indiana Democrats, McMahon called MacArthur a fine 
soldier, but emphasized the ideal of civilian authority over the military.  The senator, 
“disturbed” by the GOP reaction, claimed he would take the same view if a Republican 
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occupied the White House.  McMahon welcomed the GOP demands for an investigation 
into Far East policy, commenting, “Let’s find out why the isolationists on the European 
front want an all out war in the Far East.”21 
Senator William Benton (D-CT) used MacArthur’s firing to goad a Republican 
colleague into a major gaffe.  Debating Senator Harry F. Cain (R-WA) in a national 
broadcast, Benton dared the Republicans to quit hiding behind the “brass, leadership or 
ideas” of MacArthur, saying, “If we want war with China, why don’t you get it out in the 
open?”  Cain, a U.S. Army major in the European theater during World War II, took up 
Benton’s challenge, introducing a resolution calling for the U.S. to either declare war on 
Communist China or withdraw from Korea.  The Washington senator was the first 
Republican willing to back up his party’s rhetoric with action.  If limited war was 
intolerable, his resolution presented the only alternatives.22 
  Cain, however, failed to recognize political realities.  Benton bragged to 
Truman that the resolution was “one of the best breaks we’ve had.”  The Senate’s 
Republican leadership agreed, fearing the proposal would validate Democratic charges 
of the GOP as the party of war.  H. Alexander Smith wrote, “Cain has embarrassed us 
with his silly talk.”  Some of Smith’s colleagues were harsher at an “explosive” 
Republican meeting, as Cain’s brethren “ripped into him unmercifully.”  The 
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Washingtonian still refused to back down, bewildering his colleagues by arguing that the 
GOP should initiate a declaration of war to “pin this war on Truman.”  Wherry, 
perennial nemesis of the Secretary of State, exemplified the GOP leaders’ disaffection, 
declaring of the Cain resolution, “I am on Acheson’s side.”23  
The Democrats also had to face some political realities.  Although Rayburn and 
McCormack, their leaders in the House, initially responded coolly to GOP demands for 
MacArthur to address a joint session of Congress, they succumbed to pressure from 
Truman.  Senator Connally agreed with the president, arguing that rebuffing a speech by 
the general would allow the Republicans make MacArthur a martyr at the Democrats’ 
expense.  Democratic leaders therefore caved, formally inviting General MacArthur to 
speak to the legislators.  Someone in the White House decided to make the best of a bad 
situation, circulating the following program for MacArthur’s speech: 
 
 
 
 
Schedule for Welcoming of General MacArthur 
 
12:30 p.m. Wades ashore from Snorkel submarine 
 
12:31 Navy Band plays “Sparrow in the Treetop” and “I’ll be Glad When 
You’re Dead You Rascal You” 
 
12:40  Parade to the Capitol with General MacArthur riding an elephant 
 
12:47  Be-heading of General Vaughn at the rotunda 
 
 1:00  General MacArthur addresses Members of Congress 
                                                 
23Benton to Truman, April 30, 1951; PSF:  General File; Benton, William folder; Truman Papers, HSTL; H. 
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168
 
 1:30-1:49 Applause for General MacArthur 
 
1:50  Burning of the Constitution 
 
1:55  Lynching of Secretary Acheson 
 
2:00  21-atomic bomb salute 
 
2:30  300 nude D.A.R.’s leap from Washington Monument 
 
3:00  Basket lunch, Monument grounds24 
 
 
MacArthur’s address to Congress made April 19, 1951 a day to remember.  As 
he entered the building, “Democrats, Republicans, and the crowds in the galleries rose as 
one,” applauding and shouting.  The general gave an impressive performance that 
included a “scorching indictment” of the administration’s conduct of the war since the 
Chinese entry.  After thirty-seven minutes, during which the audience interrupted to 
applaud thirty times, the American icon ended in a “spine-tingling and theatrical climax” 
that was “audaciously beyond the outer limits of ordinary present-day oratory.”  Time 
proclaimed that history would “remember this day and this man, and mark him large.”25 
Truman wasted no time trying to deflate MacArthur’s return.  The day after the 
general’s address to Congress, New York Times reporter Anthony Leviero approached 
John Steelman, the president’s top aide, about doing a story on the October 1950 Wake 
Island meeting between the president and MacArthur.  Leviero wanted to discredit the 
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returning hero by documenting his assurances to the commander in chief that China 
would not enter the war and his promise to have the troops home by Christmas.  For his 
story, the journalist wanted notes from the meeting.  HST assented, giving Leviero his 
front-page scoop.  In addition to exposing MacArthur’s overconfidence about the war, 
Leviero reported the general had apologized for “embarrassments he had caused the 
president.”  Rep. Martin accused the administration of “trying to smear General 
MacArthur’s war record,” vowing, “they won’t get away with it.”  Senator James P. 
Kem (R-MO) recommended a dose of MacArthur’s advice for the “terrible-tempered 
Mr. Truman.”26 
The president’s declassification of the Wake Island notes, though helpful in 
discrediting MacArthur, produced undesirable consequences.  “If the New York Times 
can gain access to such documents,” declared Senator George D. Aiken (R-VT), “then I 
say it’s time the Administration made them available to Congress.”  Senator Russell B. 
Long (D-LA) chimed in, berating excessive leaks of sensitive information by both 
parties.  Truman’s release of the Wake Island notes did not set a good precedent.  During 
the subsequent MacArthur hearings, HST reaped criticism for reversing course and 
invoking executive privilege to prevent White House personnel from giving testimony 
on the details of private meetings.27 
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The Republicans planned to make the hearings on Far Eastern issues the sequel 
to the general’s speech in their quest to redirect Truman’s policies.  MacArthur led a 
parade of witnesses that included Cabinet members and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the 
probe conducted from early May through mid-June 1951.  By the conclusion of these 
hearings, the general would not loom as large as Time’s editors had hoped, and the 
bipartisan foreign policy would appear extinct.28 
H. Alexander Smith’s correspondence revealed the GOP’s partisanship as he 
prepared for the hearings.  In his diary, Smith mused not only about getting MacArthur’s 
views, but also how the Republicans could “best protect him,” unsurprisingly getting his 
colleagues’ agreement to do so.  Despite his seemingly cordial relationship with 
Acheson, Smith dedicated most of his preparatory work to drafting questions for the 
Secretary of State.  While the New Jersey Republican held no personal animosity 
towards Acheson, he clearly hoped to force the secretary from office.  Moreover, Smith 
felt MacArthur’s recall had helped him persuade GOP isolationists to go along with him 
on U.S. involvement in Europe and the Far East by making them feel included regarding 
foreign affairs.  Nevertheless, the senator had some concerns as the hearings began, 
writing a friend, “I am trying to find the hemlock to drink before my political demise.”29  
Democrats and Republicans on the panel clashed over whether to conduct the 
hearings in closed session.  Senator Russell, chairman of the proceedings, wanted them 
closed due to concerns over publicizing military secrets and the possibility of a media 
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circus if he allowed live broadcasts.  While Russell did not consult Truman on this issue, 
he did discuss it with MacArthur, who also favored executive sessions.  The chairman 
then obtained unanimous approval from the committee.  Amid criticism of Russell’s 
determination to keep the hearings closed, several committee Republicans backtracked 
and came out for public hearings.  Francis Wilcox agreed with Russell due to the number 
of top-secret documents involved, observing that the Republicans saw open hearings as 
an “excellent opportunity to needle the Administration.”30   
The chairman castigated the committee Republicans for changing their minds, 
pointedly reminding them, “There is something here that is more important than 
continued tenure in the Senate, or even the election of the President of the United States 
in 1952.”    Ultimately, Russell compromised a bit.  While the committee barred cameras 
and reporters from the proceedings, it also made provisions to release edited transcripts 
of the testimony to the press on an hourly basis.  Three of the nine Republicans on the 
panel joined all thirteen Democrats in voting for the compromise proposal.  Despite the 
portentous connotation of “edited” transcripts, Wilcox recalled that the system worked 
well.  As the typist transcribed each page of testimony, two officials, one from the 
Defense Department and the other from the State Department, immediately looked it 
over, removed any sensitive material, and then released it to the press “practically 
automatically.”  Years later, Senate historian Donald Ritchie reported that review of the 
unedited transcripts showed that the editors at the hearings held back only a “very small 
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percentage” of the testimony.  This underscores why Russell won so much praise from 
the opposition Republicans and even MacArthur for his conduct of the hearings in a 
striking contrast to Millard Tydings’ performance a year earlier.31 
Republican rhetoric during the hearings varied wildly.  After cautioning his 
colleagues about hitching their stars too closely to MacArthur’s wagon only days earlier, 
Taft endorsed the general’s strategy for winning the war four days before the 
proceedings began.  This was pure political opportunism, since the Ohioan previously 
had suggested abandoning Korea and retrenching in Formosa and Japan.  Taft also called 
Truman both an appeaser and a warmonger.  Knowland and Hickenlooper mixed their 
questions to witnesses with speeches praising the general.  Senator Wiley, typically 
associated with the bipartisan wing of the party, proclaimed that the nation would have 
avoided the tragedy of Korea if Truman had consulted the Senate at the outset, 
conveniently overlooking his own silence about the matter in June 1950.  Other 
bipartisan Republicans such as Lodge, Saltonstall, and Charles Tobey (NH) avoided 
attacking MacArthur, yet indicated they did not approve of his policies by the nature of 
their questions.  Only one Republican, Wayne Morse (OR), pushed MacArthur, grilling 
him for three hours at one point.32 
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The Democrats approached the hearings fully aware of the political ramifications 
involved.  Senator McMahon exposed the general’s weak spots.  When MacArthur 
assured the senator that the Soviets would not intervene if the war extended into 
mainland China the following dialogue ensued: 
MCMAHON:  Suppose, General, you are wrong about that?  You could be wrong, 
couldn’t you? 
 
MACARTHUR:  Most assuredly. 
 
MCMAHON:  You did not believe at one time that the communists of China would 
come into the conflict in Korea? 
 
MACARTHUR:  I doubted it. 
 
MCMAHON:  They did. 
 
After some additional give and take, McMahon concluded, “And now, of course, we can 
all agree that there’s a possibility that the Soviets will come in if we adopt the 
recommendations that you propose to carry out.”  When the senator pressed MacArthur 
about how to defend the U.S. in an all-out war with the Soviet Union, the general 
responded, “That doesn’t happen to be my responsibility, Senator.  My responsibilities 
were in the Pacific.” 33 
 That prompted McMahon to whisper to Wilcox,” "Now I've got him.  I've really 
got him.  He is a theatre commander, he doesn't know anything really about what's 
happening in the rest of the world.  The Joint Chiefs of Staff are the only ones who have 
a knowledge of the whole military responsibility of this government."34  
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Meanwhile, McMahon’s Connecticut counterpart, Senator Benton, decided to 
give a holistic defense of the administration’s side of the MacArthur saga.  Taking to the 
Senate floor a few days after the hearings began, Benton announced his speech would 
last about forty-five minutes.  As the gist of his remarks emerged, word spread quickly 
and Republicans stormed from their offices to do battle.  Ten GOP senators joined the 
debate, interrupting Benton such that his speech lasted three and a half hours.  Senators 
Humphrey and Kerr came to Benton’s aid as the latter hammered on MacArthur’s lack 
of knowledge outside the Far East.  The Connecticut senator said he had urged Truman 
to relieve the general the day before the announcement, not knowing that HST had 
already made his decision.  Benton reminded his peers that the president’s move was not 
unique, proclaiming, “Many popular generals have been fired, and I personally hope 
they will continue to be fired when they push for too much authority and 
responsibility.”35 
The Democrats grew optimistic as the hearings unfolded.  Senator Clinton 
Anderson, replying to a constituent demanding Truman’s impeachment, noted that the 
testimony proved the president made a courageous decision supported by the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff.  Anderson gloated, “It is interesting to notice that many men like Senator 
Taft who were very vocal in the beginning have been a little surprised by the 
developments of these part few days.”  The White House staff continued to try to light a 
fire under the DNC to reap political profits from the hearings.  Ken Hechler again 
whined about the DNC spending a “great deal of space denouncing partisanship, and 
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trying to prove the Committee is not guilty of partisanship.”  Hechler correctly reasoned 
that “nobody would ever be fooled into thinking that a body set up to be partisan ever 
could be nonpartisan,” and railed that DNC efforts to paint itself as a nonpartisan 
organization served as “a clock for its own timidity and masterly inactivity.”  He wished 
the DNC would “come out swinging in a bold, courageous—and full-bloodedly 
partisan—fashion.”36 
The DNC soon took Hechler’s advice, sponsoring a mid-term gathering of 
Democrats in Denver.  Truman Cabinet members and top advisors assailed Republican 
foreign policy views.  Again calling attention to MacArthur’s testimony, Averell 
Harriman said, “We are engaged in a global struggle.  It is not Asia versus Europe.  It is 
Asia and Europe.  It is the free world.”  Agriculture Secretary Charles F. Brannan went 
after Republican congressional leaders by name, calling them the advocates of “big-war-
now.”37 
A glimmer of bipartisanship emerged during the testimony of General Omar 
Bradley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  When Senator Wiley asked Bradley to 
divulge the details of a meeting the general and several advisors had with Truman on 
April 6 to discuss MacArthur’s future, Bradley refused, saying that since he was 
advising the president in confidence, he did not “feel at liberty to publicize what any of 
us said at that time.”  Bradley’s response and the president’s refusal to allow any White 
House advisers to testify set off an explosion over executive privilege when Russell 
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ruled in the general’s favor.  Senator Knowland worried that if the administration 
lowered an “iron curtain,” the committee may have to report to the full Senate that it 
could not do its job.  Senator Fulbright retorted, “I hope the Senator has not decided to 
sabotage or destroy this hearing simply because the evidence now being presented does 
not support General MacArthur.”  An incensed Wiley convened a meeting of a few 
Republicans and announced he would challenge Russell’s ruling.  The chairman 
expressed disappointment that Wiley was “having huddles with just members of his 
party” on the issue, saying the committee should be resolving such issues as Americans 
rather than as Democrats or Republicans.  Russell was so angry that he wrote a four-
page letter to the committee resigning his leadership post.  Grumbling that the 
Republicans appeared more concerned with gaining “some political advantage” than in 
conducting an impartial investigation, he avowed, “I do not propose to act as a ring 
master of a political circus.”38 
Russell nevertheless decided to weather the storm and never distributed the letter.  
Wilcox believed the chairman was right because Bradley had offered to tell the panel the 
results of the meeting.  Ultimately, several committee Republicans agreed.  Senator 
Smith decided to support Russell’s ruling as a vote of confidence in his leadership, and 
clearly was pleased with the Georgian’s performance.  Moreover, Smith wanted to “keep 
the hearings away from any partisanship or suspicion of purely political motives.”  
Legally, he believed it was a borderline case, and felt that because the committee had not 
                                                 
38 All quotes other than Russell from “Political Squall,” Time, May 28, 1951, 
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forced MacArthur to discuss similar details of his meeting with Truman at Wake Island, 
Bradley should have the same privilege.  The committee voted 18-8 to support Russell’s 
rulings.  Twelve of the fourteen Democrats backed the chairman, along with half of the 
twelve GOP senators.  Later that day at a press conference, Truman answered questions 
that, in Smith’s mind, gave the Republicans what they were after from Bradley when the 
president said he had been considering removing MacArthur since the August 1950 
VFW incident.  Although Wiley fumed about the majority’s “frantic desire to cover up 
and whitewash,” a pleased Smith wrote, “It was not a partisan vote.”39 
By the conclusion of Bradley’s testimony, Democrats and some Republicans had 
found common ground on several issues.  Truman had the right to remove MacArthur 
and had twice ordered the general to keep his policy views to himself.  They also 
established that MacArthur disagreed with the military restrictions imposed upon him 
and had lobbied publicly and privately for months to change the policy.  A number of 
GOP senators now believed that MacArthur had been out of line.40 
The end of the hearings produced a fractured Republican Party contrasting to the 
united Democrats.  Russell, reasoning that the public had already heard the various 
viewpoints on MacArthur’s removal and Far East policy, persuaded an 18-5 majority of 
the committee not to issue a final report.  The chairman believed a concluding 
commentary would be divisive and could negatively affect the peace negotiations just 
                                                 
39 Francis O. Wilcox, Diary entries, May 15 and 17, 1951; Diary, 1951-1952 folder; Wilcox Papers, HSTL; H. 
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underway in Kaesong.  Nevertheless, eight committee Republicans decided to issue their 
own statement on August 19 after failing to get persuade any Democrats to sign on.  The 
report called Truman’s Far East policy a “catastrophic failure,” rejecting any suggestion 
that it was “achieved under bipartisan sponsorship,” and denying that “all must share the 
responsibility for the failure.”  The bashing of HST aside, it was noteworthy that the 
eight Republicans issuing the report were expected to support Taft as the GOP’s 1952 
presidential nominee, with the other four Republicans thought to favor Eisenhower.  
Senator Fulbright was the only prominent Democrat to comment on the statement, 
calling it “99 per cent political” and an indication of “desperation in regard to the next 
Presidential election.”41 
 One of Truman’s friends foresaw the political motivations of the MacArthur 
hearings.  Bill Max, director of circulation for the Chicago Sun-Times, wrote of 
MacArthur, “The stupid G.O.P. is using him as a political football, and it will kick him 
in the teeth.  They will be looking for a way to dump him,” which is what the 
Republican Party did.42  
The administration continued to tout its bipartisanship in international policy 
despite the partisan rancor of the MacArthur hearings.  With the enthusiastic blessing of 
the White House and the State Department, Ken Hechler  assembled a sixty-page history 
of bipartisan foreign policy consultations.  In October 1951, the administration released 
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it.  Review of Bipartisan Foreign Policy Consultations Since World War II sometimes  
stretched its case, claiming, for example, “Since the outbreak of the Korean conflict, 
there has been bipartisan support for the United States policy toward Formosa.” 
However, it also included the major details of the Great Debate over troops to Europe, an 
incident Truman would not have cited as an example of nonpartisanship at its finest.  
Overall, the report was a reasonably accurate and comprehensive summary.  Despite the 
considerable efforts of the administration, it attracted little national media attention, 
probably because of the press’s preoccupation with the fight over Philip Jessup’s 
confirmation as a U.N. delegate.  Though the project failed, it appeared to indicate 
Truman’s determination not to give up on promoting the idea of bipartisanship in foreign 
policy, even after the rancor of the MacArthur incident.43  
Yet, appearances were deceiving.  While Hechler assembled his history of 
bipartisan cooperation, others in the administration planned an offensive against the 
opponents of Truman’s Far East policies.  The China Lobby was a group of legislators, 
along with their media and business allies, desiring to help Chiang Kai-Shek reverse the 
results of the Chinese civil war.  GOP senators Taft, Knowland, Wherry, McCarthy, 
Bridges, H. Alexander Smith, and Nixon, helped comprise the group, along with House 
Republicans Walter H. Judd (MN) and John Vorys (OH).  Publishers Henry Luce of 
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Time and Life magazines and William Loeb of the Manchester (New Hampshire) Union 
Leader backed them up.  The chief business supporter was importer Alfred Kohlberg.  
The administration believed that Chinese Nationalists were taking money received from 
American aid and funneling it to the China bloc politicians, who were using the funds to 
attack administration foreign policy.  (The Washington Post called the China Lobby the 
“chief nourisher of McCarthyism.”)  Another concern was that American and Chinese 
business interests in Formosa and China were pumping money into the hands of 
legislators for the same purpose.44 
Presidential aide George Elsey therefore recommended to Truman in March 1951 
that Congress conduct a “vigorous investigation” of the China Lobby.  Noting that the 
staffers in the DNC, State Department and White House endorsed the idea, Elsey 
believed the probe would be “highly embarrassing to a sizeable group of Republicans in 
and out of Congress,” revealing “interesting information” on monetary supporters of 
senators such as McCarthy and Knowland.  HST agreed, noting at a meeting of the 
Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) that a previous congressional probe had fallen 
short due to the failing health of Rep. Frank Buchanan (D-PA), chairman of the Select 
Committee on Lobbying Activities.  Despite Buchanan’s lack of success, Undersecretary 
of State James E. Webb suggested that the House would be more effective than the 
Senate as the source of the investigation due to “senatorial courtesy,” the unspoken law 
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discouraging senators from going after each other on ethical issues.  Webb’s optimism 
turned out to be unfounded. 45 
The administration’s inquiries into the China Lobby remained under wraps until 
Dean Acheson’s testimony near the end of the MacArthur hearings.  Since the China 
bloc staunchly backed the general, its activities came up for discussion.  When Senator 
Wayne Morse (R-OR) announced his intention to question Acheson on the topic, one 
journalist reported, “You could have heard a pin drop.”  Following the stunned silence, 
Senator McMahon exclaimed, “Oh!  Oh!” and Senator Wiley chirped, “What’s that?  
What’s that?”  Once they got their wits about them, the senators quickly let everyone 
know whose side they were one.  McMahon declared that “speculators, grafters and 
corruptionists” sympathetic to Chiang were enriching themselves, courtesy of the U.S. 
government.  Senator Bridges countered that the “so-called China Lobby and influence 
is a very minor thing compared to the whole.”  As the questioning continued, Acheson 
told the panel the president had required government agencies to gather information on 
the China Lobby and to work with any congressional inquiry “to the fullest extent.” 46 
The secretary of state’s testimony lit a fire under the administration’s languishing 
inquiry into the China bloc.  Elsey reported that Truman aide Charles Murphy initiated  
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numerous discussions between White House and State Department staffers on the 
subject within days of the end of the MacArthur hearings.  Truman’s staff complained 
that the State Department “dragged its heels” on collecting information on the Lobby 
after being assigned the task months earlier, producing “only a watery 5-page memo” on 
June 5.   Truman ordered Attorney General J. Howard McGrath to use “whatever 
Bureaus are necessary” to get the facts.  By now, the president wanted to investigate the 
China bloc “from hell to breakfast.”47 
The White House worked on the China Lobby probe through the summer and fall 
of 1951.  In addition to the Cabinet agencies, the administration tapped non-
governmental resources, such as editors Alfred Friendly of the Washington Post and Ed 
Harris of the St. Louis Post Dispatch.  They even approached a Columbia University 
graduate student writing a thesis about the China Lobby, but who was “rather reluctant” 
to turn his research over to the government.  The most fruitful effort came from 
cooperation with The Reporter magazine, which published a detailed story on the Lobby 
in consecutive issues that finally came out in April 1952.  The story described the China 
Lobby as a “vast tentacular thing” that “developed its power through an incredible 
combination of crookedness and idealism.”  Noting that part of the Republican Party was 
“inextricably tied” to the alliance, the magazine also reported that, like other lobbyists, it 
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had garnered a “large measure of bipartisan support,” menacing words for the 
Democrats.  Legislators from both parties greeted the Reporter story with silence.48  
 Truman’s team uncovered suspicious information on the China Lobby, but failed 
to find sufficient proof of wrongdoing to make a legal case against its political 
tormentors.  Part of the problem was lack of zeal for the project within the bureaucracy, 
particularly the Federal Reserve, the Justice Department and the FBI.  Another issue was 
the complexity and lack of a formal organization of the Chiang backers.  An aide 
estimated it would take a staff of 50 to 75 people eight months for the Treasury 
Department to follow the money trail of aid to the Nationalists.  The administration 
found that Alfred Kohlberg, a prominent businessman who traded in the Far East, had 
provided funds that two Republican congressmen used to fight the Jessup nomination.  
The White House believed Kohlberg and his staff were writing Styles Bridges’ speeches 
on the Far East.  They found that an agent for the National Resources Commission of 
China had “entertained Members of Congress extensively.”  Such fragments, while not 
passing the smell test, were inadequate to prove any lawbreaking.  By December, the 
participating agencies felt they had done all they could and threw in the towel.  Asserting 
only that they had indications of a “direct relationship between the money now being 
used for propaganda and political influence,” the administration conceded it did not have 
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information in hand “sufficient in itself to establish this connection.”  They reported, 
“Since the passing of money, if any . . . has been skillfully conducted in very devious 
manners,” they had no case.  While more investigation into corruption of Chinese 
Nationalists operating in U.S. political circles possibly could lead to proof of 
wrongdoing by legislators, a congressional probe involved a “grave risking of failure.”49 
Meanwhile, senators Morse and McMahon pushed for a congressional 
investigation.  A couple of days after questioning Acheson about the China bloc during 
the MacArthur hearings, McMahon communicated his desire for an inquiry to the White 
House.  Morse told Michael Straight, editor of the New Republic, that he hoped for 
approval to “open up on the China Lobby,” but only if it would not embarrass the 
administration.  On July 6, the two senators sponsored a resolution requesting $50,000 
($400,000 in today’s dollars) for the Foreign Relations committee to conduct the 
investigation.  Morse readily agreed to demands from Chiang supporters in the Senate to 
expand the probe to include improper Communist Chinese influence over U.S. policy.  
Henry Luce’s Time claimed that, “Just when cooler heads in the Administration had 
about decided to forget the whole thing,” McMahon had jumped up to “wave excitedly 
at an old dragon.”50 
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Congress’s probe into the China Lobby went nowhere.  After months of inaction 
by the Senate Foreign Relations committee, Morse tried to reenergize the probe in April 
1952.  The Oregon Republican somehow got his hands on over two dozen incriminating 
cables sent from the Nationalist Chinese embassy in the U.S. to Chiang Kai-Shek and 
presented them to the Foreign Relations committee.  One message discussed secret 
information Chiang obtained from Rep. Judd.  Another related that a close associate of 
William Boyle had served as a lawyer for the Nationalists at a salary of $30,000 per year 
while Boyle was chairman of the DNC.  The major media, other than the New York 
Times ignored the story, and the Foreign Relations committee apparently did the same.  
A similar House probe led by Rep. Frank Karsten (D-MO) of the Committee on 
Executive Expenditures in Executive Departments was equally fruitless.51   
Senator Harry Cain’s outburst in June 1952 possibly provided a clue into the 
source of the inaction.  Entering 73 pages from various reports into the Congressional 
Record to make his point, Cain accused Truman’s 1948 campaign of accepting $10,000 
in small bills from representatives of the Chinese Nationalists, suggesting they believed 
“a little moola doled out in administration circles might do them good.”  The senator 
also hinted of information implicating former Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, 
explaining why the Morse-McMahon resolution “now gathers dust in the pigeon hole of 
Sen. Connally.”  Rep. Fred Busbey (R-IL) piled on, demanding that Truman revive the 
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investigation and accusing the administration of “running its own China lobby to cover 
up its treasonable acts.”  Although Rep. Karsten had some dialogue with the White 
House a couple of weeks later about conducting hearings, nothing came of it.  The 
congressional inquiry into the China Lobby died a quiet death.52 
Truman got bipartisan support on a major issue concerning the war during his 
last year in office without having to work for it.  On January 1, 1952, six months into the 
armistice negotiations, the U.S. came out against the forcible repatriation of prisoners of 
war.  The military did not like the idea, believing that ending the war and bringing 
American POWs home should take precedence over protecting North Korean and 
Chinese prisoners.  Even Acheson opposed the idea initially.  Nevertheless, the president 
stuck to his guns for moral reasons, remembering the executions and imprisonments of 
Soviet POWs forced to return home from Nazi concentration camps after World War II.  
HST also knew that many prisoners held in U.N. prison camps in Korea were former 
Chinese Nationalists or South Koreans pressed into service by the communists.  On May 
7, the president reiterated his stance, declaring, “We will not buy an armistice by turning 
over human beings for slaughter or slavery.”53 
The repatriation issue united Democrats and Republicans, even though it 
temporarily stifled the peace negotiations.  Editorials and the general public praised 
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Truman’s stance.  One letter to the editor came from such unlikely allies as Senator Paul 
Douglas (D-IL), a New Deal liberal, right-wing king William F. Buckley, Jr., socialist 
Norman Thomas, and Rep. Judd of the China bloc.  The most startling source of support 
came from Senator Jenner, normally the most venomous of the president’s adversaries.  
Jenner assembled a bipartisan resolution supported by sixty members of Congress 
proclaiming their opposition to forced repatriation.  Equally remarkably, Secretary of 
Defense Robert A. Lovett and a group of senators managed to persuade the headstrong 
Indianan to keep his resolution under wraps to avoid upsetting the armistice talks.  The 
negotiations nonetheless came to a halt on October 8 when Communist recalcitrance on 
the POW issue caused the U.N. to declare an indefinite recess.  Even though this 
happened in the heat of the 1952 campaign, few Republicans second-guessed Truman’s 
position on repatriation.54 
Historians have debated whether the notion of a bipartisan foreign policy was 
worthwhile.  Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. called it a dangerous stifling of debate and an aid to 
presidential power.  Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., reflecting on the topic after his tenure in the 
Acheson State Department, took a more moderate approach.  Crabb believed that the 
disadvantages of nonpartisanship sometimes outweighed the advantages, and that it had 
a mixed track record of effectiveness.  In another view, Gary W. Reichard argued that a 
bipartisan foreign policy was the exception rather than the rule during the early Cold 
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War, the only exceptions being 1947-1948 with the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan, 
and the first year of the Eisenhower administration.  Schlesinger was correct only if the 
executive defines bipartisanship as the opposition party simply following the president’s 
lead, no matter what.  When a president includes the opposition party in policy making, 
whether through appointments (the most effective method) or congressional 
consultation, Schlesinger’s view was questionable.  Crabb was historically more correct 
than Reichard, for the latter ignores the bipartisan support at the outset of the Korean 
War and the Japanese Peace Treaty.  The challenge in such analyses is that definitions of 
bipartisanship vary widely, and Korea was a prime example.55 
The bipartisan foreign policy during the Korean War ebbed away with Senator 
Vandenberg.  In what had to be a painful irony for Truman, the Republican stalwart died 
the day before MacArthur gave his address to Congress.  HST professed belief in 
nonpartisanship in international affairs through the end of his presidency and included it 
in his rhetoric, even after he fired his general.  Yet, though McCarthyism and war crises 
such as the Chinese intervention prodded him to try to shore up relations with the GOP, 
the president never intended to allow them to influence his policies once Vandenberg 
was gone.  Truman defined bipartisanship as communication of his policies to them; in 
return, he felt they should support and trust him.  The Republicans expected HST to 
consult with them before making up his mind, and then, of course, to do what they 
wanted.  With the firing of MacArthur, the GOP saw their last real chance to influence 
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Far East policy slip away.  In his heart, Truman had to know that bipartisanship 
disappeared when Vandenberg no longer was a force on the Hill.   
  The president’s leadership style did not lend itself well to conducting a 
nonpartisan foreign policy.  An anecdote from journalist Drew Pearson is illustrative.  
Attending the funeral for Harold Ickes, a member of Roosevelt’s Cabinet, Pearson 
noticed Truman sitting practically alone in a pew with one of his staffers.  A couple of 
rows back behind sat most of his and FDR’s Cabinet members.  The journalist mused in 
his diary, “Almost as he sat alone in the church, Truman operates alone as a President.  
Roosevelt had strong men around him to take the share of the criticism. . . .  Truman 
takes it all on his own shoulders.”  HST was famous for “the buck stops here” slogan; he 
believed the President should lead, and leadership meant him making decisions in 
foreign policy.  To him, meetings spent listening to congressional figures merely to 
make them feel good was a waste of time except under the most serious circumstances, 
such as the December 1950 gathering concerning the declaration of a national 
emergency.56   
Truman’s own Doctrine exacerbated the irreconcilable differences between his 
Far East policy and the beliefs of many Republicans.  “It must be the policy of the 
United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed 
minorities or by outside pressures,” he had declared in 1947.  How, then, could HST 
give up on Chiang Kai-shek’s quest to defeat the Communists in 1949?  To irritate the 
GOP hawks even further, the administration passed up a chance to punish the Chinese 
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Communist victors by refusing to commit the U.S. to total war with Mao in 1951 over 
Korean reunification.  The president and much of the GOP fundamentally disagreed on 
the scope of the containment policy.  Truman and Acheson believed that preventing 
Communist expansion in Europe was the top priority due to its industrial power and 
historic ties to America, and correctly realized that the U.S. did not have the resources to 
confront communism everywhere in the world.  This view, however, contradicted 
Truman Doctrine rhetoric.  A substantial bloc of Republicans saw otherwise, believing 
that the Far East was just as vital to American interests as Europe, and China’s 
increasing economic might in the twenty-first century may yet prove them right.  No 
amount of bipartisan consultation, even had Vandenberg lived longer, would have 
overcome this basic disagreement.57 
Harry Truman nevertheless helped create one bipartisan tradition that continues 
today.  Perhaps recalling his own lack of knowledge of the international situation when 
FDR died, HST took pains to make sure Eisenhower would have few surprises when  the 
general became the commander in chief.  Immediately after the election, Truman offered 
to work with Ike appointees to let them observe the preparation of a budget and the 
affairs of the major departments.  Eisenhower dispatched his future budget director, 
Joseph M. Dodge, along with Senator Lodge, destined to be the new ambassador to the 
U.N., to work with the outgoing administration.  The president also made his top aide, 
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John Steelman, available as needed to consult with Sherman Adams, who would become 
Ike’s chief of staff.  The first transition team in presidential election history was born.58 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
HARRY TRUMAN:  WAR SELLER 
 
The Korean crisis presented a clear-cut issue, which they [the American 
people] could understand, and the President . . . met it with a clear-cut 
policy. 
 
--Newsweek, July 10, 1950 
 
Shall only a part of the country [Korea] be assured this freedom?  I think 
not. 
 
--Warren Austin, American ambassador to U.N. General Assembly, 
August 17, 1950 
 
 
Our peace plan is the plan of the United Nations.  The U.N. has 
demanded that the North Koreans . . . withdraw behind the thirty-eighth 
parallel, that U.N. members assist the Republic of Korea to repel the 
invasion . . . . 
 
--Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, August 
20, 19501 
 
 
 
Harry Truman was the only American president to serve as commander in chief 
during two major wars.  The first of these significantly affected the way he approached 
the second.  World War II ended with the American use of nuclear weapons, the only 
nation to possess them at the time.  By the time of the Korean conflict, things had 
changed dramatically because the Soviet Union had its own nuclear capability and now 
was an adversary of the U.S.  Much as he wanted to stop what he perceived as expansion  
of Soviet communism in the Far East, Truman was equally determined to avoid a third 
                                                 
1 “Truman’s Stand Electrifies Nation,” Newsweek, July 10, 1950, p. 24; “Verbatim Record of Yesterday’s Session of 
the United Nations Security Council,” NYT, 18 August 1950, p. 8; NBC television program, “Battle Reports from 
Washington- August 20, 1950,” entered in Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2d sess., 1950, 96, pt. 17:  A6195. 
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world war.  The president also had not forgotten how World War II started.  He 
remembered that the 1938 Munich Conference gave part of Czechoslovakia to the Nazi 
regime to quench Hitler’s thirst for lebensraum.  In 1950 Truman believed, that like 
Hitler, Stalin craved world domination.  HST thus interpreted the North Korean invasion 
as nothing less than a land grab orchestrated by the Soviet Union in its quest to conquer 
the globe.                
Truman’s speaking style was not an effective tool for promoting the war.  With 
the exception of campaign stump speeches, the president typically spoke from a prepared 
text.  Clark Clifford, head of the president’s speechwriters early in his administration, 
remembered Truman “read poorly from written texts, his head down, words coming 
forth in what the press liked to call a ‘drone.’”  Clifford lamented that the contrast of 
Truman to “the brilliant and compelling style of his predecessor made the problem all 
the more serious.”  Time described one key speech on the war as “painfully deliberate” 
at times and moving “occasionally with a breakaway rush to the end of a jumbled 
phrase.”  Probably recognizing that oratory was not one of his strengths, Truman treated 
his speeches as unsavory chores to get through as soon as possible, which contributed to 
his ineffective delivery.  Whereas a skilled orator like Roosevelt spoke at 95 to 120 
words per minute (wpm), Truman zoomed through his speeches at 150 wpm.2 
Truman seemed to prefer press conferences over formal speeches.  The president 
usually enjoyed friendly banter with journalists, but could become defensive.  He 
frequently cut reporters off in mid-sentence, answering their questions before they 
                                                 
2Clifford quoted in Halford R. Ryan, Harry S. Truman:  Presidential Rhetoric (Westport, CT:  Greenwood Press, 
1993), 8; “The Days Ahead,” Time, September 11, 1950, p. 22; Oratory speed in Ryan, 11. 
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finished asking them.  While most of the White House press corps liked him personally, 
even when they disagreed with him, the press conference was no more effective than 
formal speeches in getting the president’s ideas across to the public.  He conducted one 
press conference per week, breaking with a tradition begun by Woodrow Wilson, who 
met with the press twice weekly.  Although the administration tried to compensate by 
issuing more press releases than the Roosevelt team, statements were not as nearly as 
useful to reporters as question/answer sessions.3   
Truman could have promoted the war more effectively by improving his 
rhetorical style and giving speeches.  Press conferences reduced Truman’s ability to 
shape his message.  By their nature, open forums with journalists put the host in a 
defensive posture; reporters fired questions at the speaker, who tried to figure out a way 
to respond intelligently.  The press, rather than the president, framed the debate. 
In 1950, the president’s decision to intervene against North Korea was wildly 
popular, producing a nation “revived by Harry S. Truman’s immediate counterpunch.”  
New York Times reporters in all corners of the country printed descriptions such as “real 
unanimity,” “99-to-1 in favor,” “virtually unanimous approval,” and “no dissenting 
voices” to characterize public opinion.  The Roanoke World-News said the president 
“spoke for every true American,” adding, “we should be glad this showdown has come.”  
Joseph C. Harsch of the Christian Science Monitor, who had lived in the capital for 
                                                 
3 Michael S. Twedt, “The War Rhetoric of Harry S.  Truman During the Korean Conflict” (Ph.D. diss., University of 
Kansas, 1969), 80-81; Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Volume 1:  Year of Decisions (Garden City, New York:  Doubleday 
and Company, 1955), 48, expresses his view of the importance of press conferences;  Elmer E. Cornwell, Jr.,  
Presidential Leadership of Public Opinion (Bloomington:  Indiana University Press, 1965), 162-3 describes Truman’s 
change in press conference frequency; McCullough, 818-20 discusses Truman’s relations with the White House press 
corps.  Cornwell, 330, note 66 elaborates on Truman’s shortcomings in using press conferences. 
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twenty years, declared he had never “felt such a sense of relief and unity pass through 
the city.”  Telegrams and letters ten to one in favor of intervention deluged the White 
House, and support for the war came from astonishing places.  Socialist Party leader 
Norman Thomas and former Progressive Party presidential candidate Henry Wallace 
bucked their parties to support the intervention because it was a U.N. action.  Even the 
Carnegie Foundation for International Peace boarded the bandwagon.  As historian Eric 
Goldman wrote, “For one moment, suspended weirdly in the bitter debates of the 
postwar . . . the bold response of Harry Truman had united America . . . as it had not 
been since that distant confetti evening of V-J.”4 
Surprisingly, Truman communicated directly with the American public only 
sporadically during the first few weeks of his decision to commit U.S. forces.  Even 
though radio and television began interrupting broadcasts on the afternoon of Sunday, 
June 25 with updates on the situation, and Korea made front-page news in major 
newspapers the following morning, the White House did not issue a statement until 
almost noon on Monday.  The announcement commended the U.N. Security Council for 
its swift passage of an America-sponsored resolution calling for the withdrawal of North 
Korean troops and assistance from U.N. members to execute this directive.  The next 
day, the administration issued its second press release regarding the war, announcing 
                                                 
4Counterpunch in “Truman’s Stand Electrifies Nation,” Newsweek, July 10, 1950, p. 24; New York Times reports and 
Roanoke in “The Nation,” NYT, 2 July 1950,  p. E2; “Report From the Nation:  All Eyes on Korea,” NYT 2 July 1950, 
p. E8; Harsch and 10 to 1 in Eric Goldman, The Crucial Decade and After:  America, 1945-1960 (New York:  Vintage 
Books,  1962), 158-9; Thomas and Wallace in Lawrence Wittner, The Struggle Against the Bomb, Vol. I- One  World 
or None:  A History of the Nuclear Disarmament Movement through 1953 (Stanford:  Stanford University Press, 
1993), 316; Carnegie Foundation in “New Support for Truman,” NYT, 30 June 1950, p. 4; Support of other erstwhile 
peace activists in E. Timothy Smith, Opposition Beyond the Water’s Edge:  Liberal Internationalists, Pacifists, and 
Containment, 1945-1953 (Westport, Connecticut:  Greenwood Press, 1999), 122-4; Goldman quote from Goldman, 
173.   
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that the president had ordered American air and naval support to South Korea.  It also 
reported the dispatch of the U.S. 7th Fleet to the Straits of Formosa to keep the peace 
between the Chinese Communists on the mainland and the Nationalists.5 
The June 27 statement took the rhetoric up a notch from the initial 
announcement.  The previous day, the culprit was the “forces of North Korea,” but now, 
the offender was “communism,” an intentionally ambiguous term that could mean North 
Korea, China, or the USSR.  The statement discussed the motivation for the North 
Korean attack, saying it clearly indicated “communism has passed beyond the use of 
subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war.”  
It also represented a policy reversal regarding Formosa.  Due to the North Korean 
invasion, a Communist occupation of the island would now represent a “direct threat to 
the security of the Pacific area and to the United States forces” in the region.  Formosa 
now became a vital U.S. interest.  This policy change delighted the “China Lobby” 
Republicans in Congress who had criticized Truman and Acheson for the communist 
victory in China.  The move to protect Formosa, no doubt, helped Truman solicit broad 
support for the Korean intervention.6 
Nevertheless, the president hardly mentioned Korea in previously scheduled 
addresses on June 27 and 28.  Expecting Truman to discuss the Korean situation in 
                                                 
5 Broadcasts noted in John E. Wiltz, “The Korean War and American Society,” in The Korean War:  A 25-Year 
Perspective.  Ed. F. H. Heller (Lawrence:  Regents Press of Kansas, 1977), 113; “Statement by the President on the 
Violation of the 38th Parallel in Korea- June 26, 1950,” PP,  
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=799&st=&st1= (December 14, 2006). 
 
6“Statement by the President on the Violation of the 38th Parallel in Korea- June 26, 1950,” PP,  
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=799&st=&st1= (December 14, 2006); “Statement by the 
President on Situation in Korea- June 27, 1950,”  PP, 
http://trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=800&st=&st1= (Jaunary 24, 2008),  Analysis of Truman’s 
change in rhetoric in Ryan, 46-8. 
  
  
197
person for the first time in his scheduled June 28 address to the American Newspaper 
Guild, the four major networks arranged to broadcast his message to the nation.  The 
commander in chief disappointed them, saying only that the U.S. must “do everything 
we can to prevent such aggression.”7 
The president finally elaborated on the Korean situation at his routine press 
conference on Thursday, June 29.  Over half the reporters’ questions dealt with the 
conflict.  They were hungry for information:  
QUESTION: Mr. President, everybody is asking in this country, are we 
or are we not at war?   
 
THE PRESIDENT: We are not at war. 
 
Truman described the North Korean attack as a “bandit raid” and agreed with a 
reporter’s characterization of the U.N. response as a “police action.”  In both cases, the 
journalists confirmed these descriptors with the president before going to  press with 
them, and both terms came back to haunt him.  Bandit raids do not conjure up images of 
tanks, airplanes and infantry.  Critics would pound HST with the police action 
description as American casualties mounted.  As one rhetorician explained:  “’Bandits’ 
are usually ‘suppressed’ through capture and incarceration by the ‘police.’  But Truman 
mixed the metaphor:  The Security Council’s resolution called only for the ‘police’ to 
ensure that the ‘bandits’ withdraw to their hideout in North Korea.”  On the day after this 
                                                 
7 Twedt, 75. 
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press conference, the president announced he was committing American ground forces 
to North Korea.  Every day, the bandits looked more formidable.8 
Truman hesitated before delivering a war message to the public.  At a turbulent 
meeting on Monday, July 3, Dean Acheson pushed him hard to make a report on Korea 
within a couple of days.  The president did not like the idea.  Although the first 
contingent of 500 American troops had been on the ground for over a day enduring 
withering attacks, the commander in chief refused to comment on the status of the 
conflict during his July 6 press conference.  A week later, when a reporter asked Truman 
directly if he intended to address Congress and the public about the conflict, he only said 
that he was thinking about it.9 
The country grew impatient.  As U.N. forces suffered early setbacks, journalists 
called the administration “secretive” and a “beehive of indecision.”  Senator Margaret 
Chase Smith (R-ME) complained, “The gruesome reality of a shooting war should be 
brought home to the American people instead of being glossed over by the Truman 
administration.”  Nervousness edged toward panic.  Senator Owen Brewster (R-ME) 
suggested allowing General MacArthur to use the atomic bomb as he saw fit, and a 
Truman ally, Senator Lyndon Johnson, worried that Korea could become a 
                                                 
8“The President’s News Conference- June 29, 1950,” PP, 
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=806&st=&st1= (December 14, 2006); Ryan, 50-1. 
 
9Acheson in Beisner, 349; Troops in Matthew B. Ridgeway, The Korean War ( New York:  Doubleday and Company, 
Inc., 1967), 25-6; “The President’s News Conference-July 6, 1950,” PP, 
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=814&st=&st1= (December 15, 2006); “The President’s 
News Conference-July 13, 1950,”  PP, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=820&st=&st1= 
(December 15, 2006).   
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“slaughterhouse for democracy.”  The Rev. Dr. Billy Graham called the president, 
warning him that the public was in the grips of a “fear you could almost call hysteria.”10 
Finally, nearly three weeks after committing troops, the commander in chief 
spoke to the American people about Korea on July 19.  HST listed his reasons for 
intervening, but was short on specifics on how a Communist takeover of the ROK 
endangered America’s national interests in the short term.  He portrayed the North 
Korean invasion as a replay of Munich, saying, “Appeasement leads only to further 
aggression and ultimately to war.”  The Soviets, through Kim Il Sung, were continuing a 
quest for world dominance and the U.S. had to stop them.  The president injected a 
moral component, a consistent theme of his war rhetoric.  America was “united in 
detesting Communist slavery. . . .  We believe that freedom and peace are essential if 
men are to live as our Creator intended us to live.  It is this faith that has guided us in the 
past, and it is this faith that will fortify us in the stern days ahead.”11 
The speech had a religious tone, but it was most revealing through its omissions 
and vagaries.  Truman did not call for victory.  Instead, he urged the nation to meet the 
challenge “squarely” to “drive the Communists back,” and characterized the intervention 
as an effort “to help the Koreans preserve their independence.”  The president also 
stopped short of instituting wartime wage and price controls or rationing, saying he did 
                                                 
10 Livingston, J. A., “It’s 1940 Again in Washington; City’s a Beehive of Indecision,” Washington Post, 19 July 1950, 
p. B8; secretive in Leviero, Anthony, “President Sees U.S. Holding In Korea for Counter-Attack,” NYT, 14 July 1950, 
p. 1; Alsop, Joseph and Stewart Alsop, “Matter of Fact,” Washington  Post, 10 July 1950, p. 6 noted Truman’s 
reluctance despite his advisors pushing him to make an announcement; Smith quoted in Gallup, George, “Sugar-
Coated War News Not Popular in America,” Dallas Morning News, 19 July 1950, Sec. I, p. 10; Brewster, Johnson and 
Graham quoted in “National Affairs,” Time, July 24, 1950, p. 11.  
11 “Radio and Television Address to the American People on the Situation in Korea-July 19, 1950,” PP, 
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=823&st=&st1= (December 26, 2006); Analysis in Twedt, 
148-9.   
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not feel consumer shortages would occur.  Discussing the scope of the war, he declared 
the U.N. Security Council’s initial resolution was asking members to “help the Republic 
of Korea repel the attack and help restore peace and security in that area.”  Apparently, 
HST was leaving the door open for U.N. forces to attack north of the 38th parallel.  
While the commander in chief avoided talking about victory or the conquest of North 
Korea, he used language that left the battlefield goals open.12 
The public reacted favorably to the July 19 speech.  One journalist commended 
the president for waiting several weeks to give a “calm yet forceful statement.”  Another 
called the address a “bold answer to communism’s drawn sword.”  The White House 
received five times more supportive letters than critical mail.13 
Naturally, a minority criticized the speech.  Time remarked that it lacked the 
“inspiration that the occasion called for,” having no “ringing phrases of a Churchillian or 
Rooseveltian performance” or “compelling call to arms.”  Columnist Drew Pearson 
wrote that compared to Roosevelt’s “master at the helm” image during World War II, 
Truman came across as a “sincere, somewhat inadequate little guy who was trying to do 
his best.”  Some felt that the public was ahead of the president on Korea.  Time 
characterized the public attitude as “a willingness to do whatever had to be done, but an 
                                                 
12 Omissions in Twedt, 93-5; “Radio and Television Address to the American People on the Situation in Korea-July 
19, 1950” (emphasis added). 
   
13Calm in Childs, Marquis, “President’s Message,” Washington Post,20 July 1950, p. 11; bold answer in Folliard, 
Edward T., “No Further Aggression, Notice Given World Reds,” Washington Post, 20 July 1950, p. 1; Gould, Jack, 
“Radio and TV in Review,” NYT, 20 July 1950, p. 32 also gave a favorable review; Ken Hechler, Memorandum for 
Mr. Elsey, August 2, 1950; Subject File, Establishment of a Research Comm. folder; Ken Hechler Papers, HSTL notes 
mail received..  
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irritated sensation of not being told what to do.  A suspicion that the Administration 
doesn’t quite trust the country, hesitates to give it bad news or require hard sacrifices.”14 
Truman deliberately took a circumspect approach.  Kim Il Sung’s invasion took 
him (and the rest of the nation) completely by surprise, requiring him to take some time 
to formulate a strategy for responding.  The president decided immediately that the U.N. 
had to restore the integrity of the ROK for the international body to have any credibility 
in the future.  The primary goal of the intervention was to avoid a repeat of 1930s 
appeasement.  However, the commander in chief was equally determined to prevent 
another world war.  These twin goals required finesse in managing public opinion.   
However, chief executive should have taken his case directly to the people during 
the first week of July, as Acheson suggested, rather than waiting two more weeks.  
Speaking to the populace could have calmed the nation down as the initial negative 
reports from the war front rolled in.  The president easily could have made a preliminary 
speech in early July, explaining why the U.S. was intervening and what U.S. national 
interests were at stake.  He then could have followed up with the details on mobilization.  
Why did Truman wait so long?  He probably felt no need to rally the public.  Even his 
bitterest Republican political foes applauded the intervention, and support swept the 
country.   
Bad news from Korea rocked the nation during the summer.  U.N. forces finally 
stalled the North Koreans near Pusan on the southeast coast of the peninsula in early 
                                                 
14 Inspiration, ringing and compelling in “The Fabric of Peace,” Time, July 31, 1950, p. 10; Pearson, Drew, “President 
Needs All Help in Crisis,” Washington Post, 24 July 1950, p. B9; willingness in “National Affairs,” willingness in 
Time, August 14, 1950, p. 7. 
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August, with the troops merely holding their position until late September.  
Unaccustomed to retreat, which contrasted sharply with their memories of World War II 
victories, politicians and their constituents behaved badly.  Democrats and Republicans 
on Capitol Hill blamed each other for the war.  The public began panic purchasing of 
consumer goods that created shortages needlessly.  Correspondents around the country 
reported that many Americans chafed at the prospect of fighting “small brush fires” 
against the Soviets around the globe, sparking calls for a pre-emptive nuclear attack 
upon the Russians.  Time reporters often heard phrases like, “Let’s end it before it 
starts.”15 
  The State Department recognized the need to sooth the national psyche and 
published, “Information Objectives for the Rest of 1950,” to guide its personnel making 
public statements.  These guidelines highlighted past successes of the containment 
policy in Europe and Turkey, reminding the public that similar efforts would need to 
continue for an “indefinite period.”  The Department also published a “Korean Fact 
Sheet” for Democrats on the campaign trail in the upcoming 1950 elections to help them 
answer questions about Far East policy.  In August, Dean Acheson met with a group of 
Democratic lawmakers concerned that the American people increasingly were 
supporting the idea of a preventive war with the Soviet Union.  Acheson came down 
firmly against the idea of a preventive war.  In a response as relevant today as it was in 
1950, the secretary told them, “Any nation embarking upon a preventive war would . . . 
                                                 
15 Public and political behavior in Donovan, Tumultuous Years, 253 and Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power:  
The Politics of Leadership (New York:  John Wiley and Sons, 1960), 105; brush fires and  let’s end it in “National 
Affairs,” Time, August 14, 1950, p. 7. 
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find itself immediately without any Allies and would ultimately find itself in the 
unenviable position of having the world against it.”16  
The American people nonetheless stayed solidly behind the war effort through 
the summer of 1950.  Despite the defeats on the battlefield, a Gallup poll indicated 65 
percent of the populace did not believe Korea was a mistake, while only 20 percent said 
it was a mistake.  Truman’s approval rating stood at 43 percent in late August, up from 
37 percent in June.17 
At this point, the commander in chief’s subordinates sent confusing signals to the 
public about his war policy.  General MacArthur released a message for the Veterans of 
Foreign Wars extolling the value of Formosa for American military purposes, asserting it 
was wrong to assume that a U.S. defense of Formosa would antagonize Communist 
China.  MacArthur’s statement contradicted Truman’s policy of neutrality regarding 
Formosa, a tactic designed to avoid arousing Mao’s regime.  To the administration’s 
alarm, Secretary of the Navy Francis P. Matthews advocated a preventative war with the 
Soviets, declaring, “To have peace we should be willing to pay . . . any price—even the 
price of instituting a war to compel cooperation for peace.”18 
                                                 
16 “Information Objectives for the Rest of 1950,” August 3, 1950; PSF:  General File; Speech:  Instructions for Public 
Statements folder; Truman Papers, HSTL; Korean fact sheet in Kenneth Hechler, Memorandum “State Department 
Campaign Materials on Foreign Policy,” August 31, 1950; Subject File, General Research-Truman White House 
folder; Ken Hechler Papers, HSTL; Acheson quoted in “North Atlantic Union and Related Matters,” August 14, 1950; 
Memoranda of Conversations File; Aug. 1950 folder; Dean Acheson Papers, HSTL. 
 
17 “Speed of U.S. Advances in Korea Came as Big Surprise to U.S. Public,” October 4, 1950 and “Truman Popularity 
Turns Upward After Summer Slump,” September 25, 1950; 1950 folder, Records of American Institute of Public 
Opinion (hereafter referred to as AIPO), HSTL. 
 
18 MacArthur’s message in Richard Halworth Rovere and Arthur Meier Schlesinger, General MacArthur & President 
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Truman responded in a speech to the nation on September 1.  The president 
stated that the U.S. did not want Korea to expand into a general war and had no interest 
in taking over Formosa.  He rejected the idea of preventive war, calling it the “weapon 
of dictators, not of free democratic countries like the United States.”  Yet, the address 
stated a major policy shift that most observers ignored:  “We believe the Koreans have a 
right to be free, independent and united—as they want to be.”  This represented a 
significant expansion of the scope of the intervention from the initial U.N. resolution, 
which declared the objective of the war as restoring the integrity of South Korea.  If the 
U.S. wanted to keep other countries from getting involved in the war, why did its 
objective become more aggressive?  Time was one of the few publications to criticize the 
speech, saying, “By every kind of wigwag and smoke signal . . . the Administration 
seemed to be trying . . . to tell the Chinese Communist Boss Mao Tse-tung that he had 
nothing to worry about the U. S.”  However, the major media paid little mind to the 
administration’s new goal of reunifying the peninsula.19 
In late September, the Truman administration promoted its Korean War policy by 
publishing a booklet entitled Our Foreign Policy.  White House aide George Elsey 
initiated this publication to explain the administration’s objectives in layman’s terms.  
The president suggested a few editorial changes, disliking the passage, “Three times in 
recent years we have been forced to sacrifice peace . . . to preserve the independence and 
                                                 
19  “Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Situation in Korea-September 1, 1950,” PP, 
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freedom that we value even more highly.”  “We haven’t ‘sacrificed peace,’” Truman told 
Elsey, “We got into Korea to preserve peace.”  Capitalization of “Communist” and 
“Communism” irritated HST, who demanded printing these words in lower case.  To 
make the document a more entertaining read, Elsey circulated drafts for input from 
academics such as Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.20 
Our Foreign Policy explained why the administration felt the need to go to war 
in Korea, but obfuscated the goals of the mission.  Noting that the Soviet Union had 
gained control of 7.5 million squares of territory and 500 million people since 1945, it 
declared there were “no more side lines for a nation to sit on.”  The fact that a totalitarian 
nation was “seeking to extend its power and to impose its system of communism over 
others” justified the U.N. intervention in Korea.  Moreover, the Soviet Union had 
reneged on its “solemn pledge” to work with the U.S., Britain and China to restore 
Korean independence, and had “sealed off the northern area of Korea from all outside 
contact,” a reference to proposed reunification elections under U.N. supervision.  
However, the document contradicted the U.N.’s stated objective for the war at the time, 
the restoration of the ROK, saying the U.S. purpose was “helping the Koreans to become 
a united and independent people.”  South Koreans, or all Koreans?21 
Our Foreign Policy quickly exhausted an initial printing of 50,000 copies, and 
the State Department eventually printed over 400,000.  The administration sent 
                                                 
20 Truman’s editing in George M. Elsey, An Unplanned Life:  A Memoir by George McKee Elsey (Columbia:  
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thousands of copies to educate industrial leaders on defense preparations, and to public 
and university libraries, and principals of all secondary schools.  Another 20,000 copies 
went to civics teachers, 2,500 to college professors teaching international relations, and 
to organizations representing women, labor, religions, and business interests.  The 
Washington Post used it as a source in a series of question and answer articles about 
foreign affairs.  Although critics dismissed the publication as a hasty and erroneous 
rebuttal to the Republican pamphlet “Background to Korea,” most of the press received 
the booklet favorably.  Edward R. Murrow of CBS endorsed it and Earl Godwin of NBC 
called it a “very timely bit of reading matter” that was “as easy to read as a mystery 
tale.”22 
While the public was reading Our Foreign Policy, President Truman 
dramatically changed the scope of the Korean War.  In October 1950, he authorized 
U.N. forces to carry the fighting north of the 38th parallel.  Two months earlier, the U.S. 
ambassador to the U.N., Warren Austin, told the General Assembly they should expand 
the mission to prevent a future invasion by the North.  After the successful counterattack 
at Inchon in mid-September, unification of the Koreas, a stated goal of the U.N. since 
1947, increasingly appeared within reach.  Hoping to realize this objective and to 
solidify its relationship with the U.S., Britain initiated a U.N. resolution supporting 
Austin’s suggestion.  Following some revisions suggested by the U.S., the General 
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Assembly passed it overwhelmingly on October 7, redefining the aim of the 
intervention.  No longer content with repelling the Communist invaders from the north, 
the U.N.’s objective became enforcing “conditions of stability throughout Korea,” and 
establishment of a “united, independent and democratic government in the sovereign 
state of Korea.”23 
The commander in chief did little to convince the American public of the need to 
broaden the scope of the war.  In his September and October press conferences, the 
president scarcely mentioned the subject other than to dodge questions about whether he 
had authorized MacArthur to go north.  Truman’s October 17 address to the nation from 
San Francisco was his only major speech during this critical phase of the war, and he 
only briefly touched on the policy change.  Noting his discussions at Wake Island 
included plans for ensuring a “unified, independent and democratic” government in 
Korea, the purported Allied intent after World War II, the chief executive warned that 
the “evil spirit of aggression” still presented a “clear and present danger,” but was sure 
that the U.N. would shortly “restore peace to the whole of Korea.”24 
HST did not have to sell this “new” war to the public.  One poll indicated that 
nearly three-quarters of the American people supported the decision to advance into 
North Korea.  Life rejected the notion of stopping at the 38th parallel, deeming such 
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“timidity” as “quite worthless.”  The possibility of Chinese intervention caused no 
concern to its editors, who believed Mao Tse-tung certainly was awestruck by American 
air and sea power and must be “quaking in his boots.”  Both parties backed the northern 
advance.  Senator Joseph O’Mahoney (D-WY) wrote Truman that the U.S., which had 
“given so much of its blood and manhood” in Korea, should not allow the Communists 
to reestablish the “iron curtain” from which to launch future attacks.  Rep. Hugh D. 
Scott, Jr. (PA), a former Republican national committee chairman, accused the State 
Department of planning to “cringe behind” the 38th parallel.  With the 1950 
congressional elections looming, Truman sensed the political consequences of not 
liberating North Korea.25 
Could the president have persuaded the American people that U.N. forces should 
stop at the 38th parallel?  Alonzo Hamby points out Truman had to consider that halting 
at the boundary would have left the possibility of a future North Korean attack hanging 
in the wind.  In light of the current international friction with North Korea, this argument 
seems stronger by the day.  Halford R. Ryan and Melvyn Leffler, however, more 
plausibly suggest that Truman could have stopped at the 38th parallel, proclaiming 
victory by the U.N. forces for successfully repelling Communist aggression and 
protecting the sovereignty of the ROK.  Leffler points out that, despite the popularity of 
taking the battle into the north, polls also indicated that many Americans were ready for 
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a negotiated settlement to end the war in the fall of 1950.  Moreover, Truman and 
Acheson had weathered political criticism before, and they could have done so again.26  
The DNC worked to justify the war to voters as the 1950 elections approached.  
As the party controlling the White House, Democrats were on the defensive, prompting 
the Senatorial Campaign Committee to prepare a pamphlet for party stump speakers, 
“The Truth About Korea.”  Of the sixteen pages in the document, less than three 
explained why the administration intervened, the remainder dedicated to refuting 
Republican criticisms of Korean policy before the war.  Arguing that Kim Il Sung’s 
strike was the first time the “international Communist movement” had used overt 
military force, the Democrats declared that inaction by America would have encouraged 
additional attacks elsewhere.  Ignoring the policy change of reuniting Korea, the 
pamphlet asserted that the U.N. acted simply to “check and throw back the 
aggression.”27 
The State Department chipped in, collaborating with the White House to produce 
a series of questions and answers about foreign affairs for candidates to use.  It 
effectively defended Acheson’s heavily criticized defense perimeter speech of January 
1950, where the secretary had declared, “Initial reliance must be on the people attacked 
to resist it and then upon the commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter 
of the United Nations.”  This was exactly how the Korean intervention transpired.  The 
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pamphlet recalled the evils of appeasement, noting, “We have learned by hard 
experience in the 1930s that when we allow aggression to succeed anywhere in the 
world we invite aggression everywhere in the world.”  Another publication stressed how 
the Communists changed tactics in Korea.  Rather than relying on subversion, the 
“international communist movement, for the first time, adopted open warfare to achieve 
its purposes.”28 
The Democratic Party did everything possible to promote the administration’s 
Korean policy during the 1950 elections.  Nevertheless, key Truman supporters saw 
shortcomings.  Rep. Richard Bolling (D-MO) believed that when candidates adequately 
explained the “facts” of foreign policy, they did well.  He conceded, however, “It is an 
unfortunate fact that a great many politicians do not know those facts and do not 
understand our foreign policy.  Obviously they cannot make it understandable to their 
constituents.”  Ken Hechler agreed, saying that in spite of their efforts, “The 
administration has not succeeded as well as it should in convincing the people, in simple 
terms, of the rightness of the course we are pursuing.”  The problem was that foreign 
policy was more complicated than during World War II.  Hechler observed there was 
“no great, unified, patriotic” feeling about Korea, lamenting, “the people do not fully 
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understand how much better off they are than if this should develop into an all-out 
war.”29 
Part of the president’s task was persuading the American consumer to make 
economic sacrifices for the war.  HST went about mobilization cautiously, asking for the 
authority to control production and allocation of raw materials, but not prices.  Political 
expediency contributed to his conservative approach.  Sam Rayburn advised Truman 
that congressional approval for granting mobilization powers to the president would be 
easier if they did not include wage and price controls, which were unpopular during 
World War II.  In retrospect, the commander in chief should have imposed price controls 
immediately.  The nation’s overwhelming approval of the decision to intervene would 
have ensured congressional blessing for controls, which would have curbed inflation.  
As the conflict continued, inflationary pressures hampered Truman’s ability to rally the 
public for the Korean cause.  Early in the conflict, however, the president did not want 
the populace to think of Korea as on the scale of World War II and therefore opted for 
partial mobilization rather than blanket controls.  In his initial address to the nation on 
the war, HST said, “If I had thought that we were actually threatened by shortages of 
essential consumer goods, I should have recommended that price control and rationing 
be immediately instituted.  But there is no such threat.  We have to fear only those 
shortages which we ourselves artificially create.”30 
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 Americans promptly went about creating such scarcities.  Remembering the 
dearth of consumer items during World War II, people went about “hoarding everything 
from automobile tires to metal hair curlers,” all the while claiming their patriotism.  
Panic buying through the end of 1950 drove the price of rubber from $0.34 to $0.86 per 
pound and tin from $0.76 to $1.84 per pound, creating needless shortages and sharp 
inflation.  A month into the war, a dollar was worth only 59.3 cents compared to a dollar 
in 1939, when the Great Depression still lingered.  Americans responded creatively to 
shortages of certain foods.  New Jersey Bell Telephone added pot roast of whale to its 
employee cafeteria menu.  A Toledo, Ohio car wash added a frozen meat section for 
their customers’ convenience, charging them $1.75 per pound for filet mignon, 
compared to $1.50 for a car wash.  Runs on consumer goods flowed with the military 
fortunes in Korea, spiking initially, subsiding after the U.N. success at Inchon, then 
running rampant again when China intervened.31 
The American people cried out for more government action at home. One poll 
indicated seventy percent of Americans favored higher taxes to increase the size of the 
military, and backed universal military training by a margin of four to one.  In the early 
months of the war, they clamored for total wage and price controls.  The populace 
expected Washington to implement a complete mobilization as it had during World War 
II, and bombarded its representatives on Capitol Hill in a sign of “profound public 
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reaction.”  One journalist wrote, “One could almost hear Congress saying to the citizen 
in the White House:  ‘Say, you—don’t you know there’s a war on?’”32 
Heeding the public outcry, Congress passed the Defense Production Act.  The 
law gave the president the economic powers he asked for, plus one he did not request:  
The discretion to implement wage and price controls.  Truman followed up with a 
forceful speech to the nation on September 9.  To help keep inflation in check while 
increasing defense spending, the president demanded a “pay as you go” policy.  
Declaring that the nation had borrowed too much during World War II, he told the 
country that Korea would mean “heavier taxes for everybody.”  The chief executive told 
consumers to “buy only what you really need and cannot do without,” and asked workers 
not to ask for raises beyond those to keep pace with cost of living increases.  Although 
HST unfortunately did not exercise his power to cap prices or wages for several months, 
his timely September 9 speech bluntly exhorted Americans to sacrifice for the war 
effort.33 
China’s leap into the fray created new challenges to the administration’s efforts 
to retain public support for the war.  The first encounters between Chinese and ROK 
forces near the Yalu River took place on October 25, 1950.  Intense combat lasted 
though November 6, when China temporarily withdrew from the field.  On November 
25, a day after General MacArthur resumed an offensive to end the war, the Chinese 
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counterattacked.  Communist China and its massive army would stay in Korea for the 
duration. 
Congress and the public were alarmed.  Some wanted to attack Communist China 
and drive for total victory.  Others advocated a complete pullout of American troops, 
while a third faction supported Truman’s ultimate course of salvaging whatever was 
possible without expanding the war’s scope.  A November poll taken before the public 
knew the extent of the Chinese involvement indicated only 39 percent of Americans said 
the U.S. should carry the battle into China if the latter entered the conflict.  In January 
1951, a Gallup poll tainted by questions biased towards an American withdrawal 
reported that two-thirds of Americans favored pulling U.S. forces out of Korea.  Another 
Gallup survey that month with less biased questions said 49 percent of Americans now 
regarded the war as a mistake, versus 20 percent four months earlier.34   
Truman was slow to rally public response to the Chinese invasion.  He did not 
even mention it publicly until his November 16 press conference, which he opened with 
a statement that condemned China’s involvement, but reassuring the Chinese that the 
U.N. had no designs on its territory.  However, the president refused to answer questions 
about the issue.  At his next news conference two weeks later, he fielded questions on 
China’s intervention, the predominant topic of the day, and dropped a figurative 
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bombshell when he asserted repeatedly that using atomic weapons was an option in 
Korea at MacArthur’s discretion.  Although the president’s staff swiftly clarified his 
remarks to reassure allies that he had not given his field commander the authority to use 
the bomb, these remarks fueled growing public fears that another world war was at hand.  
HST waited another two weeks to address the American people directly about the new 
war they faced.  By the time he did, American forces had been fighting Chinese 
Communists for over a month.35 
Why did the president wait so long to discuss the Chinese intervention with the 
public?  Shock was part of the reason.  In a matter of days, the administration went from 
expecting the war to end shortly to facing an enemy with several hundred thousand 
troops and a possible world war.  However, they could not have been totally surprised.  
China, through Indian diplomats, had issued warnings in October that they would get 
into the war if U.N. forces crossed the 38th parallel, and some in the State Department 
took them seriously.  The sudden death on December 5 of Press Secretary Charlie Ross, 
a close friend of Truman, did not help the president’s morale or the effectiveness of 
White House communications.  As at the outset of the war, the commander in chief 
waited an unacceptably long time before making a speech to the nation about a new 
international crisis.  This was important because people were getting nervous.  In a poll 
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taken in mid-November after China crossed the Yalu, over half of the respondents said 
they believed World War III had begun.36 
Nevertheless, once Truman decided to address the public, he was effective.  On 
December 15, he disclosed his response to the serious situation in Korea, an accelerated 
mobilization adding one million people to active military duty and imposing selected 
price controls.  The commander in chief also created the Office of Defense Mobilization, 
which had more power than the War Industries Board of World War I, and announced he 
would proclaim a national emergency the following day.37 
Truman’s address on the national emergency went over well with few 
exceptions.  Time criticized the delivery of the speech, saying it had a “thin, overworked 
and flat quality,” adding it “had gone through ten draftings and it showed it.”  More 
commonly, the president earned high marks.  Reports from New York Times regional 
correspondents across the country indicated people supported the sacrifices Truman 
outlined, and that some were ready to go even further.  A California man wrote, “My 
partner and I expect to lose our small business as a result of the defense effort. . . .  That 
is not important.  Our only concern is the safety of our country, and of free people 
everywhere.”38 
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Critics have suggested several flaws in Truman’s declaration of a national 
emergency.  A valid complaint is that the commander in chief again stopped short of full 
mobilization, electing to implement only selected wage and price controls.  If the nation 
was in a true emergency, why not impose price controls across the board, which would 
have put the consuming public at ease?  Less convincing is criticism of the president for 
making only four nationally broadcasted speeches between the start of the war and the 
announcement of a national emergency.  When presidents give nation-wide addresses 
too often, the speeches lose their dramatic effect.  Another dubious critique is that the 
declaration of a national emergency was merely a psychological ploy to rally the public 
behind HST.  He gave the speech for a genuine psychological reason:  The public 
needed reassuring that the government was responding decisively to the new war.  Since 
Truman was declaring his plans to draft more Americans into the military and 
demanding more economic sacrifice from the rest, he had to impart a sense of urgency.39 
The president’s national emergency address told the nation what lay ahead, using 
familiar themes and new ones.  Like previous speeches, the chief executive reminded the 
nation about the dangers of appeasement and his determination to finance the war on a 
pay as you go basis.  In the most inspiring line of the speech, Truman recalled the theme 
of personal sacrifice:  “Each of us should measure his own efforts, his own sacrifices, by 
the standard of our heroic men in Korea.”  To justify that a national emergency existed, 
HST put much more emphasis on the threat to Americans at home, repeating a dozen 
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times that the U.S. was in danger.  As the immediate public reaction to the speech 
indicated, Americans were ready to deal with the Chinese intervention and believed that 
the Communist expansionism was a threat.40 
  The nation did not hear much from the president during early 1951 and 
therefore saw little leadership of the war effort.  Between declaring the national 
emergency and his firing of General MacArthur on April 11, 1951, Truman made only 
one address to the nation.  White House staffer George Elsey recalled his boss “hunkered 
down and worked harder than ever at his desk.”  Recognizing HST needed to take a 
higher profile, Elsey proposed a series of informal presidential visits to military and 
defense industry establishments.  However, he only took one brief trip, dismissing the 
tour as “gimmickry.”  Taking another tact, Elsey suggested having a friendly senator 
publicly ask Truman why the nation was staying in Korea, allowing him to respond for 
the benefit of the nation.  The president flatly rejected what he saw as a publicity stunt.41 
Meanwhile, public support for “Truman’s War” began to suffer.  The gung-ho 
spirit that greeted the declaration of a national emergency had withered by the spring of 
1951, despite the improved battlefield situation for U.N. forces.  Preparing for a nuclear 
holocaust, Californians shopped for bomb shelters outfitted with Geiger counters.  A 
congressman wrote the president that his district overwhelmingly wanted out of not only 
Korea, but Europe as well.  By early March, resistance was beginning to form against 
the administration’s overall defense buildup, and organized labor, rejecting its World 
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War II stance, refused to agree to a no-strike pledge as part of the mobilization effort.  
Polling data indicated Americans were losing enthusiasm for reuniting the Koreas.  One 
survey indicated the public was willing to end the war with a division of Korea at the 
38th parallel by a margin of 43 to 36 percent.  Another reported over half of Americans 
were unwilling to sacrifice their lives or those of a loved one to prevent a Communist 
takeover of Asia.  Surprisingly, 57 percent said they would accept the seating of the 
Communist Chinese government in the U.N. in exchange for peace in Korea.42 
On April 11, 1951 at 10:30 p.m., the president gave a short radio address to the 
American people concerning his policy in Korea.  The speech was a follow up to the 
hastily arranged news conference of 1:00 a.m. the same day in which his press secretary 
announced the firing of Douglas MacArthur. Using most of the talk to justify the 
nation’s continued involvement in Korea, the commander in chief discussed the 
general’s termination only briefly near the end of his remarks. 
Incredibly, given the importance of the decision to relieve MacArthur, the chief 
executive apparently gave the address only as an afterthought.  While White House aides 
took four days to prepare the press statement announcing the recall, they drafted 
Truman’s address to the nation the same day he gave it.  Elsey remembered they were in 
such a hurry they failed to include the name of MacArthur’s successor in the text, and 
had to clip it onto the president’s reading copy just before he went on the air.  Television 
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did not carry the address, probably due to the last-minute decision to make the speech.  
Lack of television coverage may seem trivial because relatively few Americans owned 
television sets.  The point, however, is that White House myopia over the plans to 
replace the U.N. commander led to neglect of the key public relations issue--tying 
MacArthur’s removal to the administration’s war policy.  Truman claimed that the 
public outcry over the general did not surprise him.  However, it appears that even he did 
not anticipate the intensity of the uproar, prompting him throw a speech together for the 
nation at the last minute.43   
The most important aspect of the address was that, for the first time since China’s 
intervention, Truman now stated his intention to keep the scope of the war limited.  
Although he had mentioned preventing another world war in his national emergency 
speech the previous December, he did not explain precisely what he meant.  Now, 
however, Truman declared that contrary to MacArthur’s desires, the U.N. forces would 
not expand the war into China because, “It is easier to put out a fire in the beginning 
when it is small than after it has become a roaring blaze.”  Concluding his remarks, the 
president revealed his disagreement with MacArthur, saying the question was “whether 
the Communist plan of conquest can be stopped without a general war.”44 
Two other things stand out about the April 11 speech.  As proof that the war was 
but the first step in a Communist plot to conquer all of Asia, the president cited 
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intelligence reports obtained from Communist army officers in North Korea.  Truman 
did not divulge anything about the source of these reports, and they apparently did not 
impress the public.  The national media said nothing about this evidence.  Another 
curiosity was the lack of discussion about MacArthur, limited to two short paragraphs 
near the end of the speech, with the president devoting most of his words to Korean 
policy.  He did say that he fired the U.N. commander to eliminate confusion about the 
nation’s policy.  However, HST did not explain the general’s specific transgressions, 
simply saying, concerning administration policy, “A number of events have made it 
evident that General MacArthur did not agree.”45 
The general’s firing overshadowed—but did not eclipse—Truman’s follow-up 
message.  General Omar Bradley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and staunch 
supporter of the president’s decision, called the speech a “complete flop.”  Bradley felt 
the president erred by emphasizing the “duller” topic of foreign policy instead of giving 
his specific reasons for firing MacArthur.  Some, however, took notice of Truman’s 
address.  Time reported, “The drama of MacArthur’s removal and homecoming obscures 
a far more important fact:  President Truman has brought his foreign policy into the 
open.”  If the president’s policy was out of the bag, not everyone digested it.  The New 
York Times claimed that the United Nations never had said it sought to reunify the 
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Korean peninsula by force, while columnists reported, “Debate Over M’Arthur May 
Clarify U.S. Policy.”46 
The commander in chief’s remarks to the nation came at a pivotal moment in his 
quest to sell the war—with its revised objective-- to the nation.  Yet, the speech was a 
missed opportunity.  Preoccupied with planning how and when he should remove the 
general, Truman inadequately prepared the public for his new policy.  The president 
should have been more specific about why MacArthur had to go.  The nation had 
awakened that morning to the shock of the general’s demise, and their first question was, 
“Why?”  However, the argument of Bradley and others that HST should have made his 
justification for MacArthur’s removal as the top priority in the speech is off the mark.  
Instead, the president should have placed equal emphasis on the change in command and 
his new policy.  He wisely began his remarks by laying out the case for limited war, but 
should have included more specifics on how MacArthur had undermined that policy, 
forcing the commander in chief to remove him.  With better planning of this crucial 
address, Truman could have reduced the duration of the ensuing storm over the change 
in military commanders.47 
The administration continued to make its case for limited war through the spring 
and summer of 1951.  In a speech to Democrats televised nationally a few days after 
replacing MacArthur, Truman made a good case for limited war, but repeated an 
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imprudent description he used at the conflict’s outset.  Drawing parallels to the triumph 
of the U.S. marines over the Barbary pirates in the 1800s, HST reminded his audience 
that in Korea, “We smashed the power of those bandits.”  Three weeks later, he gave an 
address to the Civil Defense Conference carried live by the networks.  It was the 
president’s best speech expressing his determination to control the scope of the conflict, 
declaring that a general war would endanger Japan and the Philippines, leave Europe 
vulnerable and alienate America’s allies.  Raising the specter of nuclear war, the 
commander in chief said the nation would expect “many atomic bombs to be dropped on 
American cities and a single one of them could cause many more casualties than we 
have suffered in all the fighting in Korea.”48 
Meanwhile, the public continued to struggle with the concept of fighting for 
something less than the enemy’s unconditional surrender.  A congressman told a White 
House aide that China’s involvement in Korea was “very hazy in the public mind.”  
People he talked to did not realize that the Chinese soldiers were not volunteers, but 
were fighting on the authority of their government.  The presence of such 
misconceptions as late as July 1951 underscored the administration’s challenges to 
selling the war.  Newspapers reported U.N. forces taking nameless hills and then losing 
them a few days later.  Soldiers in Korea sent word home that “the idea of this war as an 
endless one is almost universally accepted here.”  As a result, Truman’s political allies 
were telling him, “The public may not understand the dangers of MacArthur’s proposals 
                                                 
48 “Address at the Jefferson-Jackson Day Dinner- April 14, 1951,” PP, < 
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=292&st=&st1=> (January 23, 2007); Quotes from Civil 
Defense Conference speech in Lawrence, W. H., “President Warns,” NYT, 8 May 1951, p. 1. 
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for an expanded war in China, but . . . they do understand the impact of veal cutlets at 
$1.50 and ‘low cost’ house dresses at $11.95.”  With the public mostly hearing military 
news, they were “beginning to confuse military policy with foreign policy.”  Such 
confusion was understandable, since the decision to give up on reunifying the peninsula 
by force divorced the U.N.’s military objective from its political goal of uniting the 
Koreas.49 
The start of the peace talks at Kaesong on July 10 figured little in the 
administration’s promotion of the Korean cause.  When asked about the negotiations at 
his press conference, the president declined comment.  HST probably anticipated the 
long road of tough talks that lay ahead with the Chinese Communists and did not want to 
get the nation’s hopes up for a quick settlement.  Nevertheless, he should have used the 
occasion to express his hope for a quick and just armistice, and to remind the negotiators 
of the high stakes involved.  By refusing to comment on the peace talks, the chief 
executive risked giving the impression that he either did not take the negotiations very 
seriously, or was pessimistic about their chances for success.50  
Foreign policy emerged as a big issue when the 1952 presidential campaign 
season began.  The New York Times reported the American people were “arguing it hotly 
all over the place—grocers and taxi drivers, farmers and mechanics, high school students 
and old-age pensioners.”  Five thousand letters or telegrams per week besieged the State 
                                                 
49 Quote from congressman Francis E. Walter (D-PA) in Harry H. Vaughan, Memorandum for the President, July 5, 
1951; WHCF:  OF 471B, Korean Emergency (April 1951-1953) folder; Truman Papers, HSTL; was as an endless one 
in Goldman 199; veal cutlets and military policy in Clark M. Clifford to Charles S. Murphy, May 10, 1951 and 
Chester Bowles to Clifford, May 2, 1951; Clifford, Clark folder; Charles Murphy Papers, HSTL. 
 
50 “The President’s Press Conference- July 12, 1951,” PP, 
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=367&st=sabotage&st1= (January 25, 2007). 
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Department.  Convincing the electorate of the virtues of the Korean effort was therefore 
a high priority, and the Democrats had their work cut out for them, wrestling with the 
apparent “uncertainty among the people as to our sense of direction and continuity of 
policy.”  Moreover, the Democrats believed the press was against them, and they were 
right.  A subsequent analysis found that pro-Eisenhower newspapers controlled 80 
percent of national circulation.51 
Nevertheless, the Trumanites did their best to defend the president’s war policy, 
beginning with an “old reliable.”  A revised edition of Our Foreign Policy, the highly 
successful booklet first published in 1950, reappeared as 300,000 copies went out to the 
nation.  The administration blanketed the media with this pamphlet.  To reach rural 
America, the State Department sent copies to 10,000 weekly and non-metropolitan 
newspapers.  The combined readership of the newspapers and periodicals receiving the 
booklet was an estimated 75 million, representing about 68 percent of the voting age 
population.52 
                                                 
51Arguing in McCormick, Anne O’Hare, “Abroad,” NYT, 24 March 1952, p. 24; Five thousand letters in “Policy 
Stems Reds, Truman Declares,” NYT, 24 March 1952, p. 3; uncertainty among the people in Ken Hechler, 
Memorandum, “Mayflower Dinner Meeting of National Committee Research Group,” January 23, 1951; DNC 
Establishment of a Research Comm. folder; Ken Hechler Papers, HSTL; Dean Acheson to Harry Truman, “Suggested 
Quarterly Report Prepared by the Dept. of State on the Progress of our Foreign Policy,” March 28, 1952; PSF:  
Chronological Name File; Acheson, Dean folder; Truman Papers, HSTL also describes party concerns; Democrat 
beliefs that press was against them in “Final Report of Frank E. McKinney Submitted to the Democratic National 
Committee,” August 20, 1952, p. 29; Democratic National Committee folder; Charles Murphy Papers, HSTL; Pro-
Eisenhower papers in Wood, 203.  
 
52Distribution of pamphlet described in Robert Thompson to George Elsey, April 23, 1952 and Madeline W. 
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Our Foreign Policy 1952 made a good case for the Truman administration’s war 
policy.  However, it contained a few curiosities.  Despite the war, only five pages dealt 
with Korea and the Far East, compared to the nine pages dedicated to European affairs.  
The pamphlet mentioned China only once, emphasizing “Soviet aggression . . . in 
Korea,” including a drawing of a Stalinesque figure leaning over an Asian officer and 
examining a map of eastern Asia.  It also noted that the U.S. went to war in Korea to 
stop aggression against “our particular interests in the Pacific” without explaining 
precisely what these interests were. These weaknesses notwithstanding, the booklet  
pointed out that the U.N.’s credibility was at stake if its fate were not to go the way of 
the League of Nations.  The brochure argued that America’s enemies had not “pushed us 
into the sea,” and had ended up at the 38th parallel where they started.  The State 
Department summed up its case for limited war perfectly:  “The U.N. forces have not 
destroyed all the power of China.  That was not their job, and to have attempted it might 
have precipitated World War III.”  The U.N. forces had repelled aggression in Korea.53 
The State Department booklet generated lots of attention, as it did in 1950.  It 
was the subject of 30 editorials, 81 front-page stories, and 98 other news stories other 
than front page in the major metropolitan papers.  The Louisville Times called it “must 
reading for every citizen,” while the Philadelphia Bulletin quipped, “If the cracker barrel 
experts take time to read it, just possibly they might develop a better understanding” of 
                                                 
53 U.S. Department of State, Our Foreign Policy 1952 (Washington:  U.S. Government Printing Office, 1952), 10, 11, 
42-44.  
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foreign policy.  The department summed up press reaction as “widespread and on the 
whole very favorable.”54 
The administration had to play defense to sell its war policy during the 1952 
campaign.  In response to ten questions posed by columnist David Lawrence, the DNC 
published a ten-page rebuttal, including counterpoint questions for Republicans.  For 
example, Lawrence asked, “Why was a ‘stalemate war’ and a ‘stalemate peace’ 
advocated by the by the Truman-Acheson administration?”  The DNC accurately replied 
that the North Korean army had been “all but demolished” and that heavy casualties had 
been inflicted on the Chinese.  Democrats reminded the public that the U.N. had driven 
the Communists to the armistice table.  However, the DNC also responded that while the 
U.N. went to war “to repel the armed attack” and to “restore international peace and 
security to the area,” it “did not set out to take over North Korea by force.”  This, of 
course, did not explain why U.N. forces had advanced deeply into the north before the 
Chinese intervention, underscoring the challenge the war posed for the Democrats in the 
election.55      
Truman did nearly everything possible to convince the American public of the 
virtues of intervention in Korea, seeking to educate them on the need for the war while 
simultaneously convincing them it was not the prelude to World War III.  The 
president’s war salesmanship had its flaws.  His oratory skills left much to be desired, 
                                                 
54Madeline W. Harrington to Robert L. Thompson, “Our Foreign Policy, 1952” quotes the Louisville Times and the 
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particularly when compared with those of his predecessor, Franklin Delano Roosevelt.  
HST made some tactical errors as well, getting off to a slow start in communicating with 
the public at the war’s outset and being vague in his public statements about the 
momentous decision to carry the fighting north of the 38th parallel.  Most importantly, he 
made his job much harder by changing the war’s objective several times, and the concept 
of limited war proved inscrutable to many Americans, emerging so soon after the Allies 
obtained unconditional surrenders in World War II.56  
So how does history judge the president’s attempt to sell the Korean War to 
America?  In one sense, Truman appears to have failed because the war helped deal him 
the lowest presidential approval rating in U.S. history to date (22 percent) and facilitated 
the 1952 election of Republican Dwight Eisenhower.  For all of his unpopularity, 
however, HST managed to keep the nation on board with his policies.  Eisenhower 
essentially continued his predecessor’s Korean strategy, concluding the war just six 
months after the Missourian left office and under the same terms that Truman had 
insisted on throughout the latter stages of the conflict.  While many Americans called for 
changes ranging from expansion of the war into mainland China to a complete pullout of 
U.S. troops, these alternative approaches never generated enough support to force the 
chief executive to redirect his course.  After a significant drop in popular support when 
China entered the war, backing for the U.S. involvement held steady for the remainder of 
Truman’s term.  Events such as the firing of MacArthur, stalemated peace talks, and 
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several Chinese offensives did not steadily erode public opinion about the war as one 
might have expected.  HST sold the war well enough to carry it out as he saw fit.57 
 
                                                 
57 Approval rating from Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 2006, 
<http://137.99.36.203/CFIDE/roper/presidential/webroot/presidential_rating_detail.cfm?allRate=False> (December 9, 
2006); Trends in support after Chinese intervention in John E. Mueller, War, Presidents, and Public Opinion (New 
York:  John Wiley and Sons, 1973), 45-52.  
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CHAPTER VII 
 
LET THE CHIEF TAKE THE HEAT:  THE U.S. INTERVENES 
 
 
You have the right to do it as Commander-in-Chief and under the U.N. 
Charter. 
 
--Senator Tom Connally, responding to President Truman’s question 
about intervening in Korea without congressional approval.1 
 
 
Did Congress have any part in the decision to send American military forces into 
Korea, or did it just go along for the ride?  President Truman determined that he alone 
would make the decision, a move that his Republican adversaries swiftly capitalized on 
when American fortunes in the conflict soured.  Yet, the Constitution states, “Congress 
shall have power declare war.”  The Eighty-First Congress, controlled by the 
commander in chief’s party, never exercised this power in a conflict producing over 
130,000 U.S. casualties.  Subsequent presidents have followed Truman’s lead, sending 
American forces into major confrontations without a declaration of war from Congress. 
Thus far, this dissertation has examined the ways that HST tried to maintain the 
support of his party, the opposition Republicans and the populace for the war.  The 
remainder will analyze how Truman and the Congress got the nation into war in the first 
place, and how they subsequently worked to extricate the U.S. from the conflict.   
Chapter VII covers the American entry into the conflict, addressing several questions.  
Why did Truman go to war in the first place, and why did he see no need for 
congressional approval?  How did the U.N.’s participation affect these decisions?  Could 
                                                 
1 Connally, 346. 
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HST have avoided the political thrashing he suffered after China’s entry if Congress had 
endorsed the war?  The chapter examines how both political parties reacted to the 
administration’s response to the Korean crisis to determine whether the president bullied 
Congress out of the decision to intervene, or if the legislators abdicated their 
constitutional responsibility.  Chapter 7 will examine the other side of the coin, making 
the first probe into how the Congress helped push the U.S. towards the peace table. 
Trouble in Korea hit the administration with a jolt.  On Saturday, June 24 at 3 
p.m., President Truman was flying from Washington to his home in Independence, 
Missouri for what he thought would be a relaxing weekend.  Little did he know that 
before he landed, Kim Il Sung’s forces had thundered across the 38th parallel with almost 
110,000 soldiers, over 1,400 artillery pieces and 126 tanks.  Word reached Washington 
that evening, and at 11:20 p.m., Secretary Acheson phoned his boss, “Mr. President, I 
have very serious news.  The North Koreans have invaded South Korea.”  That night, 
State Department officials began working on a request for a U.N. Security Council 
emergency meeting.  Ambassador At Large Phillip Jessup recalled the attitude was, 
“We’ve got to do something, and whatever we do, we’ve got to do it through the United 
Nations.”2 
The attack made only a ripple when first reported in the American press.  Korea 
made only page 20 of the Sunday edition of the New York Times, reporting there was “no 
indication that the United States intends to take direct military action.”  The Washington 
                                                 
2 Glenn Page, The Korean Decision:  June 24-30, 1950 (New York:  Free Press, 1968), 79-81, 93, 100. 
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Post relegated the story to a section near the end, noting that North Korea had formally 
declared war on Saturday at 9 p.m. Eastern Daylight Time.3 
Meanwhile, Sunday had begun very early for American diplomats.  Ernest A. 
Gross, ambassador to Korea, telephoned U.N. Secretary General Trygve Lie at 3 a.m. to 
request the Security Council meeting as news of the invasion spread to governments 
around the globe.  Had the Soviets returned from a boycott of the Security Council to 
veto any actions against North Korea, the U.S. planned to call for an emergency 
gathering of the General Assembly.  At 8 a.m., Washington got word that a North 
Korean regiment occupied Kaesong, only 40 miles northwest of the ROK capitol of 
Seoul (see Figure 1).  Acheson rushed back to the State Department from his Maryland 
home around 11 a.m., giving reporters a whiff of crisis in the air by arriving coatless and 
disheveled.  Minutes later, after getting reports of Communist strafing of nearby 
installations, Ambassador Gross began evacuating families of U.S. embassy staff 
members from Seoul.4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 “Washington Holds Russia to Account,” NYT, 25 June 1950, p. 20; “North Korea Forces Drive Into South, Seoul 
Hears,” Washington Post, 25 June 1950, p. M1.  All subsequent references to the time of day are Eastern Daylight 
Time unless otherwise noted. 
  
4 Paige, 102-110.  The USSR had been boycotting the Security Council over the latter’s refusal to recognize the 
Communist Chinese government.  
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FIGURE 1 
 
The Korean Peninsula- June 1950 
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Truman, after a 2:45 p.m. call from Acheson describing the deteriorating 
situation for the ROK forces, decided to return to Washington.  The president believed 
North Korea would ignore the expected Security Council resolution calling for a cease-
fire and withdrawal due to the “complete disregard” of the U.N. displayed by Kim Il 
Sung and his “big allies” in the past.  If that happened, HST felt the U.S. would have to 
do something and therefore wanted to get back to Blair House.  After rushing aboard the 
plane, leaving some of his staffers behind, Truman impatiently asked a Secret Service 
agent why they were not taking off.  When the agent reported that the pilot was waiting 
for his navigator, the president insisted that they take off without him.  Obediently, the 
pilot removed the boarding ramp and closed the door.  As the pilot prepared to taxi to the 
runway, his navigator sped up next to the plane in his car and climbed a rope ladder to 
board the aircraft.5 
The president had military intervention in mind at the outset.  As he prepared to 
leave for Washington, he told reporters, “Don’t make it alarmist.  It could be a 
dangerous situation, but I hope it isn’t.”  However, Brigadier General Wallace H. 
Graham, Truman’s personal physician, told two journalists as he boarded the presidential 
plane, “The boss is going to hit those fellows hard.”  Margaret Truman, after spending 
that weekend with her father and helping him prepare for his hasty return, wrote in her 
                                                 
5 Truman quoted in Paige, 113; Navigator episode in Donovan, 195-6.  Truman was temporarily living in Blair House 
due to renovations of the White House. 
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diary that day, “Northern or Communist Korea is marching in on Southern Korea and we 
are going to fight.”6 
While HST returned to the capitol, the U.N. Security Council met and Congress 
began to weigh in on the situation.  Curiously, the Soviets continued their boycott of the 
Council rather than returning to veto the resolution, resulting in a 9-0 vote (with 
Yugoslavia abstaining) calling for North Korea to withdraw.  Rep. John Kee (D-WV), 
chairman of the Foreign Affairs committee, told reporters that, from what he knew at the 
time, South Korea was in a “fairly good position to take care of itself.”  H. Alexander 
Smith claimed the U.S. had a moral imperative to look after the “infant Korean 
Republic.”  Other Republicans assailed the White House.  Rep. Paul W. Shafer (MI) said 
Korea had been “flung into the Soviet orbit” by the State Department.  Senator Wherry 
attributed the crisis to China policy, trumpeting, “The Administration should stand up 
and do something and then we’ll stop those Commies.”7 
The president convened the first meeting on the Korean crisis with his National 
Security Council (NSC) upon arriving in Washington Sunday evening.  Attendees 
included the Joint Chiefs of Staff and officials from the State and Defense departments.  
As they waited for dinner to be served, two of them recalled Truman seated near a 
window repeating softly to himself, “We can’t let the U.N. down!”  After discussing the 
situation, HST directed the Seventh Fleet to head towards Formosa and await further 
instruction, and ordered American air and naval support to secure Seoul during the 
                                                 
6 Donovan, 195-6. 
 
7 Paige, 116-122.  
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evacuation of U.S. citizens.  They did not discuss obtaining congressional approval, and 
the president stressed, “We are working entirely for the United Nations.”8   
Congress spoke out more on Monday, June 26.  In the first Senate session after 
the invasion began, five Republicans and one Democrat brought up Korea in floor 
debate.  Only two House members, both Republicans, did the same.  Most of the GOP 
legislators blasted the administration for permitting the course of events, and Senator 
Knowland asked if the U.S. would “sit back and twiddle our thumbs and do nothing” if 
the USSR blocked U.N. action.  Senator Connally shook his finger at the critics and 
questioned their “splendid attitude of doubt,” asserting, “The President . . . is not going 
to tremble like a psychopath before Russian power.”  Despite the partisan sparring, when 
Republicans emerged from a GOP Policy committee meeting, Senator Eugene D. 
Millikin (R-CO) reported his colleagues seemed “unanimous that the incident should not 
be used as a provocation for war.”9 
News from Korea worsened as the day went on.  In a morning conversation with 
Rep. Kee, Acheson said South Korea was in “pretty good shape.”  However, by 2 p.m., 
the White House learned that the South Korean government had fled Seoul.  The 
president got varying advice from congressional Democrats.  Rep. Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, Jr. (NY) suggested a joint ultimatum delivered by the U.S. and USSR 
demanding a cease-fire and for the North and South Koreans return to their original 
                                                 
8 Let the U.N. down in Paige, 125; direction of 7th Fleet in Donovan, 197-9; working entirely for the United Nations in 
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positions.  Roosevelt believed that if Russia declined, the ploy would expose that they 
were a “party of interest in the present invasion . . . disrupting the peace of the world.”  
Significantly, Truman asked Connally whether he needed to ask Congress for a 
declaration of war before sending American forces to Korea.  Though the Texan later 
regretted it, he answered, “If a burglar breaks into your house you can shoot him without 
going down to the police station and getting permission.”  Connally warned HST, “You 
might run into a long debate in Congress which would tie your hands completely.”10   
Truman reconvened the NSC that evening.  General Bradley, JCS chairman, 
shared MacArthur’s assessment that a “complete collapse is imminent.”  When one of 
his generals reported that the U.S. had shot down its first North Korean plane (built by 
the Soviets), the commander in chief remarked, “I hope it’s not the last.”  After hearing 
out his advisors, HST decided to have American naval and air forces assist the South 
Koreans as needed below the 38th parallel, removing the previous restriction limiting 
their activities to assisting with the evacuation of Americans.  Notably, when asked by a 
general for permission to conduct operations in the North, Truman said, “Not yet.”  He 
also ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent skirmishing between the Chinese Nationalists 
on Taiwan and the Communists on mainland China.  The NSC did not discuss asking 
Congress for a declaration of war, and John Hickerson, Assistant Secretary of State for 
U.N.  Affairs, later asserted that such a request would have been premature.  The 
president nevertheless felt it necessary to have some dialogue with the legislators, and 
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scheduled a briefing with congressional leaders for the following morning.  A statement 
summarizing his decisions was prepared for release to the press the next day.  
Implementation, however, began immediately.11 
Hickerson, one of the last to leave as the NSC meeting broke up, later shared 
some poignant comments Truman made that Monday night.  Relaxing with a drink after 
a taxing day, HST confided, “I have hoped and prayed that I would never have to make a 
decision like the one I have just made today.”  The president expressed disappointment 
that lack of American support probably contributed to the failure of the League of 
Nations, underscoring his determination that the U.N. succeed in its first crucial test.  
Revealing his belief that the Soviets ordered the North Korean invasion, Truman 
declared, “Now is the time to call their bluff,” asserting, “In the final analysis, I did this 
for the United Nations.”12 
The commander in chief reiterated this conviction during his first meeting with 
lawmakers on the Korean situation on the morning of Tuesday, June 27.  Gathering 
fourteen congressional leaders (nine Democrats and five Republicans), Truman had NSC 
and military officials update them on the situation.  He then read the statement prepared 
the night before, telling the group he would release it to the press at the conclusion of the 
meeting.  During the ensuing discussion, the president affirmed the U.S was committed 
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to defending South Korea.  Republicans stressed the importance of adhering to U.N. 
orders and Senator Connally asserted that America would not intervene alone.  The JCS 
clarified that Truman’s orders did not commit U.S. ground troops.  Connally recalled 
that no one dissented, and Acheson said the consensus was that because the U.S. had 
responded with force, the lawmakers were satisfied.  The commander in chief informed, 
but did not consult, the legislators.13 
The White House released its statement following the meeting.  Truman argued 
that the June 25 U.N. Security Council resolution calling on members to assist the 
cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of North Korean forces justified dispatching  U.S. 
air and naval forces to “give Korean Government troops cover and support.”  House 
members lauded Truman’s statement with a standing ovation, with one exception.  Rep. 
Vito Macantonio (NY) of the American Labor Party said the commander in chief had 
undermined Congress’s constitutional authority to declare war, insisting, “For all 
purposes . . . we are at war.”  Marcantonio called the president’s move a calamitous 
decision which could bring “disastrous consequences on the people of the United States 
unless checked by the people themselves.”14 
Tuesday concluded with two momentous events.  Just before midnight, the U.N. 
Security Council adopted a resolution recommending that member nations “furnish such 
assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to 
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restore international peace and security in the area.”  The wording was more aggressive 
than that of the Monday resolution, which called upon members to “render every 
assistance to the United Nations” in its call for North Korea to withdraw north of the 38th 
parallel.  The Council approved it 7-1, with Yugoslavia opposed, Egypt and India 
abstaining, and the USSR absent.  As the measure came to a vote, North Korean troops 
overran Seoul, prompting a triumphant Kim Il Sung to cable his troops, “Hail the united 
Korean people!”15 
Congress united behind the president.  A Senate-House conference committee 
assembled a bill in less than an hour extending the selective service for a year and giving 
Truman broad powers of implementation.  The House passed the bill 315-4 and 
forwarded it to the Senate, which passed it 76-0 on Wednesday, June 28, after “not a 
word of debate.”  Only two days earlier, both houses seemed to be in a “hopeless 
deadlock,” haggling over restrictions on the commander in chief’s use of the draft during 
peacetime.  The outbreak in Korea changed all that, and editorials lauded Congress’s 
response.  Interestingly, the press overlooked the fact that 120 of the 439 House 
members did not bother to show up to vote.  Similarly, 20 of the 96 senators did not 
vote, although 12 of the absentees sent verbal word to colleagues that they supported the 
bill.  The most likely explanation for the poor turnout is the overwhelming support for 
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Truman’s dispatch of naval and air support to Korea.  Members knew that their vote 
would not make or break the bill’s passage.16 
Yet, Senator Taft was a significant exception to the rally around the president.  
The GOP leader delivered a major speech that, like Marcantonio’s, argued that the 
president had exceeded his constitutional authority in committing American air and 
naval forces to Korea.  “We are now actually engaged in a de facto war,” Taft declared, 
and that if this intervention went unchallenged, the president could “go to war in 
Malaya, or Indonesia, or Iran, or South America without congressional consent.”  Saying 
Truman had “no legal authority” for his action, the Ohioan warned his colleagues that if 
they did not act, they would have “finally terminated for all time the right of Congress to 
declare war as provided by the Constitution.”  Taft also brought up a vital issue, the U.N. 
Participation Act of 1945 (UNPA), which required the president to get congressional 
approval before committing American armed forces for U.N. use.  The law authorized 
the president to negotiate special agreements with the Security Council “providing for 
the numbers and types” of U.S. armed forces, along with “their degree of readiness and 
general location” to support a U.N. military action.  Although the UNPA required 
congressional approval of such an agreement, none was in place in June 1950.  Taft said 
the intervention was the right thing to do, but that there was a constitutional principle at 
                                                 
16 Less than an hour noted in “House Votes Draft Extension, Power to Call Reserves, Guard,” Washington Post, 28 
June 1950, p. 1; hopeless deadlock in “House Votes 315-4 To Prolong Draft,” NYT, 28 June 1950, p. 1; not a word of 
debate in “Draft Extension Sent to President,” NYT, 29 June 1950, p. 6; Examples of press support are “Selective 
Service,” NYT, 28 June 1950, p. 26 and “Democracy in Action,” NYT, 29 June 1950, p. 28.  Constituents punished 
only one of the four House members opposing the draft extension in the 1950 elections, Vito Marcantonio.  Reports in 
neither the Washington Post, New York Times, Time, nor Matthew Mantell’s study of dissent during the war indicate 
that legislators abstained from voting as a matter of protest.  
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stake.  He would endorse Truman’s action if the president requested Congress’s 
approval.17 
Taft’s speech drew immediate criticism.  As soon as the Ohio senator sat down, 
Majority Leader Scott Lucas rose to the administration’s defense.  Lucas asserted the 
U.N. Charter gave Truman the authority he needed, and Senator Connally later read into 
the record a portion of the June 27 Security Council resolution calling on U.N. members 
to assist the South Koreans.  The majority leader reminded his colleagues of the 
“traditions and precedents established more than 100 times” by previous presidents, 
including President Jefferson’s dispatch of the Navy to combat the Barbary pirates and 
the use of American forces to quell the Boxer Rebellion in China.  Republican Ralph 
Flanders (VT) said Truman’s action was legal as long as military activity remained south 
of the 38th parallel.  The Washington Post, conceding Congress’s right to declare war, 
argued, “Police action to halt aggression is not war, as American history testifies.”  
Secretary Acheson later dismissed Taft’s opposition as “typical senatorial legalistic 
ground for differing with the President.”18 
The administration inched deeper into the Korean affair.  During the morning of 
Thursday, June 29, the Pentagon began receiving reports that the ROK army was in a 
continuous retreat and suffering fifty percent casualties.  Truman therefore convened 
                                                 
17 De facto war  in Hinton, Harold B., “Taft Says Truman Bypasses Congress,” NYT, 29 June 1950, p. 4; “United 
Nations Participation Act, December 20, 1945,” The Avalon Project at Yale Law School, 
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another NSC meeting at 5 p.m., where the JCS recommended the introduction of 
American ground forces.  General Bradley emphasized the purpose of the troops was 
only to secure the port of Pusan for protection of American evacuees.  No troops would 
go to the invasion front.  The generals, however, wanted permission to bomb targets in 
North Korea.  The president urged restraint, saying that in Korea he did not want the 
U.S. to become “over-committed to a whole lot of other things that could mean war.”  
Truman therefore allowed attacks only upon ammunition dumps, air bases, and supply 
storage in the North, saying he “only wanted to restore order to the 38th Parallel.”  None 
of the attendees apparently knew that MacArthur had already ordered the Air Force to 
make strategic strikes into North Korea.19 
The decision to intervene in Korea culminated on Friday, June 30.  General 
MacArthur, after returning from a personal inspection of the front, cabled Washington 
during the middle of the night of June 29-30, warning, “The only assurance of holding 
the present line, and the ability to regain later lost ground, is through the introduction of 
U.S. ground combat forces into the Korean battle area.”  His request for a combat 
regiment immediately, followed by two divisions for a counteroffensive, reached the 
president at 5 a.m.  Truman, already awake and getting dressed for his morning walk, 
approved the regiment, but held off on the two divisions until he met with his military 
advisors.  At 8:30 a.m., HST and the NSC discussed an offer of 30,000 troops from the 
Chinese Nationalist government to help fight the North Koreans.  The president liked the 
                                                 
19 Accounts of the meeting in Paige, 239-41, 245-6 and Bradley and Baird, 538; overcommitted to a whole lot in 
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idea because it offered a way to get other U.N. members involved while avoiding 
sending American ground forces.  Acheson felt otherwise, fearing the Nationalist troops 
would invite Communist China to join the fight.  The JCS backed the secretary, citing 
logistical and tactical problems with using Chiang’s forces.  Truman, bowing to their 
judgement, declined the offer.  The commander in chief then made the momentous 
decision:  MacArthur could have his two divisions of U.S. troops.20 
The president briefed sixteen congressional leaders on Korea later that morning.  
HST read aloud an announcement summarizing his decisions, which he released to the 
press while the meeting was in progress.  “In keeping with the United Nations Security 
Council’s request,” the president had authorized hitting targets in North Korea and the 
use of “certain supporting ground units.”  A long silence ensued before the legislators 
began asking their questions.  Most dealt with the contributions by U.N. members other 
than the U.S., with several senators urging even token combat forces from other nations 
to emphasize that this was a U.N. action rather than an American response.  At one 
point, Truman said the U.S. had sent no troops into “actual combat” yet, and that the 
plan simply was to secure communications and supply lines at Pusan.  This was a stretch 
of the truth, given the president’s approval of two divisions for a counteroffensive hours 
earlier.21 
                                                 
20 MacArthur cable in Bradley, 538-9; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 412-3,  Beisner, 346-7 and Truman, 
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Only one of the sixteen, Senator Wherry, challenged the president.  Rising as 
though speaking on the Senate floor, the minority leader asked HST if he would advise 
the Congress before dispatching ground forces to Korea.  Truman responded that he had 
already ordered them into Korea, but would advise them in the event of a “real 
emergency.”  When Wherry argued that Congress should be consulted before the 
president made such moves, HST gave a confusing response.  Referring to the events of 
June 25 rather than his current decision to commit troops, Truman in effect said he could 
not confer with Congress because it had been a weekend emergency, asserting, “I just 
had to act as Commander-in-Chief, and I did.”  Thus, the president indicated he would 
advise Congress in the event of a major crisis in the future, yet, in the next breath, said 
he did not have time to consult the legislature during emergencies.  HST assured the 
congressmen that if any major actions occurred in the future, he would tell them.  The 
senator did not go quietly, rising again and repeating his demand.  Truman tried again to 
placate the senator, replying, “If there is any necessity for Congressional action, I will 
come to you.  But I hope we can get those bandits in Korea suppressed without that.”  
Later in the meeting, the Nebraskan raised the issue a third time, correctly surmising the 
significance of the final sentence in the president’s press release authorizing the use of 
American ground troops.  This time, a Republican colleague, Rep. Dewey Short (MO) 
sawed Wherry off at the knees, extolling Truman’s leadership and stating that nearly 
everyone Congress shared such sentiments.22 
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     Nevertheless, Senator H. Alexander Smith proposed a compromise in the 
form of a congressional resolution approving the actions that the commander in chief 
had decided to take.  HST agreed to look into the idea and assigned Acheson to make a 
recommendation.23 
Despite the president’s talk of suppressing bandits, the attendees clearly 
understood the weight of his decisions.  Acheson noted in his memoirs, “We were then 
fully committed in Korea.”  As the congressmen filed out, Senator Connally recalled, 
“All of us were shocked by the realization that only five years after World War II, 
Amerian youth were once more involved in military combat.”24 
Truman considered the question of obtaining a congressional endorsement of the 
intervention on Monday, July 3.  As Congress recessed for the Independence Day 
holiday, at Acheson’s request the president called a meeting of the Cabinet, the Service 
secretaries, and the “Big 4” representatives of the Democratic leadership on the Hill 
(both majority leaders, Vice President Barkley, and House Speaker Rayburn).  Of the 
Big 4, only Lucas bothered to attend.  Acheson pointed out that several legislators were 
quite nervous about what they perceived as “excessive Presidential independence.”  The 
meeting therefore discussed whether HST should make an address on the Korean crisis 
to Congress, and whether he should seek a joint resolution supporting the war effort as 
Senator Smith suggested during the June 30 briefing.  Acheson distributed a proposed 
resolution, which he had amended from endorsing the actions to maintain peace in the 
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“Pacific area” to ensuring security in the “Korean situation,” a change designed to avoid 
reopening the debate over China policy.25 
Senator Lucas was indecisive during the meeting, which was particularly 
problematic since he was the lone voice from Capitol Hill.  When Truman asked for his 
opinion on the proposed resolution, the senator responded that it was difficult to do so 
without talking with his colleagues.  After more prodding, Lucas said the president “had 
very properly done what he had to without consulting the Congress.”  The majority 
leader therefore opposed the resolution, even though he deemed it “satisfactory” and said 
it could pass.  Yet, Lucas reported many colleagues had told him that HST should “keep 
away from Congress and avoid debate,” and worried that discussion of the resolution 
would last at least a week.  The senator appeared sensitive to Republican criticism.  
When Lucas noted that most legislators were “sick of the attitude” taken by Taft and 
Wherry, Truman correctly surmised that Wherry had lightened up a bit following the 
June 30 briefing (Lucas disagreed).  The majority leader’s argument was baffling.  If 
most in Congress were sick of Taft and Wherry, why fear a floor debate?  Confounding 
his recommendation further, Lucas said that if Truman reconvened the congressional 
leaders from the Friday briefing, they probably would unanimously endorse the 
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resolution, ensuring its passage on the floor.  The senator also worried that a presidential 
speech to Congress on Korea would be “practically asking for a declaration of war.”26 
The Cabinet members and service secretaries in attendance did not serve the 
president well, either.  Few ventured their views on a congressional sanction.  Bradley 
was an exception, opposing a resolution in order to avoid a lengthy debate in Congress 
on “matters which now seemed to be taken for granted.”  The rest made neutral 
comments.  Even Acheson, after opening the meeting and sharing his drafts of the 
resolution and a proposed address to Congress, said little else.27 
Truman  nevertheless raised the issue of the constitutionality of his actions.  
However, when Lucas mentioned that a presidential speech to Congress could come 
across as asking for a war declaration (and therefore should be avoided), HST agreed, 
clarifying that he “had not been acting as President, but as Commander-in-Chief of our 
forces in the Far East.”  Later, he noted the need to be “very careful” to avoid appearing 
to be “trying to get around Congress and use extra-Constitutional powers.”  The 
president spoke of the challenges to keeping the legislators informed, but showed no 
inclination towards seeking their advice or approval.  Truman refused to introduce the 
resolution, maintaining it was up to Congress to do so.  The discussion ended with a 
decision to wait until the legislators returned after the recess before acting.  By the time 
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the legislators reconvened, Acheson recalled, “We were pretty well won over to Senator 
Lucas’ view.”28 
The July 3 meeting was the last meaningful discussion in the administration 
about obtaining congressional approval for sending American forces into Korea.  After 
meeting with the Big 4 a week later, Truman told Acheson they had advised him against 
making an address to Congress, and did not mention any discussion about a joint 
resolution.  However, Senator Alexander Wiley (R-WI) passionately pleaded on the 
same day for the White House to submit a resolution for a congressional endorsement.  
Wiley contended that a resolution would safeguard Congress’s “integrity,” even if it 
occurred after the fact.  He declared, “No single military action taken by the executive 
branch . . . has had as many widespread implications as this one,” reflecting concerns 
that Korea was but the first of additional Soviet forays elsewhere.  Complaining that 
Congress had been yielding “more and more of its authority . . . to the executive 
branch,” Wiley asked if his colleagues should “sit by silently while the President takes 
actions which might lead us into a third world war.”  Wiley’s pleas fell on deaf ears.  
White House aide George Elsey noted that a congressional resolution was “discussed 
half-heartedly from time to time, but the issue was never clearly thrashed out.”  When 
Elsey told Truman in mid-July that drafts of such declarations had been floating around 
the White House, HST said he had never heard of them and expressed scorn for the idea.  
The staffer later concluded his boss was “dreadfully wrong.”  Speaking of the president, 
Elsey lamented, “We of the staff had served him poorly by not . . . seeking congressional 
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involvement in the opening days of the conflict.  It was soon too late.  We had 
‘Truman’s War’ to deal with.”29  
Congress responded in a variety of ways to the president’s decision to go to war.  
The liberal Democrats, unsurprisingly, backed Truman.  Responding to constituent mail, 
Senator Theodore F. Green (RI) echoed the president’s belief that the Soviets were 
“testing the limit to which our appeasement . . . might go.”  He also cited the League of 
Nations’ failure to respond to Italy’s attack of Ethiopia in 1936 to justify the U.N. action 
in Korea.  Preaching the doctrine of Truman, Green wrote, “We are interested in a street 
fight where there is shooting, even if we are not shot at ourselves.”  A member of the 
Foreign Relations committee, Green nevertheless held that “the President, and not the 
Congress, has the conduct of our foreign affairs.”  The Rhode Islander made a 
distinction that most Americans probably did not notice, writing, “We did not go into 
Korea to fight communism,” but to “help the United Nations fight aggression.”30 
Senator Paul H. Douglas (D-IL) gave a scholarly defense of the administration.  
Sparked by Taft’s questioning of the president’s authority to lead America to war, 
Douglas reviewed James Madison’s notes from the Constitutional Convention to justify 
Truman’s approach.  The Illinois senator said the Founding Fathers substituted the word 
“declare” for the word “make” in the clause giving Congress the authority “to declare 
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war,” allowing the commander in chief the power to “repel sudden attacks” without 
obtaining congressional approval.  Douglas cited Lincoln’s call for volunteers following 
the attack at Fort Sumter as one of many precedents.  Since time was of the essence in 
responding to the Korean emergency, Truman, like Lincoln, could dispatch troops 
without a formal war declaration.  Douglas conceded that previous presidents dispatched 
the military to defend against direct threats to American lives and territory.  However, 
since there was no doubt that the Communists would attack elsewhere if they were not 
stopped in Korea, America’s “ultimate security” was at stake, justifying Truman’s 
action.  Douglas implied that presidents could wage limited war, but not world war, 
saying it “would be below the dignity of the United States to declare war on a pigmy 
state.”31 
Douglas’s assertion of the need to empower the president to make a quick 
military response echoed sentiments expressed by Senator Edwin C. Johnson (D-CO) 
five years earlier.  Johnson, who typically opposed Truman, nevertheless declared that 
the atomic weapons used to end World War II had convinced him not to tie the 
president’s hands as commander in chief.  He admitted that the bomb had reversed his 
views on congressional declarations of war.  In the midst of a debate on the U.N. 
Participation Act, Johnson decried efforts to set numerical limits on the number of troops 
the president could deploy without congressional consent.  Believing there would be no 
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time for consultations in the nuclear age, Johnson had warned, “Nations not set to get 
under way trigger-quick will be whipped before they start.”32   
Senator Douglas acknowledged “grave dangers” in giving the chief executive the 
power to use military force.  Douglas nevertheless believed that a president’s personal 
feeling of responsibility to the institution of the presidency and Congress’s power to 
impeach would act as restraints.  Both arguments were weak.  Presidents are generally 
forceful people, and want to lead the country as they see fit.  The power of the office 
does not necessarily make executives more cautious about using it.  Impeachment is too 
cumbersome and unlikely to be used at the outset of a war.  Even after months of 
protests over the Vietnam War, Congress never seriously considered impeaching Lyndon 
Johnson or Richard Nixon as a means to get the U.S. out of the conflict.33  
Other Democrats supported HST’s decision for different reasons.  Richard 
Russell said Congress could not declare war on North Korea because the U.S. had never 
recognized its existence as a sovereign state.  Senate Guy Gillette (IA) held that articles 
39 through 42 of the U.N. Charter, which describe directives by the Security Council to 
remedy breaches of the peace, gave Truman the right to go to Korea.  Curiously, Gillette 
(and nearly everyone else, save Senator Taft) ignored section 6 of the U.N. Participation 
Act (UNPA) requiring the president to get congressional approval before sending 
American armed forces to respond to a Security Council request.34 
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Sometimes, the zeal of the president’s Democratic allies went into overdrive.  
Rep. John Walsh (IN) issued a statement, saying “an irate America” would soon “deluge 
Russia itself with atom bombs.”  Skeptical that the USSR had nuclear capability, he 
continued, “It won’t be just a one-bomb attack either. . . .  We have at least 250 bombs.”  
Walsh asserted, “The only way to destroy an octopus is to strike at its heart,” adding, 
ominously, that the U.S. was “not going to continue fighting secondary nations.”  A 
White House aide called this a “rather bad statement,” and worried that anything said to 
the independent Walsh would “probably excite him to the point the he would make a 
statement far worse.”35 
The GOP—at the time--overwhelmingly endorsed the commitment of U.S. forces 
to Korea as a legitimate action by the commander in chief.  Three of the five Republican 
members of the Senate Foreign Relations committee backed the president, expressing no 
concerns about the lack of congressional approval.  Senator Vandenberg, writing to 
Truman from his sick bed, applauded the decision and said he only wished the U.S. had 
pushed the U.N. action through sooner.  On June 27, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. not only 
backed Truman’s dispatch of air and naval support; he hoped the president would “not 
shrink from using the Army,” if necessary.  In his diary, H. Alexander Smith called 
Truman’s action an “answer to prayer.”  Smith nevertheless was concerned about Taft’s 
criticism of Truman for skirting congressional approval.  He decided Taft was correct to 
assert that the UNPA did not authorize the president’s action because there had been no 
previous agreement by Congress authorizing American military support of a U.N. 
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mandate.  However, Smith also reasoned that the statute did not bar the president from 
using military force, and bought into Truman’s argument that the president’s 
constitutional powers as commander in chief allowed him to deploy military force.  Like 
the administration, Smith felt that precedents cited by the State Department gave Truman 
plenty of justification for bypassing Congress.  Nevertheless, throwing a political bone 
to the powerful Taft, Smith, proposed a joint resolution approving the president’s action 
during Truman’s June 30 congressional briefing. Of the GOP committee members, only 
Senator Wiley, who had lauded Truman’s response on June 26, called for congressional 
approval during the opening days of the war.36 
Other Republicans completely agreed with HST at the war’s outset.  Senator 
Ralph E. Flanders (VT), recalling Hitler’s aggression prior to World War II, said that in 
Korea, “We have the invasion of the totalitarian power according to the old pattern,” and 
was pleased that the U.N. was not following the “pusillanimous policy of the League of 
Nations.”  Flanders declared, “All the world knows that it is Russia which is on the 
move and not North Korea.”  He wove a creative rationalization for the legality of the 
president’s action as a police action.  The Republican reasoned that since the U.S. had 
taken the Japanese surrender in southern Korea and overseen free elections forming its 
government in 1948, the U.S. held “certain responsibilities of military protection against 
military invasion” for South Korea.  Flanders pointed out that the ROK needed 
protection because the U.N. had not formed its own police force.  The U.S. did not need 
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a declaration of war because it was simply carrying out an “existing obligation,” 
provided it did not send forces north of the 38th parallel.  Advancing into North Korea 
would “constitute action of a very different sort,” requiring a congressional war 
declaration.  Even Senator William Knowland (CA), normally opposed to Truman’s Far 
East policies, voiced support.  Echoing the president’s characterization of Korea as a 
“police action,” Knowland said HST had the right to commit troops as commander in 
chief.  The urgency of the situation made the use of such power acceptable.  Thus, Taft, 
Wherry and Wiley were the only Republicans to raise significant challenges to the 
legality of Truman’s decision to intervene at the time.  As Smith noted, “We 
Republicans were all elated.”37 
However, after China entered the conflict, the GOP did not hesitate to hammer 
Truman for his decision to skirt a congressional sanction of the war.  Senator Jenner 
demonstrated this change of heart.  At the war’s outset, he proclaimed that Americans 
should not “shrink from our patriotic duty” and should see the Korean crisis through.  
Jenner redefined patriotism a bit in January 1951, asserting that if Congress had “a shred 
of courage and patriotism left,” it should “lay down an ultimatum to the President 
demanding either a declaration of war or the bringing back of American G.I.s to home 
shores.”  In their statement at the conclusion of the MacArthur hearings, a group of eight 
Republicans said the American military involvement in Korea was “without precedent,” 
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and demanded that the administration resolve the constitutional issue of the president 
committing troops without congressional approval.  During a televised debate, Senator 
Owen Brewster (R-ME) told his Democratic opponents, “It was your President who 
started this war in Korea.”  His debate ally, Senator Homer Ferguson (R-MI) said of 
Korea, “It is not the United States’ war, because Congress has never declared it.”38 
Some historians have endorsed, in varying degrees, the wisdom of Truman’s 
decision to intervene militarily in Korea.  David Rees saw the Korean crisis as Soviet 
aggression, believing that the U.S. intervention prevented a certain drift into World War 
III and strengthened the Western alliance.  Biographer Alonzo Hamby emphasized the 
expectations of America’s Cold War allies, arguing that the nature of the North Korean 
attack magnified its geopolitical importance.  With the eyes of the world on the U.S., 
HST had to act or risk losing current or potential allies against the Soviets.  Arthur 
Schlesinger, Jr. agreed the president had to go to war, but hedged his endorsement.  
Although Truman was wrong to assume the Soviets were the sole instigators of the 
attack (we now know that Kim Il-Sung begged Stalin for the green light), he still did the 
right thing.  Schlesinger posited that if HST had not intervened, there was a good 
possibility that Stalin would have been tempted to encourage local communist offensives 
elsewhere.39     
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  Revisionist historians have been less sympathetic to Truman’s approach.  Joyce 
and Gabriel Kolko suggested American determination to create a sphere of capitalist 
countries to trade with U.S. businesses following World War II drove the president to 
intervene.  Bruce Cumings described the conflict as a civil war in which the U.S. 
meddled, purporting genocide on the Korean people, but halting its expansionist 
impulses in Asia.  Stephen Pelz argued that Truman painted himself into a corner due to 
his inept policies and leadership.  The president committed the U.S. to supporting a 
trusteeship of South Korea, then backed away by pulling American forces out of the 
country as he sought to shrink the American military budget.  Pelz argued that this 
invited the North Korean attack.  Because Truman’s rhetoric had assured support for the 
South Koreans, he had no choice other than responding militarily.40 
Of the naysayers, only Barton J. Bernstein has discussed Truman’s political 
alternatives, bluntly positing that HST could have avoided war “without producing a 
backlash at home or disrupting the alliance system.”  Bernstein suggested Truman could 
have covered himself politically by blaming the Republicans for resisting aid to Korea 
earlier in 1950.  The GOP therefore invited the invasion by rendering South Korea  
powerless to stop it.  Since John Foster Dulles was worried that military intervention 
could produce a quagmire akin to Dunkirk in World War I, Bernstein believed Truman 
could have convinced other Republicans to support a decision to stay out of Korea.  
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Bernstein did not discuss how the U.S. would maintain its credibility with its allies had it 
walked away from Korea.  However, it is difficult to imagine a significant change in the 
quality of America’s alliances.  The U.S. had established a firm military presence in 
Japan, and European allies such as Britain and France were not going to jump into the 
arms of the Soviets just because the Americans stayed aloof from Korea.41 
Truman went to war in Korea for multiple reasons.  Although he often spoke 
passionately of the need to uphold the credibility of the U.N., the president also said that 
had the Soviets attended the Security Council meetings dealing with Korea and vetoed 
U.N. action, the U.S. would have intervened unilaterally.  During the first week of the 
war, HST told a group of legislators, “If we let Korea down, the Soviets will keep right 
on going and swallow up one piece of Asia after another,” and possibly the Middle East 
and Europe as well.  Since HST would have gone to war whether the Security Council 
sanctioned it or not, his primary reason for sending U.S. troops to Korea could not have 
been to ensure U.N. credibility.  Nevertheless, since the Security Council endorsed a 
military response, Truman felt it was vital to keep the U.N. from collapsing like the 
League of Nations.  Another contributory motive for the administration was to uphold 
American prestige in the international community.  In his memoirs, the president wrote 
that failure to act would negatively affect the “confidence of peoples in countries 
adjacent to the Soviet Union,” particularly if the U.S. did not protect a nation 
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“established under our auspices.”  Acheson agreed, calling U.S. prestige “the shadow 
cast by power” that had “great deterrent importance.”42   
Did McCarthyism lead the president into a war that he otherwise would have 
avoided?  The 1949 Communist victory in China’s civil war and Senator McCarthy’s 
antics in 1950 certainly created pressure on Truman to respond forcefully to the Korean 
crisis.  Moreover, HST swiftly changed his policy towards Formosa once Korea ignited.  
Prepared to concede Taiwan to the Communists before the war, the commander in chief 
swiftly dispatched naval forces to protect the Kuomintang from the Communists on the 
mainland (and vice-versa) following the North Korean attack, gladdening the hearts of 
his GOP opponents.  Nevertheless, McCarthyism was a negligible factor in Truman’s 
decision to respond militarily.  He had resisted political pressure in staying out of the 
Chinese civil war and, later, when recalling MacArthur.  The president possessed quite 
enough antipathy of his own towards communism and did not need additional 
encouragement from McCarthy and company.  The nature of the North Korean attack 
motivated HST more than fear of the McCarthyites.  Had Kim Il Sung pursued his quest 
by subversive means, he likely would have succeeded.  Syngman Rhee’s political party 
had suffered a major defeat in recent South Korean elections, and his regime may well 
have collapsed if Il Sung had bided his time.  When North Korea launched a large scale 
armed invasion (with equipment supplied by the Soviets), the president interpreted it as a 
replay of the 1930s.  Thus, the main reason HST committed the U.S. to war was to stop 
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what he perceived as Soviet expansionism.  Josef Stalin, in Truman’s eyes, had replaced 
Hitler and Mussolini. 
The president had ample reasons to be wary of the Soviet leader.  Even though 
we now know that Kim Il Sung rather than Stalin initiated the invasion, the Soviet could 
have prevented it, yet chose not to.  (In contrast, although Syngman Rhee gladly would 
have attacked North Korea, the U.S. did not allow him to do so.)  Stalin’s willingness to 
unleash Il Sung came as no surprise, given the former’s international behavior during the 
previous decade.  The USSR took control of the Baltic States and parts of Finland in 
1939, followed by Bulgaria and Rumania five years later.  In 1945, the Red Army 
occupied Poland, and Stalin demanded (unsuccessfully) that Turkey give him access to 
the Dardanelles Straits linking the Black Sea to the Mediterranean.  When the Soviet 
leader made his famous speech in 1946 declaring that world war was inevitable as long 
as capitalism existed, it had a profound effect on the U.S., Truman included.  These 
circumstances understandably led the president to jump to the erroneous conclusion that 
Stalin ordered the attack.43 
Another relevant question is whether it was legal for Truman to commit 
American forces to Korea without congressional approval.  Since the U.S. went to war 
under the auspices of the U.N., some background on the implementation of the U.N. 
Charter is in order.  Articles 39 through 43 of the charter deal with breaches of the peace 
(see Appendix A).  They define the steps the Security Council takes to restore 
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international order, leading up to the use of force.  In Article 39, the Security Council 
identifies the act of aggression and makes recommendations on how to respond, while 
Article 40 empowers the Council to call for “provisional measures,” such as cease-fires.  
Article 41 discusses economic and political sanctions.  If the actions of Article 41 are 
ineffective, Article 42 empowers the Security Council to “take such action by air, sea, or 
land forces . . . to maintain or restore international peace and security,” using forces of 
member nations.  Article 43 explains how to implement Article 42.  To provide military 
resources for the U.N., the Security Council and member nations negotiate a “special 
agreement or agreements” to provide “armed forces, assistance and facilities, including 
rights of passage” for the Council to use.  The special agreements delineate the “numbers 
and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location.”  Such agreements 
are “subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective 
constitutional processes.”  In 1945, Truman took pains to assure Congress that he, as 
president, did not intend to circumvent them in these special agreements to commit 
American forces.  As the Senate debated ratification of the charter, HST sent a message 
from the Potsdam Conference to Senate President Pro Tempore Kenneth McKellar (D-
TN) that he would “ask the Congress by appropriate legislation to approve” such special 
agreements.44 
After approving the charter in July 1945, legislators wrestled with implementing 
it.  A key issue was how to reconcile Congress’s constitutional authority to declare war 
with providing American military forces for U.N. usage.  Senator Connally therefore 
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introduced the UNPA bill to integrate the charter with American law.  After a week of 
debate on the Senate floor, both houses approved the bill and sent it to Truman, who 
signed it into law in December 1945.  From the debates, it is clear that Congress 
intended to approve any commitments of American forces to the U.N.  Section 6 of the 
statute (see Appendix B) authorized the president to negotiate the special agreements 
with the Security Council per Article 43.  Congress then had to approve the special 
agreement before the U.N. could use American military resources.  However, once 
Congress endorsed the special agreement, the president did not have to get its approval 
to dispatch forces for an Article 42 situation, so long as the scope of the deployment did 
not exceed the conditions in the special agreement.45 
The intent of Article 43, then, was to provide in advance a contingent of forces 
from member nations approved for use in case the Security Council needed them.  In 
February 1946, the Security Council directed the U.N. Military Staff Committee to make 
recommendations for the special agreements, and the General Assembly subsequently 
asked the Council to “accelerate as much as possible the placing at its disposal of the 
armed forces mentioned in Article 43 of the Charter.”  The committee produced its 
report in late June 1947, but the five permanent Security Council members never came 
to terms on special agreements.  Discussions continued for an additional year, but were 
fruitless, with the Soviets usually at odds with the others.  Thus, when the Korean crisis 
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occurred, no special agreement per Article 43 (or congressional approval to use U.S. 
forces per Section 6 of the UNPA) was in place to provide U.S. forces for an Article 42 
military intervention.46 
The U.N. intervened in Korea based on an Article 39 Security Council 
recommendation rather than an outright U.N. military action declared under Article 42.  
Truman did not publicize this distinction, but it was problematic because the UNPA did 
not mention congressional approval regarding resolutions under Article 39.  The 
president therefore decided he had no need to involve Congress, claiming that the 
Security Council recommendation to assist the South Koreans and his constitutional 
powers as commander in chief justified his actions.47         
A couple of analysts have affirmed the chief executive’s right to go forgo 
congressional approval for disparate reasons.  Historian Ronald Caridi claimed that the 
UNPA permitted Truman to skirt Congress, citing the following portion of Section 6: 
The President shall not be deemed to require the authorization of the 
Congress to make available to the Security Council on its call in order to 
take action under article 42 of said Charter and pursuant to such special 
agreement or agreements the armed forces, facilities, or assistance 
provided for therein: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall be 
construed as an authorization to the President by the Congress to make 
available to the Security Council for such purpose armed forces, facilities, 
or assistance in addition to the forces, facilities, and assistance provided 
for in such special agreement or agreements. 
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Caridi misread the legalities in two ways.  He mistakenly treated the June 27, 1950 
Security Council resolution recommending assistance to South Korea as a special 
agreement discussed in the UNPA.  In addition, Caridi interpreted the above portion of 
the UNPA as allowing the president to bypass Congress when supporting an Article 42 
military action.  This passage actually means that the president does not repeatedly have 
to get congressional approval to dispatch military forces to the U.N., so long as the 
deployment does not exceed the scope of the original special agreement that Congress 
previously approved.48 
Political scientist Edward Keynes also claimed Truman had sound legal footing 
to circumvent Congress.  Keynes argued that the president did not need to declare war 
because World War II was not yet officially over.  (The Japanese peace treaty was 
signed in April 1952.)  Therefore, statutes passed legalizing the American involvement 
in World War II still applied when the Korean fighting erupted.  From a practical 
standpoint, this reasoning is difficult to swallow, since few Americans believed World 
War II was still underway in 1950.  Furthermore, Keynes said that since Truman 
intervened in support of a U.N. resolution, and since the U.N. Charter was a binding 
treaty, he had no need to get a declaration of war from Congress.49 
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More often, analysts have determined that HST violated the Constitution or the 
UNPA in the Korean intervention.  Political scientist Louis Fisher hearkened back to the 
debates over the U.N. Charter.  To help get the charter passed, Dean Acheson, 
Undersecretary of State at the time, assured a House panel, “It is entirely within the 
wisdom of Congress to approve or disapprove whatever special agreement the President 
negotiates” with the Security Council.  Fisher argued that Truman clearly violated the 
substance of the UNPA and ignored its history.  Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. was also critical 
of Truman’s method, if not the decision to intervene.  Schlesinger correctly pointed out 
that the State Department’s report describing eighty-five instances of chief executives 
using force without congressional approval was suspect in that none of them involved a 
military action against another nation.  (Though not officially recognized by the U.N., 
North Korea was a sovereign state for all practical purposes.)  Moreover, all of the 
incidents listed in the report involved military actions of a considerably smaller scope 
than the Korean crisis.  Historian Arnold Offner conceded that during the first days of 
the crisis, Truman did not know how large the U.S. military commitment would be, and 
therefore excuses him for bypassing Congress in the initial commitment of air and naval 
support.  However, when the president received MacArthur’s request for two divisions, 
Offner correctly argued that HST knew he was making a major commitment to Korea 
and therefore should have sought congressional approval immediately.50 
 Why did the administration eschew a congressional endorsement for the war 
effort?  Paradoxically, Truman and Acheson justified their action by citing both support 
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and opposition in Congress.  When Army Secretary Frank Pace asked Truman about 
getting congressional approval, the president replied, “Frank, it's not necessary.  They 
are all with me."  Acheson later affirmed, “We had complete acceptance of the 
President’s policy by everybody on both sides of both houses of Congress.”  They were 
right.  The president’s archenemies, Taft and Wherry, guaranteed that Congress would 
pass a resolution endorsing the military action.  Yet, the administration shied away from 
a resolution, fearing the political lumps they would take during the floor debate.  The 
secretary later said he did not want to answer “ponderous questions” that could have 
“muddled up” Truman’s policy.51 
The administration had plausible reasons for not requesting a formal declaration 
of war from Congress early on.  Noting the possibility of the North Koreans backing 
down upon a show of U.S. force, some suggested that a congressional declaration would 
have rendered such a tactic useless.  A more important reason is that Truman did not 
want to inflame the situation at the outset, fearing that a declaration of war would raise 
the likelihood of drawing the Soviets or the Communist Chinese into the fray.  Another 
justification was that American forces were acting under U.N. authority.  Even though 
U.S. military preparations began before the passage of the Security Council resolutions, 
American forces ultimately acted on behalf of the U.N.  A congressional declaration of 
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war would have been inappropriate for what technically was an international 
peacekeeping operation.52 
Nevertheless, Truman briefly considered seeking Congress’s blessing.  Early in 
the first week of the crisis, the president asked Senator Connally for his opinion 
regarding congressional input.  A few days later, HST directed Acheson to research the 
history of presidential use of military force without Congress’s approval.  Acheson’s list 
of eighty-five precedents did not build a convincing case.  For example, the most recent 
use of force in the State Department report was the dispatch of about 2,800 troops to 
China in 1932 to protect Americans at the International Settlement in Shanghai.  Such 
incidents bore little resemblance to the Korean situation.53  
The State Department’s report, however, reinforced Truman’s belief that he did 
not need a congressional approval of any kind.  His comment at the July 3 meeting 
explaining he “had not been acting as President, but as Commander-in-Chief of our 
forces in the Far East” gave hints about his reasoning.  The Korean crisis was not a war, 
it was a police action enforcing a U.N. directive.  Therefore, a declaration of war was not 
necessary.  Because the U.S. was acting at the behest of the U.N., Truman decided he 
had the constitutional right as commander in chief to deploy American forces as he 
wished.  The president desperately wanted the U.N. to become an effective peacekeeping 
entity.  Moreover, he felt strongly that he should not weaken the office of the 
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Presidency.  As an aide wrote to a Republican senator concerning a congressional 
sanction for the intervention, “It is quite certain that the President would never have 
asked for a resolution.”54 
Truman should have sought some form of congressional approval (other than a 
declaration of war) to commit American forces to Korea.  The president and Acheson 
knew from their experiences with getting the U.N. Charter and the UNPA through 
Congress that it fully expected approve the use of American troops on behalf of the U.N.  
Technically, one could argue that the president acted legally because the Security 
Council did not implement Article 42 in the Korean crisis.  (The UNPA required 
Congress’s approval to send U.S. troops to support an Article 42 intervention, but was 
silent on Article 39 interventions.)  The administration had tried and failed for two years 
to hammer out an Article 43 special agreement with the Security Council.  Truman’s 
intense desire for an effective U.N. response led him to take some short cuts.  Still, it 
was unnecessary to circumvent Congress.  If the administration did not violate the letter 
of the law, it clearly ignored the intent. 
Congress, however, contributed significantly to Truman’s abuse of presidential 
power, a topic that historians to date have not fully investigated.  The legislative branch 
performed weakly in various ways, one of which was failing to show up for work.  The 
tumultuous initial week of the conflict ended on Friday, June 30 with the commander in 
chief’s announcement committing ground troops to Korea.  This was an opportune time 
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for Congress to push the administration to seek legislative endorsement.  Instead, the 
legislature took a weeklong Fourth of July recess, giving the president another reason 
not to consult them.  During the July 3 meeting, Truman indicated he preferred not to 
call Congress back to Washington to discuss Korea.  Presidential counsel Charles 
Murphy later recalled legislators’ antipathy towards special sessions, which may partly 
explain the president’s reluctance to call one.  Congress’s lack of attention to the UNPA 
was a more important factor.  Two-thirds of the senators and 256 of the 439 House 
members were holdovers from the Congress that debated congressional approval of U.S. 
military commitments to the U.N. in 1945.  Most were in office when they approved 
amendments to the UNPA in 1949.  Yet, only Taft seemed to remember the need to 
adhere to this law.  Neither the urgency of the Korean crisis, nor the lack of precedent 
for a U.N. military intervention excuse Congress’s lack of attention to the UNPA.55 
The Republicans could have done more to encourage Truman to seek Congress’s 
approval.  After hearing Truman’s June 27 statement sending air and naval support to 
Korea, Republican Senator Arthur V. Watkins (UT) immediately questioned the legality 
of these actions.  However, he reluctantly accepted Lucas’s defense that the Security 
Council resolution made the president’s action legitimate.  After the war turned sour, 
Watkins published a cogent article explaining the importance of the UNPA.  He could 
have pushed back harder in 1950.  Another Republican remembered the UNPA--later.  
In the aftermath of the MacArthur firing, Senator Karl E. Mundt (SD) pointed out that 
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the U.S. had not adhered to the UNPA or Article 43 at the outset.  Mundt therefore 
argued that the U.S. had the right to push for total victory in Korea regardless of the 
U.N.’s desires.  Although Taft and Wherry, leaders of the Senate Republicans, publicly 
asked the president to consent Congress, most of their colleagues sat on their hands.  
Had the Republicans rallied to their leaders’ cause while professing their support for the 
intervention, HST may have reconsidered his decision.56  
 Mccarthyism was an even larger factor.  While Red Scare fanatics did not drive 
Truman to intervene in Korea, they had a lot to do with his reluctance to seek Congress’s 
approval.  This is the only explanation for why the administration and the Democratic 
leadership paradoxically feared congressional debate on the intervention amidst the 
overwhelming approval on the Hill for going into Korea.  If Congress debated a war 
resolution, Acheson predicted the McCarthyites would rehash recent Far East policy in a 
chorus of “endless criticism.”57   
The Democrats were more culpable than the Republicans because they were 
Truman’s party.  Senator Connally made a mistake on June 26 when he advised HST 
that congressional approval was unnecessary.  Connally was an influential senator in the 
right place at the right time.  Had he advised the president to solicit Congress’s blessing, 
the Democratic leadership could have started the process of obtaining congressional 
approval to commit troops by the end of the week.  In his memoirs, the Texan admitted 
the error, “as a matter of political strategy,” recalling the GOP using the decision against 
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Truman in 1951.  Strangely, he said nothing about the UNPA, which he had introduced 
in 1945, even though the clear intent of the law was to ensure congressional approval 
before committing U.S. forces to U.N. action.  Majority Leader Lucas’s indecisiveness 
during the July 3 meeting could not have given HST much confidence in the Democratic 
leadership obtaining a congressional endorsement.  Had the Democratic leaders told 
Truman he needed Congress’s approval, the president would have had to comply.  While 
Truman deserves the most blame for skirting constitutional checks and balances, the 
Democratic leadership should have steered him towards a wiser path.  Consequently, a 
White House aide wrote that there was “no serious discussion” about a resolution from 
Congress, adding, “There was no strong Congressional leadership to push one 
through.”58     
A final question is whether a congressional sanction of the war at the outset 
would have helped Truman politically when the war turned sour for the U.S.  Hamby 
claimed the political value of a congressional endorsement has been overblown.  He 
argued that the GOP was so keen to usurp Democratic control that they would have 
criticized Truman’s foreign policy harshly during the 1952 election season, even if they 
had approved a declaration of war.  Hamby was right.  While the Republicans may have 
had to temper their attacks on “Truman’s War” had they endorsed it, a congressional war 
resolution would not have saved the president much political grief in 1951-2.  Arnold 
Offner argued that approval from Congress up front could possibly have put the 
legislators in a position to prevent the U.N. from going north of the 38th parallel, or at 
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least forced a debate on it.  This seems unlikely.  The U.N.’s military momentum had 
most Americans in a state of euphoria, including Congress.  The legislative branch was 
as eager to seize an opportunity to roll back Communist expansion as the executive 
branch.  Congressional approval at the outset would have made no difference in 
subsequent war policy.59  
On June 30, 1950, moments after the White House announced the commitment 
of American troops to Korea, Senator John Stennis (D-MS) prophesied, “I believe we 
are creating precedents which will constitute new rules of international law.”  He was 
half-right.  The Eighty-First Congress was helping create new rules of domestic (not 
international) law, allowing presidents to send Americans to war without its consent.  
Congress was perfectly content to let Truman take the heat for the war.  A couple of 
weeks later, a political scientist wrote in the New York Times,  “We seem to have come 
to the point where Americans are willing to accept the President as sole and undisputed 
master of our actions abroad in time of international crisis.  Somehow we have moved a 
long way from the conceptions of ‘checks and balances’ that set some limit to the Chief 
Executive’s role in making war and peace.”  Several members of the administration, 
along with Senator Connally, later expressed regret that they did not work harder to 
persuade HST to obtain Congress’s blessing before going to war.  The disconcerting 
thing about their remorse is that they all focused on the political ramifications of 
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Truman’s bypassing of Congress.  None of them worried about the violation of the spirit 
of American governance.60  
Ironically, the president made several comments during the first weeks of the war 
that demonstrated the dangers of Congress’s passivity.  When asked by an aide about the 
need for a congressional resolution approving the Korean intervention, the commander 
in chief snapped, “It was none of Congress’s business. . .  .  I just did what was in my 
power.”  Yet, he told another staffer, “I sit and shiver . . . at the thought of what could 
happen with some demagogue in this office I hold.”61 
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Hechler, 150-1.  Elsey and Hechler both note Averell Harriiman’s failed attempted to persuade Truman to get a war 
resolution.   
 
61 Congress’s business in Elsey, 195; sit and shiver in Ferrell, ed., Truman in the White House:  The Diary of Eben A. 
Ayers, 357. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
 
CONGRESS AND THE DRIVE FOR PEACE 
 
Korea has become a meat grinder of American manhood.  —Rep. Albert 
Gore, Sr. (D-TN)1 
 
The U.S. exit from the Korean War proved more tedious than its entry.  A year 
after the fighting started, the belligerents began armistice talks at Kaesong.  Tragically, 
the conflict continued for another two years as the two sides jockeyed for a favorable 
settlement.  The Truman administration had to watch from the sidelines as the newly-
elected Eisenhower team ended the fighting in 1953 under the same terms that the 
Democratic regime had doggedly pursued for two years. 
This chapter examines how Congress influenced the attempts to end the war 
during the Truman administration.  Did the legislature simply follow the executive 
branch’s lead in searching for an end to the conflict (as when it acquiesced in Truman’s 
decision to go to war), or did it take a more activist role?  What was the nature of 
congressional efforts to stop the fighting?  Did Congress affect the commander in chief’s 
decisions regarding peace overtures to the Communists?  How did lawmakers manage to 
suggest ways to settle the conflict short of total victory during the heyday of 
McCarthyism?  This chapter reveals congressional proposals ranging from the bizarre to 
the pragmatic to the idealistic as Capitol Hill, like the White House, struggled to 
simultaneously stop the shooting and claim victory over communism. 
                                                 
1 “’Cataclysmic’ U.S. Weapon Reported,” Los Angeles Times, 16 April 1951, p. 1. 
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A couple of congressmen advocated ending the fighting in its early stages.  In 
August 1950, Rep. Charles E. Bennett (D-FL) recommended to Truman that he ask the 
Russians to accept a cease-fire, and to allow the U.N. to station police forces throughout 
the Korean peninsula to oversee free elections.  Bennett, a freshman congressman, 
admitted the proposal was a long shot.  Nevertheless, he was naïve to suggest it, given 
that Soviet refusal to accept such elections had hardened the division of Korea in the first 
place. Later that month, Senator H. Alexander Smith met with Truman foreign policy 
advisor Averell Harriman, suggesting the U.S. should propose peace terms.  Harriman 
rejected the idea, countering that America should pressure lesser U.N. members to make 
such initiatives.  Smith’s idea was nearly as bad as Bennett’s.  With U.N. troops 
struggling to hold onto a small piece of South Korea, Kim Il Sung would not have 
agreed to a cease-fire unless accompanied by his enemy’s surrender.2 
China’s entry into the fray prompted a couple of House members to approach 
Truman with some tactics for exiting the war.  Mao Tse-Tung would have liked both 
plans, had he known of them.  Democrat Frank W. Boykin (AL), a staunch ally of the 
president, advocated the U.S. pull out of Korea to enable it to improve defense of its 
“outer ramparts” of Japan, Formosa and the Philippines.  Boykin reasoned that retreat 
and retrenchment would be less humiliating to the U.S. than caving in to demands for 
U.N. recognition of the Communist Chinese regime in exchange for U.N. control of 
South Korea.  Republican Francis Case (SD) submitted a more involved proposal that 
                                                 
2 Charles E. Bennett to Truman, August 7, 1950 and Truman to Bennett, August 12, 1950; PSF:  General File, B- 1 of 
2, Ba-Bl folder; Truman Papers, HSTL; H.A. Smith, “Memo re Conference H.A.S. & Averell Harriman,” H. 
Alexander Smith Papers, Box 101, Foreign Relations 1950 Averell Harriman folder, SGMML. 
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included abolishment of the U.N. Security Council and setting up an annual system for 
reviewing the admittance of new member nations.  Both of these measures were 
designed to facilitate seating Communist China in the U.N.  Case also wanted to 
withdraw the U.S. fleet from the Straits of Formosa by October 1951, which addressed 
China’s insistence that Korean armistice talks needed to include other regional issues in 
the Far East.  Truman responded politely to both suggestions, then ignored them.3 
The president waited until March 1951 to make his first meaningful peace 
overture.  By the middle of the month, U.N. forces had retaken Seoul and controlled 
most of South Korea.  In the meantime, the U.S. and its allies had planned a diplomatic 
initiative proposing armistice talks before sending the U.N. army north of the 38th 
parallel for a second time.  The administration drafted a statement suggesting a cease-
fire and a willingness to discuss other Far East issues with the combatants once the 
Korean situation was settled.  The Joint Chiefs of Staff had input into the statement and 
passed it along to General MacArthur.  On Friday, March 23, the State Department was 
pushing for the concerned governments to approve the document by the weekend for 
possible issuance “on short notice.”4 
MacArthur, however, torched this olive branch.  The next day, without bothering 
to consult his superiors, the general issued a statement to his battlefield opponents 
                                                 
3 Frank W. Boykin to Admiral Sidney W. Souers, December 5, 1950 and Truman to Boykin, December 8, 1950; PSF:  
General File, Bo-Bz folder and Telegram, Francis Case to President Truman, December 8, 1950; WHCF:  OF 471B, 
Korean Emergency (Dec. 1950-Mar. 1951 folder); all from Truman Papers, HSTL.  By early 1952, Case had reversed 
his conciliatory view towards Communist China, opposing its admittance to the U.N.  See Richard Chenoweth, 
“Francis Case:  A Political Biography,” South Dakota Historical Collections  39 (1978):  367-8. 
 
4 For descriptions of the planned peace overture, see Acheson, Present at the Creation, 518-9, FRUS, 1951, Vol. VII, 
252-264 and William Manchester, American Caesar:  Douglas MacArthur, 1880-1964 (Boston:  Little, Brown and 
Company, 1978), 634.  Quote is from FRUS, 256. 
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offering to discuss ways to end the war.  He also mocked them.  Calling the power of the 
Communist Chinese army “exaggerated,” the U.N. commander declared the enemy did 
not have the means to support a ground war without the “refinements science has 
introduced into the conduct of military campaigns.”  Due to its weakness, MacArthur 
asserted, “The enemy . . . must by now be painfully aware” that an expansion of the U.N. 
war effort would “doom Red China to the risk of imminent military collapse.”  His 
statement alarmed the international community.  India, trying to initiate its own peace 
feelers, termed the statement “fraught with grave consequences.”  The French press was 
“unanimous in its disapproval,” and predicted the statement would bolster the “resolve 
of Peking to continue hostilities.”  On March 29, China unsurprisingly rejected 
MacArthur’s offer.  Amidst concerns from allies and American diplomats abroad, the 
administration had no choice but to shelve its plans to initiate peace talks.5 
As frustration over the stalemate mounted, proposals for peace became more  
bizarre.  In a letter to Truman, Rep. Albert Gore, Sr. (D-TN) proposed putting newly 
developed technology to use by planting radioactive waste between the Koreas, 
producing an “atomic death belt.”  Supposedly, after notifying all belligerents, the U.S. 
would deliberately lace a strip of land across the peninsula with nuclear waste; American 
troops would then re-contaminate it periodically until the U.N. and the Communists 
                                                 
5 Malik’s statement in FRUS, 1951, Vol VII, 265-6 (foreign reaction, 275); Indian reaction in “Nehru Scores 
MacArthur Move,” NYT, 29 March 1951, p. 3; French press in Telegram, Charles Bohlen to Secretary of State, March 
26, 1951; Concerns from other nations in Memorandum of Conversation, Mr.. Campbell (Canadian Embassy) and Mr. 
W. A. Johnson, “President’s Statement on Korea,” March 24, 1951, Telegram no. 1727, Moscow to Secretary of State, 
March 27, 1951,  Telegram no. 1327, New York to Secretary of State, March 26, 1951 and Memorandum of 
Conversation, “Norwegian Inquiry re MacArthur Statement,” March 27, 1951.  All correspondence from SMOF:  
Dept. of State Topical Subseries, Folder 36; Truman Papers, HSTL.  Decision to pigeonhole the proposal in Beisner 
427. 
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hammered out an official agreement to end the war.  Radio broadcasts would warn 
intruders that entering the zone “would mean certain death or slow deformity to all foot 
soldiers.”  As a member of the Appropriations Committee, which allotted funds to the 
Atomic Energy Commission, Gore probably had access to research projects on 
theoretical uses of nuclear material.  His idea was similar to General MacArthur’s 
unpublicized plan for cutting off the Communist Chinese Forces (CCF) from their 
supply lines by planting radioactive waste along the border between Manchuria and 
Korea.  To supplement his “dehumanized belt,” the Tennessee congressman would 
protect Japan from invasion or submarine attack by making available “such variety of 
atomic bombs and other weapons as might be necessary.”6 
Gore’s plan got some attention when he publicized his letter to the president.  
The Los Angeles Times made the proposal a headline story, while the New York Times 
and Washington Post covered it for several days.  Senator Brien McMahon (D-CT), 
chairman of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy and a proponent of 
nuclear weaponry, downplayed the feasibility of the Tennessean’s idea.  However, the 
Army was not as pessimistic.  One report proposed dispersing one pound of nuclear 
material per square mile, and pointed out that, fortunately, such waste was already 
available.  Acknowledging that while no type of warfare was good, the Army said such a 
tactic could be described as having “humane possibilities greater than those of most 
                                                 
6Death belt, slow deformity and atomic bombs in “Atomic Death Belt Urged for Korea,” NYT, 17 April 1951, p. 3; 
radio broadcast in “A Radioactive Belt Across Korea?” NYT, 22 April 1951, p. 157; Gore’s access to research in 
“’Cataclysmic’ U.S. Weapon Reported,” Los Angeles Times,  16 April 1951, p. 1; MacArthur’s similar idea in 
Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (New York:  McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964), 384; Wainstock, 118-119.  It 
is unknown whether Gore’s idea came from MacArthur. 
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other weapons of modern war.”  Telling the president that Korea called for “something 
cataclysmic,” Rep. Gore later asserted that if some called his idea lunacy, “Other people 
think it is crazy to keep swapping American lives for Chinese lives.”7  
Although the administration disregarded Gore’s idea, it soon considered reviving 
a more conventional method for getting a cease-fire.  At an April 24, 1951 meeting, they 
agreed to revise the planned armistice initiative that MacArthur had scuttled because, as 
an aide noted, “The old draft is like damp cotton, you can’t see through it and you can’t 
make anything of it.”  Figuring out a time to use it was a problem, as the CCF had 
launched an offensive two days earlier producing the largest single battle of the war.  
Making a peace offer in the midst of this attack would be perceived as a sign of 
weakness.  Moreover, hopes by American allies that MacArthur’s removal would make 
China more amenable to an armistice turned out to be futile.  Throughout late April, the 
Chinese indicated the general’s firing meant nothing because U.S. policy in Korea had 
not changed.  Even though the Communist offensive subsided at the end of the month, 
the administration did not issue the revised proposal.8 
 The influence of Congress on hopes for peace surfaced briefly in a conversation 
between American and Russian diplomats in early May.  Offering their U.S. counterparts 
a car ride into Manhattan following a meeting, Soviet U.N. representative Jacob Malik 
                                                 
7 Page one attention in “’Cataclysmic’ U.S. Weapon Reported,” 16 April 1951; McMahon, the Army and Gore quoted 
in “Atomic Belt Plan Held Not Feasible,” NYT, 18 April 1951, p. 16.  For other press coverage, see Carey, Frank, 
“Radioactive Zone Across Korea Urged,” Washington Post, 17 April 1951, p. 7; Pearson, Drew, “Atomic Super-
Weapons Reported,” Washington Post, 24 April 1951, p. B15 and NYT articles in note 6. 
 
8 George M. Elsey, “Memorandum for Mr. Murphy,” April 24, 1951; Subject File; Korea-New Peace Proposal, 1951 
folder; Elsey Papers, HSTL.  The April 22-29, 1951 Chinese offensive employed 250,000 soldiers in 27 divisions 
fighting five U.S. Army divisions.  See U.S. Department of Defense Commemoration of 50th Anniversary of the 
Korean War, http://korea50.army.mil/history/chronology/timeline_1951.shtml (September 12, 2007); Discussions of 
the initiative and China’s reaction in FRUS, 1951, Vol. VII, 370, 375, 379. 
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and his alternate engaged them in a freewheeling discourse.  The Americans described 
the Russians as “enjoying a frank exchange of views with two antagonists.”  
Significantly, the Soviets suggested the Korean War could and should be settled via 
discussions between the U.S. and the USSR.  Malik challenged the Americans’ 
insistence that the U.S. wanted peace, noting “speeches of Senators which advocate 
dropping atomic bombs on Moscow.”  Even though the discussion revealed the deep 
mistrust between the superpowers, the State Department interpreted Malik’s openness as 
a possible opportunity for further communications, and sent Soviet expert George 
Kennan to talk more with the ambassador.  Kennan’s work would come to fruition 
several weeks later.9 
Malik’s legitimate concerns notwithstanding, other senators were promoting 
ways to reduce Cold War tensions.  In mid-May, Senate Majority Leader Ernest 
McFarland (AZ) talked with Secretary Acheson about a feature in Cosmopolitan 
magazine.  The publication wanted to do an article on the views of several senators 
concerning how to ensure a peaceful world.  McFarland outlined his own six-point plan 
for the secretary, who had concerns about two of them.  One included, “End the arms 
race by establishing a truce in the rearmament process of the Soviet Union,” and the 
other proposed permanently disarming Germany and Japan.  Acheson grew agitated over 
this, particularly when McFarland turned down his offer to send someone from the State 
Department to “assist” him with his comments for the article.  The secretary worried that 
                                                 
9 FRUS, 1951, Vol. VII, 401-410, 421-2; Malik’s openness as an opportunity in John D. Hickerson, Memorandum for 
Files, May 16, 1951; SMOF:  Dept. of State Topical File Subseries, Negotiations for Armistice, Dec. 1950-June 1951 
folder; Truman Papers, HSTL.  Quotes are from FRUS citation above, 401-402. 
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such a quote from McFarland could be “quite serious.”  Acheson therefore had a State 
Department staffer to make an excuse to see the senator for other business, and then use 
the opportunity to water down the statement.10 
Senator McFarland toed the administration line, but other senators commenting 
in the article did not.  Instead of calling for an end to the arms race, the majority leader 
now suggested an “armament program . . . for police purposes only.”  Rather than 
disarm Japan and Germany, McFarland proposed peace treaties to “insure the 
establishments of free governments.”  Senator Paul Douglas (D-IL), however, called on 
U.N. forces to “complete the liberation of Korea,” an idea the administration had 
abandoned.  In an obvious slap at the Soviet Union, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. (R-MA) 
suggested changing the U.N. charter to enable it to “expel members who want to destroy 
the organization.”  Estes Kefauver (D-TN) declared, “To get peace, we shall have to 
surrender a part of our sovereignty.”  Criticizing the administration for considering his 
measure “too drastic a step,” Kefauver quipped, “They overlook the fact that war is a 
drastic problem demanding a drastic solution.”11   
On May 17, Senator Edwin C. Johnson (D-CO) submitted a resolution outlining 
a peace plan for Korea.  Calling the war a “hopeless conflict of attrition and 
indecisiveness and a breeder of bitter racial hatreds,” he proposed a cease-fire, effective 
on June 25, the first anniversary of the fighting.  U.N. troops were to relocate south of 
                                                 
10 McFarland’s proposal and Acheson quoted in L.D. Battle, untitled note to file, May 14, 1951; Memoranda of 
Conversations File, May 1951 folder; Acheson Papers, HSTL.  Additional discussion in James E. McMillan, ed., The 
Ernest W. McFarland Papers:  The United States Senate Years, 1940-1952 (Prescott, AZ:  Sharlot Hall Museum 
Press, 1995), 285. 
 
11 “Can We Keep the Peace?” Cosmopolitan, August 1951, 32-5, 120-1. (Emphasis added.)     
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the 38th parallel, with the Communists moving north of the parallel.  Johnson called for 
all non-Koreans to leave the peninsula, and for an exchange of all prisoners by the end of 
the year.  The Coloradoan justified his suggestion by arguing that there was “no way to 
keep the limited war with China from developing into a full-scale war.”12 
Johnson’s resolution was a reversal of his views on the conflict.  A month earlier, 
he had called MacArthur’s firing a “tragic development,” presumably because he agreed 
with the general’s desire to expand the war.  Four months after he submitted his peace 
proposal, the Coloradoan reversed field again.  Asking why the U.S. did not use “these 
fantastically ferocious lethal weapons,” the senator dismissed the dangers of nuclear war, 
claiming that the possibility of Soviet retaliation was “too absurd to consider.”13 
Initially, Senator Johnson’s peace initiative seemed irrelevant.  The Senate did 
not debate it at all, referring it to the Foreign Relations Committee, which tabled it.  The 
major U.S. newspapers barely mentioned it.  Most of the political world probably 
dismissed the resolution as pie in the sky posturing by a reactionary isolationist.  The 
editor of the Denver Post did not doubt the senator’s sincerity, but called his idea a 
“proposal of despair” from “Colorado’s senior ostrich.”14 
                                                 
12 Hopeless conflict in S. Res. 140, May 17, 1951; SMOF:  Dept. of State Topical Subseries, Negotiations for an 
Armistice, Dec. 1950-June 1951 folder; Truman Papers, HSTL; no way to keep in “Sen. Johnson Believes Cease-Fire 
Order Will Be Issued June 25 To End Conflict,” Pueblo Star Journal and Chieftain, 28 May 1951, p. 6; Johnson’s 
speech accompanying the resolution in CR, 82nd Cong., 1st sess., pt. 4, May 17, 1951:  5424. 
 
13Tragic development in Nover, Barnet, “Big Ed Disappointed By Truman’s Action,” Denver Post, 11 April 1951, p. 
2; fantastically ferocious in “Big Ed Demands U.S. Use New Arms in Korea,” Denver Post, 9 September 1951, p. 
14A; too absurd in “Use of Atomic Arms in Korea Is Urged by Senator Johnson,” Washington Evening Star, 5 
November 1951, p. A3. 
 
14 Press coverage discussed in Rees, 261; Example of scant coverage is “For Halt in Korean War,” NYT, 18 May 1951, 
p. 3; “Back in the Sand With Big Ed,” Denver Post, 18 May 1951, p. 18.  The Washington Post did not mention 
Johnson’s proposal in its May 18, 1951 issue. 
 
  
283
However, the proposal leapt into prominence two days later.  Pravda, the 
Communist party newspaper in Russia, covered the resolution extensively, printing its 
entire contents, and it drew coverage by local radio.  (Coincidentally, the CCF had 
launched a new offensive in Korea the same day that Johnson entered his resolution.)  
The Soviet paper suggested the proposal indicated some American leaders were 
“beginning to realize that Wall Street’s gamble in Korea is hopeless.”  The New York 
Times noted this was the first peace initiative by the U.S. published by the Soviet press 
in quite awhile.  Two Communist newspapers in Vienna also printed the resolution, one 
running a “Cease-Fire In Korea, June 25” headline.  Marxist dailies in the West, such as 
the New York Daily Worker took notice, running the story on its front page for almost a 
week.15 
The Communist coverage of the Johnson resolution attracted the attention of the 
non-communist world.  A news story from London reported that the senator’s proposal 
apparently sparked a sudden concession by Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet representative 
at a meeting of deputy foreign ministers.  The State Department voiced concern that the 
plan did not provide for supervision of the cease-fire or troop withdrawals, and Secretary 
Acheson felt it important enough to mention in a report to the U.S. United Nations 
contingent.  While the State Department noted no new peace gestures from the 
Communists, they resurrected the possibility of submitting a revised version of 
                                                 
15Soviet press coverage described in:  Telegram, Dept. of State to USUN, Circular #728, May 22, 1951; SMOF:  Dept. 
of State Topical File Subseries, Negotiations for an Armistice, Dec. 1951-June 1951 folder;  Truman Papers, HSTL 
and Alsop, Stewart, “Our Korean Objectives Decided,” Washington Post, 27 May 1951, p. B5.  Pravda quoted in 
“Russians Play Up Johnson Peace Bid,” NYT, 21 May 1951, p. 6.  “Pravda Prints Peace Bid by Senator of Colorado,” 
NYT, 20 May 1951, p. 8 notes this was the first U.S. peace initiative published since World War II.  “Reds’ Interest in 
Korea Armistice Plan Heartens Sen. Ed Johnson,” The Rocky Mountain News, 28 May 1951, p. 3 notes coverage by 
the Daily Worker. 
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Truman’s March 1951 peace initiative to the U.N. once the new CCF offensive ended.  
Acheson also indicated a willingness to discuss seating Communist China in the U.N. 
provided it was not linked with a Korean settlement.  Western diplomats in Moscow 
speculated that Soviet interest in Johnson’s resolution could be “significant.”  Moreover, 
the proposal reportedly “stirred interest” at the U.N.  India’s representative, Sir Benegal 
N. Rau, said the plan motivated him to remind the General Assembly of General 
Matthew Ridgeway’s earlier comment that it would be a “tremendous victory“ for the 
war to end with U.N. forces controlling the ROK to the 38th parallel.  Once the U.N. 
weathered the May 17-22 offensive, journalist Stewart Alsop speculated that the 
Communist reaction to the senator’s plan could be a step towards a cease-fire.  Warren 
Austin, U.S. ambassador to the U.N., prepared an alternative proposal to Johnson’s that 
called for U.N. troops to stop pursuing the Communists upon reaching the 38th parallel.  
He reasoned that if the Chinese and North Koreans wanted peace, they would stop 
shooting as well.  Unlike Johnson’s idea, Austin suggested that the U.S. remain in the 
South long enough to train and arm ROK troops, continuing air reconnaissance of the 
North.  Senator Ralph Flanders (R-VT) aired his views on the Coloradoan’s resolution, 
worrying that the Communists might prevail in reunification elections held shortly after 
withdrawal of foreign troops.  Instead, he said the U.N. should rebuild North and South 
Korea before holding elections to improve the odds of keeping Korea in the “anti-
communist camp.”16 
                                                 
16 London story in “Big Ed and Russia Start Peace Rumors Flying in West Europe,” The Rocky Mountain News, 21 
May 1951, p. 3; supervision of cease-fire in Kuhn, Ferdinand, “Safeguards Against New Attack Asked,” Washington 
Post,  24 June 1951, p. M1; mention of Johnson proposal to U.N. representatives and seating of Communist China in 
Acheson to U.S. representatives to U.N., May 22, 1951; SMOF:  Dept. of State Topical File Subseries, Negotiations 
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Others took notice of the Johnson initiative.  Activists from the Denver Peace 
Council slipped into the audience at an international affairs forum sponsored by the 
Democratic Party and asked Averell Harriman about the proposal.  Harriman responded 
that there was “no indication” of a cease-fire desire by the Communists.  When the 
meeting broke up, the Peace Council members passed out leaflets urging the Democratic 
National Committee to endorse the resolution.  A few days later, the leadership of the 
Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers Union sent a telegram to Senator Tom Connally asking 
for quick action on Johnson’s plan, calling it an “honorable method whereby war in 
Korea can be halted.”17 
Surprisingly, given the McCarthyist atmosphere of the time, Senator Johnson 
refused to shy away from the Communist press’s embrace of his resolution.  Brushing 
aside criticisms of his proposal as appeasement, he called Russian media coverage a 
“great opportunity” because it was a sign of Soviet interest.  He was one of few 
politicians publicly questioning the wisdom of demanding the absolute capitulation of an 
enemy that had not been totally routed.  The senator blamed slogans like “unconditional 
surrender” and “no separate peace” for dividing the Allies after World War II, and 
believed the U.S. should not repeat the error regarding Korea.  In a nation-wide 
broadcast on NBC, Johnson said that no interest group drove the initiative; he had come 
                                                                                                                                                
for an Armistice, Dec. 1950-June 1951 folder; Truman Papers, HSTL; significant in “Russians Play Up Johnson Peace 
Bid”; stirred interest and Ridgeway quote in Frye, William R., “Rau Asks UN Peace Offer With Partition of Korea,” 
Christian Science Monitor, 19 May 1951, p. 1; Alsop, “Our Korean Objectives Decided”; Austin proposal in FRUS, 
Vol. VII, 1951, 451; Ralph Flanders, “Broadcast for Vermont Stations- Week of June 16, 1951,” Box 152, Flanders 
Papers, SUL. 
 
17 “Harriman Questioned on Big Ed’s Peace Plan,” Denver Post, 25 May 1951, p. 3; telegram quoted in “Union Backs 
Big Ed In Peace Program,” Rocky Mountain News, 30 May 1951, p. 12. 
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up with the idea himself.  He contrasted the Communist coverage with that of most U.S. 
newspapers, accusing the latter as treating his resolution as a “hot potato.”  Perhaps 
some of them shared the sentiments of a South Korean diplomat, who called Johnson 
“absurd beyond imagination—like a daydreamer.”18    
Speculation about a cease-fire quickened in late May and early June.  Thomas J. 
Hamilton of the New York Times reported on a Soviet offer to negotiate with the U.S. for 
peace based on the division of the peninsula before the war started.  Hamilton noted that 
this gesture was consistent with the recent Communist rhetoric about the Johnson 
resolution.  Although Jacob Malik’s spokesman denied the offer, other diplomats 
confirmed its legitimacy and speculated that Soviet officials backed away due to China’s 
irritation at the peace feeler.  In a radio address sponsored by the U.N., Canadian foreign 
minister Lester Pearson declared that the scope of the war was limited to restoring South 
Korea, and did not require complete destruction of the enemy.  Similarly, U.N. 
Secretary-General Trygve Lie said a cease-fire based on a boundary near the 38th parallel 
would satisfy the resolutions of the summer of 1950, ignoring the October 1950 
resolution authorizing the advance of U.N forces into North Korea to reunify the 
peninsula.  Responding to these and other rumors, the State Department, in Acheson’s 
words, “cast about like a pack of hounds searching for a scent.”19 
                                                 
18 Great opportunity and slogans quoted in “Reds’ Interest in Korea Armistice Plan,” Rocky Mountain News, 28 May 
1951, p. 3; hot potato in Nover, Barnet, “Big Ed Claims Wide Support For Peace Plan,” Denver Post, 26 May 1951, p. 
1; “Korean Envoy Calls Johnson ‘Daydreamer’,” Rocky Mountain News, 31 May 1951, p. 11.  Johnson made a valid 
point about American print media coverage.  Major publications such as the New York Times, Chicago Tribune, 
Washington Post, Time and Newsweek ignored his May 26, 1951 national address.  The Los Angeles Times mentioned 
it briefly.  See “Senator Pushes War Anniversary Armistice Plan,” Los Angeles Times, 28 May 1951, p. 4.   
  
19 Hamilton, Thomas J.,  “Soviet Proposal to Discuss Truce in Korea is Revealed,” NYT, 24 May 1951, p. 1 and 
Hamilton, “Soviet Denies Move for Peace in Korea,” NYT, 29 May 1951, p. 1; Pearson and Lie in Rees, 261-2; rumors 
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Meanwhile, George Kennan met informally with Malik on May 31 and June 5.  
Although Kennan was not officially attached to the U.S. government at the time, his 
status as a Soviet expert coaxed the Russian to open up a bit on the Korean issue.  Malik 
said his government wanted peace in Korea “at the earliest possible moment,” but felt 
his government should not be directly involved in armistice talks because it was not 
involved in the fighting.  He recommended that the U.S. approach the North Koreans 
and Chinese Communists.  In his reports to the State Department, Kennan worried that 
although the USSR did not want war, they also had a “mortal apprehension” about the 
specter of American troops in Manchuria or on the Korea-Soviet border.  The Soviet 
guru warned, “The hour of Soviet action, in the absence of a cessation of hostilities in 
Korea, may be much closer than we think.”20 
Privately, the administration did not share Kennan’s belief that Malik wanted 
peace.  Shortly thereafter, Truman met with Acheson and Secretary of Defense George 
Marshall on “a most important matter.”  From the meeting, the president surmised that 
Soviet weariness of the Korean situation had made them “want to quit.”  Yet, his 
reaction was, “Well, we’ll see.”  A day after the Kennan-Malik meetings concluded, the 
State Department vented its frustrations internally in an open letter to the Russian: 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                
in Leviero, Anthony, “Acheson Unaware of Talks,” NYT, 3 June 1951; Acheson quoted in Acheson, Present at the 
Creation, 532.   
 
20 FRUS, Vol. VII, 1951, 507-511, 536-8.  
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“Rumors of Peace in Korea” (excerpts) 
 
Somebody has started these peace rumors . . . but who?  This time 
they can’t accuse the Western powers of starting them.  For—on this 
issue, peace—we have never dealt in rumors.  Our cards are on the table.  
We have put it on the line every time.  We want peace, and, what’s more, 
we’re not ashamed of wanting it. 
But there are, perhaps, other people who are a little bit ashamed of 
it. 
Ahhh Mr. Malik, dear Mr. Malik, no one could ever accuse you of 
starting such rumors.  You would not be ashamed of it, would you?  
You’d never beat around the bush, would you?  You’d never deal under 
the table, would you?  Of course not. . . .  
Then why don’t you say it?  Straight out!  The one word the 
whole world is waiting for.  Speak up like a man.  Gain yourself honor.  
Cover your nation with glory.  Speak, Mr. Malik.  Speak! . . . 
We know who can stop the war.  Stalin! . . .  
So I’m writing him a letter. . . .My message is simple: . . . Stop the 
killing!”21  
 
Finally, Malik spoke.  The Soviet proceeded to make a key diplomatic move that 
helped trigger the armistice talks.  In a radio address broadcast throughout the U.S. on 
June 23, the Russian called for a cease-fire and a peace based upon withdrawal of forces 
from the 38th parallel.  The significance of Malik’s remarks, however, lay in what he did 
not say.  The Soviet dropped previous requirements that all foreign troops must leave 
Korea, that the U.N. must seat Communist China, and its demand for the transfer of 
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Formosa to Mao.  The speech attracted significant media and diplomatic attention in the 
U.S.22 
Congressional response to Malik’s address varied.  Senator William Jenner (R-
IN) criticized the initiative as reminiscent of the Yalta agreement and Defense Secretary 
Marshall’s failed attempt to reconcile the Chinese civil war a few years earlier.  The 
Russian’s “mock-peace terms” were repulsive because they played upon humanity’s 
natural desire to stop the bloodletting.  Democrat Walter George (GA) complained that 
the proposal would not reunify the peninsula.  Senator Harry P. Cain (R-WA) declared 
that the U.N. should reject appeasement and attack the enemy “with everything we’ve 
got” until the two sides reached a peace satisfying to the U.S.  Eugene Millikin, chair of 
the Senate Republican conference, said Malik’s initiative sounded “completely false to 
me.”23 
A more prevalent reaction in Congress was guarded optimism, sometimes from 
surprising sources.  Senators James Kem (MO) and Bourke Hickenlooper (IA), 
consistently harsh administration critics, were willing to give the Soviet peace feeler a 
chance.  Kem, while cautioning against appeasement, said the U.S. should “examine 
carefully any approach that has the possibility of leading to an honorable peace.”  
Speculating on whether Malik intended for the Chinese to pull out their troops, 
Hickenlooper expressed concern if withdrawal meant “only that they back away 10 feet 
                                                 
22 Importance of Russian move in Rosemary Foot, A Substitute for Victory:  The Politics of Peacemaking at the 
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from the thirty-eighth parallel,” but added that if China did withdraw, “I don’t think we 
should hesitate” to reciprocate.  House Minority Leader Joseph Martin, Jr. (MA), a 
MacArthur ally, said he wanted to hear more about the Soviet’s intentions.24 
Other legislators from both parties responded to the Malik speech cautiously.  
Rep. Mike Mansfield (D-MT) recommended following up on the proposal, stressing the 
need to ensure South Korea’s security and, unrealistically, the withdrawal of Communist 
troops from all of Korea.  GOP senator Zales M. Ecton (MT), anticipating that the 
Russian probably would not be coming forward with additional detail, nevertheless 
urged the administration to follow up on the Soviet gesture.  Rep. Chet Holifield (D-
CA), a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, offered the most prescient advice.  
Suggesting that the U.S. explore Malik’s offer, Holified advised caution because the 
offer did not come from China.  Senator Lyndon Johnson (D-TX) indicated the wariness 
of many of his colleagues, saying his initial reaction was to “beware of any wolves 
parading in the clothing of peace.”25 
Some of Truman’s strongest allies on Capitol Hill were more bullish on the 
Soviet’s address.  Senator Brien McMahon (D-CT), after expressing concerns about 
previous dealings with Malik, added, “This country will never slam the door on any 
efforts to negotiate an honorable peace.”  Democratic Senator Theodore Green (RI) 
publicly echoed McMahon’s cautious optimism, saying Malik’s offer merited “careful 
consideration” from the U.N., despite suspicions that it was “only a political move.”  
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While Green declared the U.S. had an obligation to avoid demonstrating “any apparent 
unwillingness” to end the war, he added that the country should accept “peace based on 
the removal of the causes which brought about the war.”  Privately, some of the 
president’s supporters were less inhibited about endorsing the Malik initiative.  Tom 
Connally told Acheson the U.S. should carefully scrutinize the proposal and “not turn it 
down cold.”  Rep. John A. Blatnik (D-MN) urged Truman to accept a cease-fire at the 
38th parallel because there was no hope for an absolute victory.  Blatnik worried that the 
conflict could expand into another world war at huge human and financial costs, and told 
the president not to worry about the “political shysters and demagogues” who were 
calling him an appeaser.  The Minnesotan, a combat soldier in World War II, declared, 
“War is a form of insanity.”26       
The Truman administration responded to Malik’s speech guardedly.  A State 
Department press release expressed a willingness to talk peace, but also noted, “The 
tenor of Mr. Malik’s speech again raises the question as to whether this is more than 
propaganda.”  Admiral Alan G. Kirk, the U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union, was 
more optimistic.  In a message to Acheson, Kirk called the address a “significant new 
turn” in the Russians’ approach to Korea, and recommended following up on “any 
element of sincerity” in Malik’s communication.  Truman apparently delayed releasing 
advance press copies of his scheduled June 25 speech in Tullahoma, Tennessee due to 
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the Soviet offer (presumably, to revise his remarks).  The president’s address conveyed 
wariness, saying the U.S. should “always keep the door open” to peace, but insisted a 
cease-fire had to be a “real settlement.”  A few days later, HST told an aide he was “not 
too optimistic,” quipping that Malik’s sudden unavailability to the press might mean that 
the Soviet was “in the doghouse with the Kremlin.”27 
So Truman followed up six days after Malik’s speech with action.  Secretary 
Acheson notified congressional leaders of foreign affairs committees that the 
administration had authorized U.N. commander General Matthew Ridgeway to discuss 
armistice terms with his Communist counterpart.  The proposal included a cease-fire 
around the 38th parallel and establishment of a demilitarized zone (DMZ).  Acheson 
attempted to quell concerns such as that of Rep. Charles Eaton (R-PA), who was 
convinced that the Malik speech was a trick.  The White House press corps noted that 
some on Capitol Hill were already grumbling that peace under such terms would 
constitute appeasement.28   
Senator Flanders seemed to approve of the administration’s response, but still 
used the occasion to give it a strong dose of criticism.  A tireless proponent of peace, 
Flanders acknowledged Truman’s “cautious acceptance” of Malik’s proposal.  
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Nevertheless, with the MacArthur hearings winding down, the Vermonter could not 
resist pointing out the administration’s decision to have military commanders in the field 
(rather than governments) negotiate an armistice.  Flanders argued that MacArthur had 
advocated the same approach and Truman had fired him; however, the senator failed to 
remind his audience that the general’s statement was unauthorized and threatened China 
with annihilation. Moreover, Flanders took Acheson to task for not admitting sooner that 
the secretary had changed his mind about trying to reunify Korea through military 
conquest.  Recalling his unsuccessful attempts to pin Acheson down on the issue during 
the MacArthur hearings, the senator likened Acheson to God’s description in the book of 
Job of people who “darkeneth counsel by words without knowledge”  Despite his 
vengeful ramblings, Flanders touched on a valid point:  Malik had seized the initiative in 
the quest for peace.  The Vermonter noted that had the U.N. made the first move, 
perhaps including his idea to rebuild the peninsula, they could have “put the 
Communists on the spot.”  As recently as two weeks earlier, the administration had been 
revising drafts of its aborted March peace initiative.  The Soviets, however, beat them to 
the punch.29 
The Communist Chinese responded curiously to Malik’s speech.  While they 
knew about the Soviet peace feelers of the past several weeks, the Russians did not give 
their Chinese comrades advance notice about the address.  Thus, Communist China did 
not broadcast Malik’s offer locally until June 29, the same day that Ridgeway broadcast 
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the U.N. armistice proposal.  Interestingly, when China publicized the Russian’s 
initiative, they also included the details of Senator Edwin Johnson’s May 17 resolution.  
The Johnson proposal differed from the U.N.’s because he called for withdrawal of all 
foreign troops from Korea and a full exchange of prisoners, regardless of whether the 
POW’s wanted to go home or not.  These points of the Johnson resolution foreshadowed 
China’s negotiating position once the talks began.30 
On July 1, the Communist Chinese agreed to begin armistice negotiations within 
a couple of weeks.  A few congressional figures expressed hopefulness.  Senator 
Connally said he was happy about the possibility of peace.  Senate Minority Leader 
Wherry echoed Connally’s pleasure, provided the terms had “positively no 
appeasement.”  Most members of Capitol Hill interviewed on the subject gave either 
noncommittal or negative comments.  House Speaker Rayburn preferred to wait before 
giving his views.  Senator Taft was suspicious because the Communists did not want to 
begin the cease-fire immediately, and complained, “Rather than punishment, it looks like 
a reward for aggression.”  Senator Pat McCarran (D-NV) declared he had “no 
confidence in that Communist group,” insisting (erroneously) that the U.N. would be 
negotiating with the Soviets rather than the Chinese, making the process more difficult.  
Senator Karl Mundt (R-SD) expressed his hope that the talks would be a “prelude to 
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peace.”  Unfortunately, he prefaced his remark by warning the public of  “possible 
Trojan horse tactics by the Russian bear.”31       
Shortly thereafter, a new peace initiative spearheaded by Senator Brien 
McMahon rose to the forefront.  McMahon seemed an unlikely proponent for such a 
cause.  A co-chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, the senator promoted 
himself as “Mr. Atom,” once declaring Hiroshima “the greatest event in world history 
since the birth of Jesus Christ.”  At times, he seemed to feel that there was no way to 
avoid eventual war with the Soviets, and expressed no qualms about the prospect of 
nuclear conflict.  Nevertheless, in early 1951, McMahon began crafting a “friendship 
resolution” directed at the Russian people, seeing it as part of a “great moral crusade for 
peace akin  . . . to the Fourteen Points and the Four Freedoms.”32 
The Connecticut senator’s resolution sought to counter a Russian “peace 
offensive.”  In March 1950, a series of international conferences promoting world peace 
and a ban on the use of atomic weapons culminated in Stockholm, Sweden.  
Communists from around the world dominated these meetings, with French Communist 
Frederic Joliot-Curie chairing the permanent committee of the World Peace Congress.  
In Sweden, Joliot-Curie’s group began circulating a petition around the globe demanding 
a ban on nuclear weapons.  By August 1950, over 273 million people had signed the 
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petition, some one-eighth of the world’s population.  Eighty-six percent of the signatures 
came from the Soviet bloc and China.  However, 1.4 million people in the U.S. also 
signed the petition, or one out of every 111 Americans, a quantity much larger than the 
estimated number of Communists in the nation.  As one journalist noted, the timing of 
the U.S. intervention in Korea “caught the United States in about as tight a propaganda 
trap as any it has fallen into in the post-war years.”  Senator McMahon crafted his own 
call for peace to neutralize the “spurious but unprecedentedly successful Stockholm 
Petition.”33 
The friendship resolution took over six months to come to fruition.  McMahon 
did his homework, lobbying the Foreign Relations Committee and involving the White 
House in the preparation.  On February 8, 1951, the senator submitted the first version 
from the Senate, endorsed by twenty-two of his colleagues.  The co-sponsors included 
nine Republicans, giving the resolution bipartisan clout, particularly since they included 
Foreign Relations Committee members Alexander Wiley and H. Alexander Smith.  The 
resolution, lengthily titled, “A Declaration of Friendship from the American People to 
All the Peoples of the World, Including the Peoples of the Soviet Union,” sought to 
assure the world that the U.S. was not a warmongering nation.  It expressed regret over 
the “artificial barriers” separating the American people from their Russian counterparts 
and ended with a challenge for the Soviet government to share the resolution with its 
citizens.  Commending the bill to the Senate, McMahon noted that the USSR was calling 
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the U.S. “atomic barbarians,” and said it was a “great tragedy that the Communists have 
stolen the word peace from the free nations of the world.”34 
 Rep. Abraham Ribicoff, a fellow Connecticut legislator, sponsored the House 
version of the bill on the same day.  A bipartisan group of eight representatives co-
sponsored the measure with Ribicoff, and the friendship resolutions enjoyed favorable 
press coverage from across the nation.  Like McMahon, Ribicoff took the moral high 
ground, noting, “Spiritual power and not material power—is the key to the world’s 
ills.”35 
The State Department strongly supported the friendship resolution.  Responding 
to a request from the Senate Foreign Committee for an analysis of the bill, Secretary 
Acheson expressed a “most sympathetic interest” in the proposal.  Acheson had his 
department help reconcile the House and Senate versions of the bill, consulting with 
McMahon and Ribicoff for their input.  The legislators suggested that the department 
“tone down” the overall critiques of the Soviet government while adding details on past 
instances when it had kept its people in the dark about U.N. activities.  Acheson agreed 
to the changes and generated a four-page evaluation of the McMahon-Ribicoff bill for 
Foreign Relations Committee chairman Tom Connally, which the New York Times 
printed in its entirety.  The secretary expressed pleasure that the resolution clarified that 
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Americans would “not sell our souls” to end war, by insisting on a peace based on 
“moral principles.”36 
Progress on combining the McMahon and Ribicoff resolutions into a joint bill 
slowed considerably following Acheson’s March 20 assessment.  The full Senate did not 
approve its bill until May 4.  Things went worse in the lower chamber.  The full House 
did not vote on Ribicoff’s resolution until a month after the Senate did.  Moreover, only 
43 of 433 representatives showed up for the vote, passing it 36-7.  Many felt the failure 
to make a quorum call to get more members onto the floor for the vote was a mistake.  
While there was widespread support in the House for the bill, the low turnout sent a 
negative message to the world, which was not helpful with a measure designed to 
combat Soviet propaganda.  One Democrat attributed the poor turnout to everyone’s 
belief that the resolution would pass easily.  Nevertheless, referring to American radio 
broadcasts beyond the Iron Curtain, he conceded the vote was “hard to explain on the 
Voice of America.”37 
Despite the vote, the House incorporated a couple of substantial changes into the 
final joint resolution that Truman signed into law.  Both amendments toughened the bill.  
One asserted Congress’s policy to “exert maximum efforts to obtain agreements to 
provide the United Nations with armed forces.”  Another, referring to the “artificial 
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barriers” between the American and Soviet people, suggested,  “The Soviet government 
could advance the cause of peace immeasurably by removing those artificial barriers, . . . 
permitting the free exchange of information.”  Finally, on July 6, President Truman 
invited McMahon and Ribicoff to the White House for a signing ceremony celebrating 
the peace initiative.  Jacob Malik was so impressed he sailed out of New York Harbor to 
begin a two-month vacation.38 
It is not clear from the historical record why it took Congress and the president 
over five months to pass the friendship resolution.  One possibility was that they treated 
it as a low priority.  Although the bill began its trek from Capitol Hill to the White 
House in the midst of the Great Debate over U.S. troop deployments to Europe, the 
Congress and the State Department acted promptly on the bill during February and 
March.  A more likely explanation for the delay was MacArthur’s torpedoing of the 
administration’s peace efforts in late March.  With the White House shelving its plans to 
offer armistice talks to the Communists, it is likely that Truman’s team quietly put the 
brakes on McMahon-Ribicoff for a couple of months.  The momentum toward armistice 
talks that reappeared in May probably encouraged lawmakers and the president to revive 
the friendship message to the Soviet people. 
The official transmittal of the McMahon-Ribicoff resolution to the USSR 
government happened swiftly.  Truman, however, did not approach this communication 
haphazardly.  Noting press speculation that the Democrats might propose an official 
congressional endorsement of the impending armistice talks for political reasons, the 
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president was not enthused about McMahon’s plans to deliver a speech extolling the 
administration’s peace efforts on the day of the bill-signing.  “This is a very delicate 
matter,” HST told his staff, “and if those fellows up on the Hill start making speeches 
they’ll blow the whole thing out of the water.”  The senator did not make his address, 
probably due to White House concerns.  An aide noted, “The President does not feel that 
this is a time for Congressional action, or a time for Congressional consultation.”  With 
the legislators under control, the White House dispatched the McMahon-Ribicoff 
resolution to the Soviet Union two hours after Truman signed it.39   
The administration sent the declaration to Soviet president Nikolay Shvernik 
under a cover letter from President Truman.  In the spirit of McMahon’s hope that the 
message would be “an extremely effective weapon in the battle for the minds of men,” 
the first and last paragraphs of Truman’s letter urged Shvernik to release the resolution 
to the Soviet public.  The commander in chief pointed out, “We shall never be able to 
remove suspicion and fear as potential causes of war until communication is permitted to 
flow, free and open, across international boundaries.”  However, the president’s message 
did not include something McMahon and Ribicoff suggested:  an invitation for Stalin to 
come to the U.S. to confer with HST.  The Voice of America broadcasted the letter and 
accompanying resolution twice each hour for three days.  Truman now waited to see 
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how the USSR would respond to his dare to communicate a message of peace from the 
U.S. to the Soviet people.40 
The McMahon-Ribicoff resolution attracted significant attention in the U.S.   
After Undersecretary of State Dean Rusk gave a speech on China policy voicing 
surprisingly staunch support for the Nationalists, he asserted he was simply expressing 
American support for the Chinese people as the friendship resolution had for the Russian 
populace.  The New York Times endorsed the proposal, and Senator McFarland 
publicized it as a significant accomplishment of the 82nd Congress.  More than anyone 
else, McMahon kept the initiative in the public eye.  In a speech to the International 
Federation of War Veterans Organizations eleven days after transmittal of the peace 
message, he blasted the USSR for failing to release it to the Soviet people.  As a product 
from his bill, the Connecticut senator suggested exchange visits between Russian and 
American veterans as a pathway to peace.  A couple of weeks later, he kept the 
friendship resolution alive in a speech on the Senate floor chastising USSR inaction.  
Mocking Soviet president Shvernik’s lack of response and figurehead status, McMahon 
posed a series of sarcastic questions:  “Where is the man hiding? . . .  Has Mr. Shvernik 
been liquidated? . . .  Has he won . . . a one-way ticket to the salt mines of Siberia?” The 
senator added a new challenge, offering to send a congressional delegation to the Soviet 
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Union to deliver its message of goodwill personally.  McMahon declared, “The Kremlin 
crowd has been caught without an answer.”41 
Shvernik broke his silence.  On August 6, the Soviet president released a 
personal response to Truman’s challenge accompanied by a resolution from the USSR’s 
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.  Using similar language to the McMahon-Ribicoff 
resolution, Shvernik declared that the Soviet people had “no basis for doubting that the 
American people also do not want war.”  He blamed tensions on forces in the U.S. which 
were “striving to unleash a new world war” for “their own enrichment.”  The 
presidium’s lengthy message primarily was a litany of American diplomatic offenses 
against the Russians.  Nevertheless, it noted, “It goes without saying that one can only 
welcome the approach of the Congress . . . for the strengthening of friendly relations 
between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.”  The substantive response of the letter reiterated 
Soviet demands for a Five Power peace pact to reduce the arms race, a position the U.S. 
had consistently opposed because it favored the U.N. as the proper forum for such 
issues.  Shvernik released his response, along with the McMahon-Ribicoff resolution and 
Truman’s cover letter, to the Soviet press simultaneously.  For the first time since World 
War II, the people of the USSR had heard a message from an American president.42 
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Shvernik’s response to the friendship resolution did not impress the Truman 
administration.  Although the State Department called the Kremlin’s answer “a step 
forward,” and expressed pleasure that the Russians had “finally seen fit” to communicate 
American goodwill to the Soviet public, Secretary Acheson publicly and bluntly 
declared he was skeptical that it signified a change in Soviet policy.  Again rejecting the 
call for a Five Power agreement, the State Department called the counter-proposal a 
“propaganda trap.”  When an aide brought HST a copy of Shvernik’s letter, the president 
quickly scanned it, then tossed it back to his underling, snorting, “Bunkum.”43 
Some shared the administration’s skepticism.  Rep. Ribicoff said the Russian 
response fell “far short“ of answering his friendship resolution, while Senate minority 
leader Kenneth Wherry said it “should not be taken at its face value.”  His adversary 
across the aisle agreed, as majority leader Ernest McFarland warned the American 
people not to be “deceived by the current peace drive of the Kremlin.”  A State 
Department analysis indicated that the non-Communist Western European press gave 
much more attention to Shvernik’s response than to Truman’s initial letter, regarding the 
former as “almost universally regarded . . . with suspicion.”  The executive council of 
the American Federal of Labor (AFL) called the Five Power proposal a “Trojan horse.”44 
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Yet, others perceived the Soviet response more optimistically.  Edward Morgan 
of CBS cautioned against rejecting the proposal out of hand even though it appeared 
phony.  The New York Times agreed Shvernik’ response was a sham, but lauded the 
publishing of an American message to the Soviet public.  The Washington Post said the 
McMahon resolution had “paid off—with a dividend” because it gave the Soviets an 
opportunity to back up their peace rhetoric with action.  Even Senator Harry P. Cain, 
who had earlier demanded a declaration of war against Communist China, said the U.S. 
should be ready to come “more than half way” with the Soviets.  Criticizing Shvernik for 
waiting a month before following the “usual Communist propaganda line with 
monotonous regularity,” McMahon, nevertheless, was “delighted.”  He declared the 
friendship resolution was the “biggest hole blasted in the Iron Curtain since it was first 
established more than thirty years ago.”45 
The administration and key congressional figures butted heads concerning how 
or whether Truman should answer Shvernik.  The U.S. embassy in Moscow advocated a 
speedy reply from the president to keep the peace issue alive and the Soviets on the 
defensive.  However, when reporters asked the president about responding to the Soviets 
three weeks after the Shvernik letter, he said there was “no hurry.”  Although at one 
point the State Department considered asking the Soviets to broadcast a Truman speech 
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live (calling it a “gimmick”), it dropped the idea in early October.  Despite “working 
assiduously” on an answer to Shvernik, Acheson’s group concluded during a meeting 
with McMahon and Ribicoff that they had nothing meaningful to communicate, and that 
it would be better for HST not to respond at all than to reply “simply for the sake of 
replying.”  The legislators strongly disagreed.  McMahon pointed out that Winston 
Churchill, likely to be re-elected as prime minister of the U.K., was planning to convene 
a conference with Truman and Stalin.  Arguing that the U.S. “should not be in a position 
of following Churchill’s lead,” the senator advocated a forceful initiative for peace by 
the president.  McMahon noted that Soviet progress in producing atomic weaponry was 
another motivator to stop the war.  Saying he did not believe the American people 
“could be reconciled to another winter of indecision in Korea,” he claimed that political 
pressure could force the administration to use nuclear weapons.  This remark shocked 
everyone present, including Ribicoff.  Nevertheless, the senator reasoned that as long as 
international tension and defense build-ups continued, people would believe war was 
inevitable, causing them to lose confidence in administration foreign policy.  All of this, 
underscored McMahon, justified a continued push to end the war.  Ribicoff suggested 
that HST respond directly to Stalin.  After discussing the possibility of a major address 
on peace by Truman at an upcoming U.N. General Assembly gathering, the meeting 
concluded with nothing decided.  Acheson, rather than the president, addressed the U.N. 
General Assembly in December, and the dialogue on the friendship resolution withered 
away.46 
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 Ironically, Edwin Johnson’s peace proposal did more to drive the adversaries to 
the armistice table than the McMahon-Ribicoff resolution.  Johnson introduced his 
resolution alone, and it went into the record with no debate or fanfare.  It was a 
spontaneous act, reflecting the Colorado senator’s vacillating views of the war, which 
mirrored the ambivalence of many Americans grappling with how to stop Soviet 
expansionism in the dawning nuclear age.  In contrast, McMahon planned his initiative 
for months with an assist from the administration, garnering support from a number of 
colleagues and soliciting extensive U.S. media coverage.  The two senators had different 
aims.  The Connecticut senator targeted the Soviets, hoping to end not only the Korean 
War but the Cold War as well.  His resolution was more of a propaganda weapon than a 
specific proposal to halt the fighting.  Big Ed simply wanted to stop the shooting in 
Korea, using the psychological effect of the first anniversary of the war’s eruption to 
spur the armistice.  He directed his message to the U.S. adversaries on the battlefield, the 
Communist Chinese and North Koreans.  Johnson’s suggestion, seemingly made on a 
whim, restarted the move towards peace that MacArthur had scuttled in March 1951.  
While one historian correctly credited Jacob Malik’s June 23, 1951 radio address with 
getting the armistice talks started in July, the Johnson proposal triggered the dialogue 
with the Communists that culminated in the Russian’s broadcast.  McMahon-Ribicoff 
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began a war of words with the Soviets that may have cracked the Iron Curtain, but 
otherwise did nothing to help end the Korean War.47 
Senator Ralph Flanders proposed an innovative formula for peace in Korea at 
about the time the armistice talks began in July 1951.  Flanders, whom Secretary 
Acheson described as a “peppery little man from Vermont,” had spent the early months 
of the war marshalling spiritual resources for the U.N. cause.  Making a speech on the 
Senate floor titled, “Let’s Try God,” he had exhorted his colleagues to heed the 
command of Jesus Christ to “love thy neighbor as thyself” by applying it to the Russian 
people in a similar vein as McMahon’s peace resolution.  The Vermont senator argued 
that the U.S. had to adhere to the moral law of the universe as well as to physical laws to 
prevail in Korea.  Flanders thereupon persuaded twenty-six of his Senate colleagues to 
join him in submitting a petition urging President Truman to wage a “psychological and 
spiritual offensive against the Kremlin.”  The senator later wrote, “Military forces . . . 
can bring victory only.  Only moral forces can bring peace.”48 
Nevertheless, Flanders’ proposal to end the war went beyond moral exhortations.  
The Vermonter suggested a demilitarized zone (DMZ) fifty to one hundred miles wide 
along the Yalu River, which formed much of the boundary between North Korea and 
Communist China.  The U.N. would permanently supervise the DMZ. Flanders probably 
got the idea for this feature from a plan pushed briefly by the British and discussed 
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within the U.S. State Department during the lull between China’s initial entry and its 
second offensive in November 1950.  The senator’s plan recognized China’s sensitivity 
to its industrial complex along the Yalu and sought to ensure Communist concerns about 
the security of the key port cities of Rashin and Vladivostok.    He also proposed that the 
U.N. negotiate an agreement with the “Korean government” to rebuild North and South 
Korea within three years.49 
Flanders fleshed out his plan through the spring of 1952.  He specified that 
Asiatic U.N. member nations would supervise the DMZ to eliminate suspicions that 
America and its allies were seeking to “intrench [sic] themselves in the peninsula.”  
Later, the senator stipulated that no capitalistic nations could participate in supervising 
the DMZ, nor should any “white races,” reasoning that such restrictions would refute 
Communist accusations of U.S. imperialism in Korea.  Calling the entire peninsula an 
“abode of unimaginable misery,” Flanders justified his plan to rebuild Korea by pointing 
out that the U.N. had “practically ruined the people we set out to save.”  With his DMZ 
positioned at the Chinese border, the Vermonter was one of few in the government 
calling for “a Korean settlement of a Korean war.” Flanders therefore proposed U.N. 
elections to unite Korea under one government after the second year of the three-year 
rebuilding plan.  He believed that seeing the benefits of the reconstruction effort would 
win over skeptical North Koreans, persuading them to participate in reunification 
                                                 
49 Flanders plan explained in “Address by Senator Ralph E. Flanders-Vermont Press Association,” June 30, 1951, 
Flanders Papers, Box 140; June 30, 1951 Vt. Press Ass’n Bellows Falls Speech folder, SUL; Peter N. Farrar, 
“Britain’s Proposal for a Buffer Zone South of the Yalu in November 1950:  Was It a Neglected Opportunity to End 
the Fighting in Korea?” Journal of Contemporary History 18, no. 2 (April 1983): 331-4.  The British proposal made 
the major newspapers.  See “South Korean Bars North Buffer Strip,” NYT, 18 November 1950, p. 2 and “Guns—and 
Talks,” NYT, 26 November 1950, p. E1.   “Capital Cautious in Truce Comment,” NYT, 10 July 1951, p. 4. 
 
  
309
elections.  The senator then made some startling concessions.  While he doubted that 
elections would produce a Communist regime after two years of U.N. rebuilding efforts, 
such a result was not unthinkable.  Declaring he was certain that South Korea would 
have gone Communist if left to its own devices in early 1951, Flanders suggested that 
even though reunification elections could elect a Marxist regime, the U.S. “must run that 
risk.”50 
The Vermont senator’s proposal attracted little media attention at the time and 
only lip service from the Truman administration.  Flanders obtained an audience with 
Secretary of State Acheson and others in the State Department in December 1951.  
Acheson’s notes on the meeting indicated he merely thanked the senator for his views 
and told him the proposal was “interesting.”  Although the secretary had proposed a 
buffer zone ten miles wide on each side of the Yalu in November 1950, he had 
apparently discarded the idea.  Flanders recalled that when he brought his idea to 
Truman and Acheson, they simply replied that the “Russians don’t understand anything 
but military force.”51 
Flanders finally attracted public attention to his plan by the 1952 presidential 
election.  Pitching his plan in Ottawa, Canada, to the Commonwealth Parliamentary 
Association, he suggested that since China entered the war to protect its interests in 
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Manchuria, his buffer zone plan would work.  Flanders blasted the effects of the U.N. 
armistice objectives on the North Korean people, declaring, “To destroy them endlessly 
without giving them acceptable peace terms is to plumb the depths of human iniquity.”  
Pointing to America’s war costs at six billion dollars annually, Flanders argued he would 
rather spend the money for construction than destruction.  At least one portion of his 
speech proved prophetic.  The senator asserted that the ongoing negotiations would not 
guarantee peace.  Instead, he predicted, “Two hostile armed forces will continue to face 
each other for an indefinite period.”52    
Senator Flanders was the only member of Congress to put forth a peace plan for 
Korea after the armistice talks began.  It had some strong points.  The senator’s proposal 
attempted to mitigate the effects of the war on the Korean people and the U.N. threat to 
Manchuria in the eyes of the Chinese.  Applying the Marshall Plan formula, and he was 
banking on a similarly successful program in Korea.  By his willingness to accept a 
Communist regime after reunification elections, Flanders recognized the fallacy of the 
domino theory.  All of East Asia would not inevitably fall into the Soviet sphere if Korea 
went communist.  Yet, in other respects, the senator’ plan was unrealistic.  As one 
historian pointed out, his scheme did not address the POW repatriation issue, which 
became the main roadblock to peace.  Moreover, China perceived the U.N. as its enemy, 
and would never have trusted it to maintain a DMZ on the Korea/China border.  The 
U.N., after all, had declared China the aggressor in the war after bombing bridges over 
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the Yalu.  Flanders also underestimated the determination of both Syngman Rhee and 
Kim Il-Sung to unite Korea under their individual rule.  A reconstructed Korea would 
not have softened either man’s desire to govern the peninsula.  Finally, by mid-1951, 
Chinese Communists had decided to consider an armistice only at the 38th parallel.  They 
stubbornly and successfully rejected an initial U.N. attempt to divide the peninsula in 
areas slightly north of that parallel.  Acheson later faulted himself for not seeing that the 
his adversaries viewed settling the war at any location other than the 38th parallel as a 
loss of face.  Unlike Flanders, the Communists would not have been willing to risk 
losing Korea to the other side in reunification elections, giving the senator’s plan little 
hope for success.53   
How did these congressional peace initiatives surface during the heyday of 
McCarthyism?  In the summer of 1950, a Brooklyn judge gave five people six months to 
a year in jail for painting “peace” on a sidewalk and monument pillars in a local park.  
Asserting that he was not calling the perpetrators Communists by name, the magistrate 
remarked, “When you see a duck that has the characteristics of a duck and associates 
with ducks, then it is reasonable to assume it is a duck.”    A Hollywood studio shelved 
plans for making a movie about Hiawatha; since the Henry Wadsworth Longfellow 
character smoked the peace pipe to end intertribal warfare, the studio feared the movie 
could be perceived as “Communist peace propaganda.”54 
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Neverthetless, the McCarthyites did not go after the peace proposals from 
Congress.  The McMahon-Ribicoff universal brotherhood theme bore little resemblance 
to appeasement of communism.  Friendship for the Russian people did not equate to 
sympathy for Stalin’s regime.  The lack of flamboyance of the other proposals made 
McCarthyite attacks unattractive.  Johnson’s resolution received no attention from the 
U.S. media until the Communist news agencies began publicizing it.  Similarly, the 
national media did not pick up on Flanders’ DMZ idea until his 1952 speech in Canada.  
Neither plan dominated the headlines, and, as Joseph McCarthy once told a reporter, 
“My only forum is page one.”55 
More importantly, by 1951 the political atmosphere had changed considerably.  
Although conservatives initially backed Truman’s intervention as an overdue stand 
against communism, they reversed field when the war ground to a stalemate and 
American casualties mounted.  They wondered:  If stopping communism in Korea was 
so important, why had the U.S. not done the same in China?  The McCarthyites also 
played upon the public confusion about limited war as a national policy.  Thus, by the 
spring of 1951, many hard-line anti-communists were criticizing the war.  Days before 
Johnson entered his resolution, McCarthy advocated gradually replacing U.S. troops 
with Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalists in order to “let our Chinese friends fight our 
Chinese enemies.”  Soon, he had declared the war a U.S. defeat, calling it, the “planned 
betrayal of 1951.”  Other Republicans, such as Senator Irving Ives (NY) and Rep. Walter 
Judd (MN) attacked the armistice talks as they got under way, saying the Communists 
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had outwitted the U.S. and its allies from the outset of the discussions.  In such an 
atmosphere, McCarthy and others could not very well criticize proposals from Congress 
to end the war.  They, like everyone else, were searching for a way out of Korea.56 
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CHAPTER IX 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Congressional attempts to influence American foreign policy sometimes 
bordered on the bizarre.  In April 1952, Gordon Diesing, president and general counsel 
of a Catholic anti-communist organization, told House Majority Leader John 
McCormack about a sixteen-year old Irish Catholic girl who had received visions from 
God concerning world events.  Her visions sometimes included stigmata wounds 
(similar to Christ’s on the cross), and Diesing claimed she had correctly predicted the 
outbreak of the Korean War.  Most recently, the Virgin Mary had told the child that the 
USSR would attack Europe and the U.S. in 1952.  McCormack was so impressed that he 
arranged for Diesing to see a several top officials in the FBI, the military and the State 
Department, including Dean Acheson.  The attorney asked Acheson to appoint him as 
the secretary’s special assistant.  In this role, Diesing envisioned a secret mission to 
show film footage of the girl to British Prime Minister Winston Churchill.  Although 
Acheson turned Diesing down, McCormack followed up by lobbying for increased 
defense spending on the House floor.  The majority leader insisted that the Soviets’ 
“next surprise attack will probably be right in [the] continental United States,” adding, 
“this very year . . .is the crucial period.”  Within a couple of days, McCormack asked 
President Truman to see the attorney and his tape of the girl’s testimony.  Truman 
politely begged off, adding, “I hope very much the prophecy . . . will not come to pass.”1 
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  HST had more significant challenges in dealing with his own party during the 
war, some of which he brought upon himself.  A major obstacle was the Dixiecrat bloc.  
Emboldened by the defeats of key Democratic allies of the president in the 1950 
congressional elections, Southerners wasted no time reestablishing their control over his 
agenda by reasserting the power of the House Rules Committee.  They openly opposed 
the administration by joining Republican cries for Acheson’s head when China entered 
the war and escalated their complaints following MacArthur’s removal.  While 
Truman’s refusal to dump the secretary was an admirable act of personal loyalty, it 
strained party unity.  Nevertheless, HST’s decision not to punish the Dixiecrats for 
bolting in 1948 paid off during the MacArthur hearings when Senator Russell’s 
masterful leadership quelled the firestorm over the general.  The president alienated his 
party in other ways, waiting until late in his term to commit adequate resources to 
congressional relations and, more importantly, through his slow response to corruption 
within his administration.  Although many Dixiecrats abandoned Truman’s appointed 
standard-bearer, Adlai Stevenson, in 1952, civil rights and McCarthyism were not the 
main reasons.  Southern disenchantment with the Trumanites stemmed from the Korean 
War and corruption in government.  Ironically, the incumbent’s successful hardball 
tactics against Dwight Eisenhower late in the campaign motivated the GOP to emphasize 
Korea as an election issue, helping them dethrone the Democrats. 
The Korean War marked the end of a brief period of bipartisanship in foreign 
policy that began during World War II.  Cooperation between the parties disintegrated 
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due to a combination of divergent philosophies regarding nonpartisanship, the 
personalities of the players involved and honest differences of opinion over international 
issues.  Truman and Acheson had very different definitions of a bipartisan foreign policy 
compared to that of the Republicans.  HST believed bipartisanship simply meant 
communicating his intentions to GOP leaders on Capitol Hill before publicizing his 
policies to the nation.  To him, nonpartisanship meant that he should take the 
Republicans into his confidence, and they, in return, should trust his judgment and 
refrain from publicly criticizing his policies.  The GOP believed they should be 
consulted, not just informed.  Truman’s relationships with senators Vandenberg and Taft 
demonstrate how personalities affected his interfacing with the opposition.  Vandenberg 
was the only Republican the president went to for advice, respecting his knowledge of 
international affairs.  HST president never would (or should) have trusted Taft, who was 
bent on opposing the administration and unapologetically used the Korean War to do so.  
Another example of how personalities affected bipartisanship was Millard Tydings’ 
conduct of the hearings on Joseph McCarthy’s accusations of communist spies in the 
State Department.  Tydings’ transparent partisanship, inflamed by his arrogance, drove a 
wedge between the parties shortly after the war’s outset.  Most importantly, a significant 
GOP faction, the China Lobby, wanted the U.S. to treat the Far East with the same 
priority as Europe in opposing Communist expansion during the early Cold War.  This 
made bipartisan agreement on East Asia policy much more difficult than on European 
issues, where Truman enjoyed broad support for NATO and the Marshall Plan.  Once 
the Communists prevailed in China, the administration had little hope of maintaining a 
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nonpartisan foreign policy.  “Why stay in Korea?” wondered the Republicans as the war 
plunged into stalemate, much as many Americans in the 1960s asked about Vietnam and 
today ask about Iraq. 
The commander in chief’s dealings with General MacArthur had immediate and 
long-term effects upon bipartisanship.  When the war erupted, one of Truman’s few 
Republican advisors, John Foster Dulles, recommended replacing the general.  The 
president, however, demurred, citing the need to keep peace with the Republicans.  In 
retrospect, HST should have heeded Dulles’s advice because the backlash over the firing 
would have been less intense than in April 1951.   
The MacArthur hearings a few months later raised discussion of a more lasting 
issue in American politics, the concept of executive privilege.  While the Dwight 
Eisenhower administration was the first to coin the term “executive privilege,” the 
concept was much older.  George Washington initiated the idea that Congress was not 
necessarily privy to everything that went on in the executive branch, including foreign 
policy.  When the legislature requested records of diplomatic correspondence with 
France in 1794, Washington responded that he would comply, with the exception of 
those details that he judged, “for public considerations, ought not to be communicated.”  
Congress did not challenge this, establishing the precedent that the chief executive could 
withhold information from the legislature if he deemed it in the public interest to 
maintain secrecy.  Virtually every president since has followed suit.  During the 
MacArthur hearings, General Omar Bradley refused to divulge the details of a 
conversation with Truman, arguing that the discussion was confidential.  A large 
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majority of the Senate joint committee agreed.  HST refused to allow subordinates to 
testify to Congress or provide other information on several other occasions, most notably 
when he declined to release files on government employees associated with his Loyalty 
Security Program.2 
Eisenhower took the notion of executive privilege to a new level, invoking the 
idea over forty times.  After a decade of losing battles to obtain information from the Ike 
era, a Democratic Congress fought back by passing the Freedom of Information Act in 
1966, which required the government to give the fullest disclosure of information 
possible when requested.  Richard Nixon’s presidency represented another step-change 
in the concept with his attempt to use executive privilege to withhold information 
incriminating him in the Watergate scandal.  Most recently, the George W. Bush 
administration has used the concept to deny Congress the names of advisors on energy 
policy (a legitimate use) and to give former presidents the power to determine when 
records of their administrations may be released (a disturbing use).  Putting Bush’s 
approach in historical perspective, political scientist Mark Rozell observed, “What feels 
different this time is how both sides are really digging in hard.”3 
President Truman firmly believed in executive privilege, maintaining the status 
quo in its contribution to the power of the presidency.  When he asserted the right to 
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preserve confidentiality, the public and Congress accepted it because he limited its 
application to private conversations with subordinates and to protecting the reputations 
of government employees from the excesses of McCarthyism.  The following anecdote 
illustrates the integrity of HST’s staff in maintaining confidentiality in the midst of his 
struggles to maintain a bipartisan foreign policy.  Following Truman’s December 1950 
meeting with a bipartisan group of congressmen to discuss the declaration of a national 
emergency, a White House usher brought presidential aide Charles Murphy a memo 
found under the meeting table that apparently had been dropped accidentally.  In this 
note, the Senate Minority Policy committee advised GOP attendees Robert Taft and 
Kenneth Wherry that if the president asked for a pledge of bipartisan support for his 
continuing conduct of the war, they should resist “at all costs.”  The reason:  The war 
could turn bad by the Easter recess, and Republicans “might wish to accuse Truman of 
treason and should be free to do so.”  Murphy’s lieutenants “fell upon it with whoops of 
joy,” crying, “get it copied . . . show it to the President . . . leak it to the press.”  Murphy, 
however, simply smiled, took the memorandum, placed it in a sealed envelope and had it 
hand-delivered to Senator Taft.  In the Harry S Truman administration, the maxim, 
“What’s said in the White House stays in the White House,” applied even to his bitterest 
enemies.4 
Truman’s efforts to sell the war to the public were successful, but not flawless.  
Initially, the anti-communist fervor of the day squelched popular dissent.  One example 
was Editor John W. Powell of the China Monthly Review, who received a $130,000 fine 
                                                 
4Richard E. Neustadt, “The Constraining of the President:  the Presidency after Watergate,” British Journal of 
Political Science 4, no. 4 (October 1974):  383. 
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and 260 years in prison for criticizing the U.S. intervention in Korea.  Even though 
Truman’s popularity suffered as the conflict dragged on, he sold his policies well enough 
to manage the war as he saw fit.  However, the commander in chief damaged his cause 
by waiting too long to communicate directly to the American people about the conflict at 
the outset and following the Chinese intervention.  Most damaging were the American 
people’s inability to grasp the concept of limited war and the administration’s varying 
objectives for the war.5 
President George H.W. Bush remembered this in 1991 as he sent American 
troops and their allies to defend Kuwait from invasion by Iraq.  At the time, Bush 
weathered heavy criticism for not pursuing the retreating Iraqis into their country and 
toppling the invaders’ regime.  Bush, like Truman, presided over a coalition of military 
forces that went into battle with a limited objective:  The restoration of a country 
invaded by another.  However, Bush resisted the popular feelings of the day and did not 
allow the euphoria of victory to deter him from the initial purpose of the war.  He clearly 
learned a lesson from his Missourian predecessor’s misstep in 1950, reminding an 
audience, “Whether in Korea or in Lebanon, history shows us the danger of losing sight 
of our objectives.”6 
                                                 
5 Douglas Miller and Marion Nowak, The Fifties:  The Way We Really Were (Garden City, NY:  Doubleday and 
Company, 1977), 37-8. 
 
6 George H. W. Bush, “Remarks to the American Legion National Convention in Chicago, Illinois,” August 25, 1992,  
1992 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Vol. II,  p. 1422 http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/multidb.cgi?WAIStemplate=multidb_results.html&WAISqueryRule=%24WAISqueryString&WAISdbName=199
2_public_papers+1992+Public+Papers+of+the+Presidents+of+the+United+States%2C+Books+I+and+II&WAISquer
yString=%22korea%22+and+%22iraq%22&Submit.=Submit&WAISmaxHits=50&WrapperTemplate=pubpapers_wra
pper.html (December 14, 2007). 
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  A number of historians have criticized President Truman for committing troops 
to Korea without congressional approval.  Few, however, have thoroughly examined 
Congress’s acquiescence in allowing this to happen.  Though Korea was the first U.S. 
military venture in conjunction with the U.N., the legislators buried their heads in the 
sand when the president argued that a U.N. resolution gave him the authority to commit 
American troops to battle.  A large majority of senators and representatives were in 
office during the debates over the UNPA only five years earlier, and therefore knew that 
Congress had never intended to give up its constitutional mandate to approve American 
troops going into battle.  Senator Taft of the opposition Republicans was the only one to 
bring this up at the time, while a couple of his GOP colleagues raised the issue only after 
the war turned sour.  Yet, the Democrats deserve the most blame for congressional 
reticence for they, unlike the Republicans, had the ear of the president.  With better 
advice from the Democratic leadership in the Senate, HST almost certainly would have 
obtained congressional approval—if the legislators had delayed their Fourth of July 
recess.7 
Korea was the first of two crises in which Congress failed to properly exert its 
authority to approve national decisions to go to war.  In 1964, President Lyndon 
Johnson, a senator during the Korean conflict, determined not to repeat Truman’s error 
and forged passage of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.  Responding to a North 
                                                 
7 For additional critics of Truman in addition to those in chapter 6, note 52, see Francis D. Wormuth and Edwin B. 
Firmage, To Chain the Dog of War:  The War Power of Congress in History and Law (Urbana:  University of Illinois 
Press, 1986), 28-9 and Hess, 225; For an opposing view see Thomas M. Franck and Faiza Patel, “UN Police Action in 
Lieu of War:  ‘The Old Order Changeth’,” The American Journal of International Law 85, no. 1 (January 1991):  70-
71.  
 
  
 
322
Vietnamese gunboat attack on an American ship, Johnson secured a congressional 
mandate to “repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent 
further aggression.”  Moreover, Congress authorized the president to used armed force to 
“assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty” 
requesting assistance.  This gave Johnson the legal footing to expand the defense of a 
U.S. gunboat into a war sending over a half-million troops overseas.  Congress 
responded to the folly of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution with the War Powers Resolution 
(WPR) of 1973, which was somewhat of an improvement.  While the WPR forces 
presidents to obtain congressional approval to maintain U.S. troops in extended combat, 
it allows the chief executive to dispatch the military into harm’s way for ninety days 
before seeking a validation from Congress. However, it is quite unlikely that Congress 
would remove troops from an incomplete military operation after three months, even if it 
disagreed with the decision to send them into battle in the first place.   
The legislative branch indicated signs of reasserting itself in 1991 when it forced 
the George H. W. Bush administration to fight a tough political battle for approval to 
send U.S. forces to drive Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi troops from Kuwait, producing close 
votes of 250-183 in the House and 52-47 in the Senate.  When Bush’s son, George W., 
set about to oust Hussein in 2002, he took care to solicit a congressional resolution 
approving his action several months in advance.  Time will tell if Capitol Hill will force 
the executive branch to end a war, as it did in Vietnam.8 
                                                 
8 Johnson and the Tonkin Resolution in Lofgren, “Mr. Truman’s War,” 239; “Joint Resolution of Congress H.J. Res 
1145,” August 7, 1964, The Avalon Project at Yale Law School, <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/tonkin-
g.htm#joint> (December 14, 2007); War Powers Resolution in Wormuth and Firmage, 215-6; Kuwait vote in Hess, 
194-5. 
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The Korean War demonstrated that Congress could be a positive force for peace.  
Senator Flanders’ plan for a DMZ near the Yalu River had some good features that could 
have been helpful had he pushed it before China attacked U.N. forces.  The McMahon-
Ribicoff resolution began a propaganda war with the Soviets that nevertheless opened a 
small crack in the Iron Curtain.  McMahon pushed HST to pursue talks with Stalin, 
albeit unsuccessfully. Surprisingly, Edwin Johnson’s solitary peace resolution caught the 
attention of the Communist press, starting the momentum leading to the beginning of the 
Kaesong peace talks.  Yet, war would continue for two more painful years.  As someone 
in the Truman White House wrote, “Korea is one place where we have had to learn 
hard.”9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9Author unknown, “Some Notes on Republican Campaign Statements Regarding Korea,” n.d.; White House file, 
Eisenhower-Korea troops folder; David Lloyd Papers, HSTL. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
UNITED NATIONS CHARTER (EXCERPTS) 
 
Article 39 
 
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of 
the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what 
measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore 
international peace and security.  
 
Article 40 
 
In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before 
making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, 
call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems 
necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the 
rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take 
account of failure to comply with such provisional measures.   
 
Article 41 
 
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force 
are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of 
the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial 
interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and 
other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations. 
 
Article 42 
 
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be 
inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land 
forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such 
action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land 
forces of Members of the United Nations. 
 
Article 43 
 
1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of 
international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security 
Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, 
armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the 
purpose of maintaining international peace and security. 
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Article 43 (ctd) 
 
2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, 
their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and 
assistance to be provided. 
 
3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the 
initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security 
Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and 
shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their 
respective constitutional processes. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
UNITED NATIONS PARTICIPATION ACT OF 1945 
 
Section 6 
 
The President is authorized to negotiate a special agreement or agreements with the 
Security Council which shall be subject to the approval of the Congress by appropriate 
Act or joint resolution providing for the numbers and types of armed forces, their degree 
of readiness and general location, and the nature of facilities and assistance, including 
rights of passage, to be made available to the Security Council on its call for the purpose 
of maintaining international peace and security in accordance with article 43 of said 
Charter. The President shall not be deemed to require the authorization of the Congress 
to make available to the Security Council on its call in order to take action under article 
42 of said Charter and pursuant to such special agreement or agreements the armed 
forces, facilities, or assistance provided for therein: Provided, That nothing herein 
contained shall be construed as an authorization to tile President by the Congress to 
make available to the Security Council for such purpose armed forces, facilities, or 
assistance in addition to the forces, facilities, and assistance provided for in such special 
agreement or agreements. 
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